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Church over Nation:   
Christian Missionaries and Korean Christians in Colonial Korea 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the interrelationships between the foreign Missions and the 
Korean Church in colonial Korea. In contrast to previous scholarship that assumes a 
necessary link between the Korean Church and Korean nationalism, this study focuses on 
the foreign Mission’s predominance over the Korean Church as a major obstacle in the 
Korean Church’s adoption of nationalism as part of its Christian vision.   
 
The foreign Missions established controlling power over the Korean Christians by relying 
on colonial privileges such as extraterritoriality and financial wealth, and perpetuated their 
power over local Christians through Church and mission schools. By insisting on the 
separation of Church from politics as an ecclesiastical principle, the Missions prevented  
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Korean Christians from engaging in nationalist politics. Therefore, Korean Christian 
nationalists who joined the Korean Church with the intent of making the Church a 
nationalist center were constantly checked by the mission-dominated Church authority and 
forced to leave the Church to pursue their nationalist aims, while the majority of Korean 
Christians stayed in the Church, remaining loyal to the ecclesiastical order. The increasing 
frustration of nationalist Christians eventually exploded in the 1919 March First Movement, 
the greatest nationalist uprising of Korea’s colonial period. Many Christians participated in 
the political demonstrations of March First in protest not only to Japanese colonial rule but 
also against the ecclesiastical principle that prohibited Christian engagement in secular 
politics.   
 
By highlighting the constant struggle that existed between the Protestant Church and 
Korean nationalism, this study argues that being a loyal Church member and being a 
Korean nationalist were incompatible roles in the mission-dominated Korean Church where 
the Church held primacy over the nation.   
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Introduction 
 
Easter Sunday in 1885 is commonly regarded as the first page of Protestant Christian 
history in Korea. On that day, the first Protestant missionaries to Korea, the Americans 
Horace G. Underwood (1859-1916) and Henry G. Appenzeller (1858-1902), landed in 
Korea. To commemorate this historic event, the Korean Church held various events and 
ceremonies celebrating the year 1984 as the “100th Anniversary of Korean Christianity.”
1 
The climax of these ceremonial events was a huge mass service held in Yoŭido Park in 
Seoul where reportedly more than 200,000 people attended. Interestingly, this event was 
held on August 15, the Liberation Day celebrating Korean emancipation from Japanese 
colonial rule in 1945. The intention behind this scheduling decision was clear: to 
synchronize Korean Christian history with a national history that places the struggle against 
Japanese colonialism at its center. In fact, Christian struggles under Japanese rule were 
frequently mentioned in the sermons and prayers of this day and were praised as the most 
valuable service that the Korean Church has rendered to the Korean nation (minjok). 
                                                   
1 For instance, On April 22, there was a symposium to discuss the Christian contribution to 
the national history; Han Kyŏng-jik was invited to visit President Chun Doohwan to brief on 
the ceremony. Hanʾguk kidokkyo 100-chunyŏn kinyŏm saŏp hyŏbŭihoe, Hanʾguk kidokkyo 
100-chunyŏn kinyŏm saŏp ch'ongnam (Sŏul: Poisŭsa 1987), 39.  
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At the same time, the ceremony highlighted the contributions by foreign 
missionaries as they walked alongside Korean Christians in serving the Korean nationalist 
cause. Han Kyŏng-jik (1902-2000), representing the Korean Church, said in his opening 
remarks: “We thank God for loving this nation and sowing the gospel seed here a century 
ago. We also thank the American Presbyterian and Methodist missionaries, and other 
missionaries from different organizations for their service to us, the Korean Church and the 
Korean nation.”
2   
As this ceremony clearly shows, there has long been a popular understanding in 
South Korea that the Korean Church was from its genesis to the present a leading 
nationalist institution which the foreign Missions served as its guardians. Loyalty to the 
nation has been widely accepted as a Christian virtue and thus it has been widely believed 
that Koreans and missionaries stood shoulder-to-shoulder against the enemy of the nation, 
Japanese colonialism, not only because of their common support for Korean nationalism 
but also because they were Christians. Simply put, historians of Korean Christianity have 
been loath to recognize any tension between Christianity and the tasks of modern 
nationalism.   
                                                   
2 Ibid., 45.  
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The centrality of the nation is a common feature of any nationalist discourse, but the 
Korean case is unique in that a nationalist perspective prevails in the field of Christian 
history. This stands in contrast to the usual historical pattern which finds Christians faced 
with the dilemma of being a loyal servant of a transcendental God and a loyal national 
subject. In European history, roughly speaking, Protestants solved this dilemma by 
nationalizing the Church, while Catholics rejected nationalism and maintained their 
commitment to a Universal Church irrespective of national boundaries. In Asia, however, 
where Christianity was a foreign religion, the Protestant solution of Church nationalization 
was difficult to apply. In Korea, as in Japan and China, Christianity was introduced by the 
western Missions and often collided with local nationalism due to its foreign origin, 
transnational character or association with western imperialism. Christian converts were 
thus often identified as anti-nationalists and remained a social minority.   
  Previous studies have emphasized that Korea’s atypical experience of being 
colonized by non-Christian Japan instead of the Christian West made Korea different from 
other Asian nations because it prevented Christianity and the Missions from being  
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identified with colonial aggression.
3  Instead, Christianity in Korea retained its positive 
image as a religion of the advanced, powerful, and friendly West and thus did not conflict 
with the rise of Korean nationalism, which was primarily directed against Japanese 
colonialism. Moreover, Japan’s continuous suppression of Christianity further strengthened 
the bond between anti-Japanese nationalism and Christian faith, making the Korean Church 
a breeding ground for Korean nationalism. Simply put, a consensus exists in the current 
historiography that all potential causes of conflict between Christianity and the Korean 
nation were largely cancelled out by the presence of Japanese colonialism. 
  It is true that there was continuous conflict between the Japanese colonial regime 
and the Korean Church, and there were Christian nationalists who participated in 
anti-colonial activities such as the March First Movement in 1919. However, Christianity 
began to take root in Korea during the Chosŏn period (1492-1910) in the form of 
Catholicism in the late eighteenth century and Protestantism in the late nineteenth century, 
prior to the rise of Korean nationalism and long before the Japanese colonial period 
(1910-1945). Therefore, the Korean encounter with Christianity, especially in its early 
stages, was not necessarily influenced by Japanese colonialism and thus Korea did not 
                                                   
3 Min Kyŏng-bae, Han'guk kidok kyohoesa (sin kaejŏn p'an) (Sŏul Yŏnse Taehakkyo 
Ch'ulp'anbu, 1993), 20-21.  
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enjoy any particular advantage with respect to other Asian countries in resolving the tension 
between Christianity and nationalism. Rather, Koreans shared the same difficulty as other 
Asian nations in adopting Christianity and the Missions as foreign intruders, while Korean 
Christians shared the experience of being torn apart between Christianity and nationalism, 
as these two forces continued to grow under Japanese colonial rule.   
Seen in this way, what made the experience of Korean Christians unique was not 
that they were colonized by non-Christian Japan but that they had been placed under two 
foreign masters, Christian missionaries and Japanese colonizers, both of whom tried to 
inculcate new ideas and values in Korea. Though their ideologies and methods of 
propagation were different, both missionaries and Japanese tried to create new identities for 
Koreans, and Korean Christians had to configure their own identity, living among and 
having frequent intercourses with both foreign masters.   
 
  This dissertation aims to explicate how this unique experience of being placed 
under missionary and colonial rule affected the formation of ideological dynamics within 
the Korean Church with special attention given to its relation to Korean nationalism, and 
also how it affected the actual Christian involvement in the nationalist movement. While  
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previous studies have narrated Korean Christian history as a smooth linear development 
toward the formation of a nationalist Korean Church, this study focuses on the complex of 
microform dynamics and tensions that existed between Korean Christianity and nationalist 
ideology and that, when viewed through a nationalist framework, have either been not fully 
comprehended or completely overlooked. Specifically, it sheds light on the foreign 
Mission’s influence in shaping the Korean Christian relationship to nationalism and shows 
that missionary dominance kept Korean Christians from being nationalized. Furthermore, it 
illustrates how some Korean Christians, who were gradually turned towards nationalism 
through their encounter with Japanese colonialism, had to struggle in keeping their balance 
between loyalty to the mission-dominated Church and loyalty to the nation. Ultimately, it 
shows that Christian nationalists could not sustain that balance. While some Korean 
Christians left the Church and often rebelled against the missionaries by participating in the 
nationalist movement, the majority of Korean Christians stayed in the Church as loyalists to 
the ecclesiastical order. In so doing, this study provides an alternative account of the 
genesis and evolution of Korean Christianity as a history of constant conflicts between 
Church and nation and argues that Christianity and nationalism were never identified with  
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one another within the mission-dominated Church but only by Korean Christians outside 
the Church.   
 
In this dissertation, discussion of these issues proceeds in the following order. In the 
first chapter, I briefly summarize the history of the Catholic Church in Korea, which 
preceded the introduction of Protestantism in the late nineteenth century. The purpose of 
incorporating Catholic history into this study is that the social image and status of 
Catholicism that had already been established in Korea affected how Koreans later 
understood Protestantism. Of particular importance here is that the Catholic Mission had 
long propagated Christian faith in Korea against the legal proscription of the Chosŏn 
dynastic government, often taking advantage of French imperial power. For these reasons, 
the Chosŏn state labeled Catholicism a treacherous foreign cult and persecuted by, while 
Catholics subscribed to it as a transnational form of faith and as a religion of a foreign 
power whose authority superseded that of their own state.   
The second chapter shows that the tactical strategies of the Catholic Mission 
discussed in Chapter 1 were largely inherited by the American Protestant Missions and thus 
Koreans adopted Protestantism as a transnational religion sponsored by the superior power  
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of the United States. It pays special attention to the extraterritorial rights of American 
missionaries and how such privileges helped them to establish their authority among 
Koreans, attracting many locals seeking an escape from the oppressive government of the 
Chosŏn dynasty. In so doing, it stresses the significance of the specific local context that led 
the early Protestant Church in Korea, like its Catholic counterpart, to draw the majority of 
its converts from the oppressed class and allowed the missionary to rule over them as their 
legal guardian.   
  The third chapter discusses how hierarchical power relations between missionaries 
and Korean converts were institutionalized in the Korean Church. It details the various 
missionary prerogatives in the Korean Church and reveals how they managed to keep 
Korean converts in subordinate positions, while maintaining their claim to control the 
Church. An in-depth examination of the internal structure of the Church will help us to 
understand that the Korean Church was only nominally independent of the Mission and that 
Korean Christian agency was largely suppressed in the ecclesiastical sphere.   
  The fourth chapter looks into the management of the mission school. As was true 
of the Korean Church, mission schools were also kept under missionary control for many 
years. Moreover, mission education was predominantly religious in character due to the  
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mission policy of making schools more evangelical than educational. Hence, Korean 
Christians were not given many opportunities to learn broader general subjects and advance 
in western scholarship. As a result, the educational standards of Korean Christians remained 
as low as that of average non-Christians and few modern intellectuals capable of leading 
the nation were born out of the mission schools. By detailing how the Missions controlled 
the intellectual standards and orientation of Korean Christians, this chapter prepares the 
context for later chapters that examine how Korean Christian students engaged in strikes to 
demonstrate their frustration against mission school policy.   
  The fifth chapter discusses the issue of national politics in the Korean Church. 
First, it portrays how the Mission defined and controlled the relationship of Korean 
Christians to politics and shows that it basically kept the Korean Church as aloof from 
secular politics by adopting the “separation of Church from politics” as its ecclesiastical 
principle. It also shows that this policy was sustained even as Korea came under Japanese 
rule, so that the Korean Church was not responsive to the call of nationalism promoted by 
patriotic Koreans outside the Church and was at times criticized as anti-national.   
  The sixth chapter treats several cases of Korean Christian challenges toward 
missionary authority. Frustrated by their secondary status in church and school, some  
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Korean Christian leaders began to oppose the foreign missions from the 1890s onward and, 
in some cases, split the church to build an independent church outside missionary 
jurisdiction. By analyzing the causes of conflict between the missionaries and the Korean 
Christians, this chapter argues that nationalistic sentiments among Korean Christians were 
fermented primarily through conflict with western missionaries rather than with the 
Japanese colonial regime. To prove this point, it shows that some anti-missionary Christians 
actually sought an alliance with the Japanese as a means of freeing themselves from 
missionary control. In so doing, it highlights the peculiar position of Korean Christian 
leaders who had to rely on Japanese colonial power to counter the religious colonialism that 
western missionaries imposed on Korean Christianity.   
  The seventh chapter deals with similar instances of resistance to missionary 
authority by Korean students and intellectuals in missionary schools and also in public 
media. These Koreans perceived the missionary’s intellectual domination over Korean 
Christians as a major obstacle toward achieving enlightenment and civilization, which they 
perceived as a necessary step in Korean efforts toward self-strengthening and future 
national independence. A close look at the frustrations of Korean intellectuals about the 
missionary presence in Korea will also help us understand why they perceived Japanese  
11 
 
educational policy, especially its advanced school system, as more beneficial to Koreans 
than the mission schools.   
  The last chapter provides an alternative account of the 1919 March First 
Movement, often regarded as a manifestation of Korean Christian nationalism. Based on 
the findings of the previous chapters, it argues that Christian participation in the movement 
was limited not only in scale but also in terms of its regional base. This chapter shows that 
the Christian leaders who played a leading role in the movement were actually dissenters 
who had been dissatisfied with the Church’s apolitical attitude and its subordinate status to 
the foreign Mission. It also shows that Christian leaders who were loyal to the ecclesiastical 
order were quite reluctant to participate in such political activism and that the majority of 
Korean Christians followed their church leadership, while a minority in the northern region 
played a disproportionately large role in the movement. This chapter argues that the 
conventional understanding of the Christian role in the Movement has been exaggerated 
and that the Korean Church played a much smaller part than has been believed.   
  In its concluding chapter, this dissertation provides a brief summary of post-March 
First developments in the Korean Church and shows that the schism between the Korean 
Church and the nationalist camp widened after the Movement as missionary control of the  
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Church was reasserted and the Church became a bulwark of religious conservatism entirely 
disengaged from the secular world. Based upon these observations, this chapter reasserts 
the thesis of this study that the Korean Church had to contradict with Korean nationalism 
because it was not able to subvert the ascendency of foreign missionary authority and any 
political commitment to the nationalist cause was constantly checked and suppressed by the 
mission-dominated Church authority. In conclusion, it argues that being a loyal Christian to 
the ecclesiastical order and being a loyal Korean nationalist were incompatible identities 
under the mission-dominated Church in colonial Korea and that this circumstance led many 
Korean Christians to seek national salvation outside the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical 
institutions. 
   
Review of Historiography 
  The major thesis of this dissertation, that the relationship between the Korean 
Church and the nationalist movement in Korea was characterized by conflict, poses a bold 
challenge to the conventional scholarship on Korean Christianity. In particular, it takes 
issue with the works produced by a particular group of historians, who are commonly  
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referred to as the scholars of the “national Church (minjok kyohoe).” It is therefore 
important to briefly review here the existing historiography on Korean Christian history. 
 
Korean-language studies   
Writing Korean history within a nationalist framework has been the dominant 
practice among Korean historians in post-colonial South Korea until recently. This practice 
began to show a marked change with the publication of Haeban chŏnhusa ŭi chae insik 
[New understanding of pre- and post-Liberation Korean History (2006)], which revealed a 
more complex and often collaborative dynamics between colonial power and the 
development of Korean modernity/ modernization
. Nevertheless, nation-centered 
perspectives still remain dominant in historical narratives of the Korean church.
4  In fact, 
none of the articles in Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi chae insik deals with the question of 
Christianity, and the Korean Church history, based on the conventional nationalist 
framework, has been left largely untouched by the recent historiographical trend.   
Since Korean nationalism was suppressed under Japanese rule, writing Korean 
history from a nationalist perspective was an act of reviving a lost past and serving the 
                                                   
4 Pak Chi-hyang et al., eds., Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi chae insik (Sŏul: Ch’ek sesang,2006).  
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interests of nation-building in a post-colonial context, and this attitude was fully adopted by 
Christian historians and writers as well. As a result, the presence of the nation or minjok 
was taken as a given premise in the post-colonial Korean Christian historiography and 
Christian nationalist struggles against Japanese colonial aggression were often placed at the 
center of its narrative.   
However, this trend in the writing of Korean Christian history did not begin as 
soon as Korean became liberated from Japanese rule in 1945. While numerous writings on 
the Korean nationalist movement were published upon independence through the 1950s, 
there was actually a paucity of studies on Korean Christian history that stressed Christian 
contributions to national development during this same period. It is true that the Christian 
backgrounds of some prominent nationalist leaders such as An Ch’ang-ho and Yi Sŭng-hun 
were mentioned in their biographical sketches,
5  but no substantial study focusing on the 
nationalist aspect of the Korean Church was published through the 1950s.   
There were several reasons for this lacuna, but the primary reason was likely the 
internal division of the Korean Church over the issue of pro-Japanese collaboration. It was 
                                                   
5 Tosan Kinyŏm Saŏphoe, Tosan An Ch'ang-ho (Sŏul: T'aegŭk sŏgwan, 1947); Kim To-t'ae, 
Namgang Yi Sŭng-hun chŏn (Seoul: Munʾgyosa, 1950). In these biographies, their 
association with Christianity is mentioned but it is overshadowed by their nationalist zeal.  
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no secret that, during the last stage of the colonial period, many Korean Christian leaders 
collaborated with the Japanese war effort. As a result, some of the top church leaders were 
arrested and interrogated by the special investigation committee by the post-liberation 
government in South Korea.
6  Also, the majority of Korean Church leaders had surrendered 
to Japanese pressure to worship at Shinto shrines and their compromise came under harsh 
attack by the minority of non-conformist Church leaders who were released from Japanese 
imprisonment after national liberation. This serious internal strife over the collaboration 
issue continued to shake the Korean Church both from within and without, and eventually 
resulted in a series of church splits during the 1950s.
7  In short, the Korean Church was far 
from being sufficiently united to claim nationalist credentials for its colonial past and was 
barely qualified to present itself as a leading nationalist institution under the political 
climate of the time.       
                                                   
6 For instance, the Superintendent of the Korean Methodist Church, Chŏng Ch’un-su, and 
the Moderator of the Korean Presbyterian Church, Chŏn P’ilsun, were both arrested for the 
collaboration charge in 1946. Hanʾguk kidokkyo yŏksahakhoe, Hanʾguk kidokkyo ŭi yŏksa 3 
(Sŏul: Hanʾguk kidokkyo yŏksa yŏn'guso, 2009), 21. However, both were exempted from 
the prosecution for the insufficient evidence. Later, Chŏng was ousted from the Church, 
while Chŏn continued to preside over the Church as the Moderator. Consequently, today, 
only Chŏng is remembered as a notorious pro-Japanese. For the details of his pro-Japanese 
activities, see Ch’inil Inmnyŏng sajŏn (minjok munje yŏn’guso, 2009), s.v. “Chŏng 
Ch’unsu.”   
7 Min Kyŏng-bae, Han'guk kidok kyohoesa (sin kaejŏn p'an), 512-525.  
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The unfavorable political situation for the Church began to change in the 1960s 
after Park Chung-hee (1917-1979) established his new regime after the military coup in 
1961. Park made rapid economic growth the primary goal of his administration and 
mobilized the entire nation toward that purpose. Under his dictatorial leadership, national 
unity was promoted to achieve economic development and the idea of service to the nation 
was propagated in every corner of life, while voices of dissent that were seen as 
undermining national integrity were harshly suppressed.   
It was with this general rise of national consciousness in Korean society that Kim 
Yang-sŏn, a Presbyterian historian, published an article, The March First Movement and 
Christianity [Samil undong kwa kidok kyohoe], in 1969. He contributed this article to the 
collection of papers that was compiled by a popular newspaper, Tonga Ilbo, for the 
commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the March First Movement, the first national 
uprising against Japanese rule in 1919. In this article, Kim not only emphasized the 
Christian contribution to the historic national movement but generalized it as a consistent 
characteristic of Korean Christianity, going as far to say that “Korean nationalism was  
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fostered by Christianity.”
8  Considering that the Korean Church was divided over the issue 
of collaboration in the 1950s, Kim’s confidence was a good indication that the historical 
memory of the Korean Christian past was being revised with the rise of Korean nationalism. 
The Korean Church was now going on the offensive to claim its nationalist credentials and 
asserted that Christianity and Korean nationalism went along with each other and the 
March First Movement was reinterpreted as the manifestation of Korean Christian 
nationalism.   
Christian propaganda stressing its historical affinity with Korean nationalism 
gained significant momentum in the 1970s. In 1972, Min Kyŏng-bae, a church historian, 
published the first comprehensive History of the Korean Christian Church (Han’guk kidok 
kyohoe sa), in which he narrated Korean Church history as a story of consistent Christian 
service to the nation.
9  His nationalist perspective was clearly manifested in his use of a 
new term, minjok kyohoe, which he used to identify the fundamental character of the 
Korean Church that had been sustained throughout its history. Literally, minjok kyohoe is 
the combination of “nation” and “church” in the Korean language, but it means more than 
                                                   
8 Kim Yang Sŏn, "Samil undong kwa kidokkyohoe," in Samil undong 50-chunyŏn kinŏym 
nonjip, ed. Ko Chae-uk (Seoul: Tonga Ilbosa 1969), 235-270. 
9 Min Kyong-bae, Han'guk kidok kyohoesa (Sŏul: Taehan Kidokkyoso hoe, 1972).  
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what “national church” usually means in English. Since minjok specifically refers to the 
Koreans as a race or an ethnic group,
10  minjok kyohoe presents a highly exclusive image of 
the Church that consisted of ethnic Koreans and was solely concerned with Korean 
nationals. Hence, when Min argued that the Korean Church developed as minjok kyohoe, 
his implication was that the Korean Church was always a nationalist institution. This grand 
thesis was reasserted in several revised versions of Min’s work,
11  and the image of the 
Church as a nationalist institution was firmly established.   
  To be fair, Min does not simply glorify the Christian past. He admits that the 
Church made mistakes and had to face “disgraces” such as instances of wartime 
collaboration with the Japanese empire among its leadership. However, he does not dare to 
question the validity of his basic premise that the minjok was the fundamental and 
consistent concern of the Korean Church. Thus, his teleological understanding of Korean 
Christian history as a linear development toward the formation of the minjok kyohoe 
appears to be more a belief than an empirically tested argument.   
                                                   
10 For more detailed discussion about the ethno-based understanding of nation in Korea, see 
Gi-Wook Shin, Ethnic nationalism in Korea : genealogy, politics, and legacy, Studies of the 
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2006) 
11 Min Kyŏng-bae, Han'guk kidok kyohoesa (sin kaejŏn p'an). For the English translation, 
see Min Kyoung Bae, A History of Christian Churches in Korea (Seoul: Yonsei University 
Press, 2005).  
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Min’s minjok kyohoe concept left a profound impact on other historians, including 
but not limited to church historians, who were interested in the relationship of Korean 
Christianity to nationalism. While Min’s work focused mainly on the Church as its major 
object of study, the historian Yi Man-yŏl and his study group, specializing in “Korean 
national history” (kuksa), ventured to expand their scope of study and made a series of 
surveys on the various social, cultural and intellectual movements led by Christians from 
the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century.
12  Certainly, these scholars made a 
significant historiographical contribution by broadening the range of studies on Korean 
Christianity. Their interpretive framework, however, was no different from Min’s. In fact, 
their method and goal was to search for nationalist traits in Christian-led movements and 
put them together to buttress the established narrative, stated implicitly or explicitly, that 
Korean Christians were nationalists.   
   
English-language studies 
While Korean scholars emphasized the historical affinity between the Church and 
nationalism, foreign missionaries and their descendants, who left behind many writings on 
                                                   
12Yi Man-yŏl ed. Hang̕uk kidokkyo wa minjok undong (Sŏul: Posŏng 1986) ; Yi Man-yŏl ed. 
Hang̕uk kidokkyo wa minjok ŭisik (Sŏul: Chisik Sanŏpsa 1991) .  
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Korea that range from personal recollections to more academic essays, showed virtually no 
interest in the relationship of Christianity to nationalism.
13  Their writings are mostly 
concerned with their personal experiences in Korea and are inclined to focus solely on 
ecclesiastical affairs. The political and social issues in Korea and their potential influence 
on Korean Christian development attracted little attention from missionary scholars and 
writers. Needless to say, they had no dialogue with Korean scholars in the field, who tended 
to approach Korean Christian history from a completely different perspective. 
Here it is important to note that the lack of missionary interest in Korean 
nationalism and the paucity of their dialogue with Korean scholars in the same field is 
actually a legacy of the historical tension between the Mission and the Korean Church, 
which this study discusses. The missionary’s indifference or hostility to Korean nationalism, 
contrasted with the embrace of nationalism by Korean intellectual elites, was no 
post-colonial phenomenon; it was inherited from the colonial period.   
      With the growing interest in the rapid Christianization of Korea from the 1970s 
onward, there emerged a number of studies in English-language scholarship to explain the 
factors behind phenomenal Church growth. As part of this endeavor, some studies sought 
                                                   
13 For the missionary-authored publications on Korean Christianity, see the bibliography.   
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possible answers in the history of the Korean Church. However, these studies were mainly 
carried out by Korean or Korean-American scholars who had access to Korean-language 
scholarship and tended to translate the arguments of Korean scholarship into English, rather 
than using their command of Korean for the purposes of innovative research. The 
consequence was, needless to say, the continuation of the nationalist perspective that had 
already been established in Korea. 
14 
    This uncritical reception of Korean scholarship has also been common in several 
English-language monograph studies on Korean Christianity. Kenneth Wells, for instance, 
generally accepts the claim that “Protestants were involved in most phases and streams of 
the nationalistic movement in Korea” from the late nineteenth century through the Japanese 
colonial period.” Nevertheless, Wells expresses reservations about the division of Korean 
Protestants in Korea across a wide range of political approaches, some of which were 
mutually antagonistic, and admits that it is actually “difficult to identify any specific 
                                                   
14 There are numerous studies of this kind, but to name a few, Wi Jo Kang, Religion and 
politics in Korea under the Japanese rule (Lewiston, N.Y.: E. Mellen Press, 1987);  Shin 
Ki-Young, "Christianity and nation-building in Korea, 1885-1945" (Arizona State University, 
Ph.D. Diss., 1993 ) ; Kim In Soo, "Protestants and the formation of modern Korean 
nationalism, 1885-1920: A study of the contributions of Horace Grant Underwood and Sun 
Chu Kil" (Union Theological Seminary in Virginia, Ph.D. Diss., 1993) ; Kim Shin, 
"Christianity and Korean nationalism, 1884-1945: A missiological perspective" (Fuller 
Theological Seminary, Ph.D. Diss., 2008).  
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Protestant contribution to Korean nationalism.”
15  Therefore, to refine his argument, he 
selected a single group of Protestants who “did directly influence the formation of at least 
one stream of nationalism: self-construction or ‘ethical’ nationalism”
 16  by which he meant 
those who sought to “build a modern nation-state whose identity centered on the attainment 
of a democratic, self-reliant, ‘Christian society’ through spiritual renewal, moral 
reformation, and purposeful action.”
17   
  Though the detailed account and analysis of this group of Protestants is interesting 
and insightful, Well’s work is in agreement with the conventional Korean scholarship that 
identifies Christianity with Korean nationalism. He shares the same assumption that 
“Protestant” nationalist leaders could be “Church” leaders and is silent on the question of 
whether nationalism was institutionally supported by the Church or simply embraced by 
particular Christian individuals as a personal creed. Moreover, since his approach is 
grounded more in intellectual history than social history, important “on the ground” issues 
such as the social and cultural tension between the Mission and the Korean Church receive 
scant attention.   
                                                   
15 Kenneth M. Wells, New god, new nation : Protestants and self-reconstruction nationalism 
in Korea 1896-1937 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 9. 
16 Ibid., 9. 
17 Ibid., viii.  
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  By contrast, Park Chung-shin pays more attention to the socio-political 
circumstances of the colonial period and traces how external conditions affected the course 
of Korean church development. Nonetheless, while Park’s social historical approach is 
somewhat new, his understanding of the Korean Church’s relations to nationalism remains 
entirely orthodox. He simply adopts the conventional claim that Protestant Christianity in 
Korea “established a strong ideological and organizational relationship with the Korean 
nationalist movement” and asserts that “the religious community served as a rally point for 
fervent nationalists striving for independence” and “Church leaders enthusiastically 
supported those nationalists who used the religious community as a base of operations; 
some even initiated anti-Japanese activities.”
18  Again, Christian nationalists are identified 
with “Church leaders” and the “Church” is presumed to be a nationalist institution from top 
to bottom without any account for the foreign missionary presence in the Church and their 
power relations with the Protestant nationalists.   
  Timothy Lee’s recent publication, Born Again: Evangelicalism in Korea, also 
follows the convention in finding that the major reason for Christian growth during the 
                                                   
18 Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and politics in Korea (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2003), 5.  
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colonial period was the close interaction between the Church and nationalism.
19  His main 
argument throughout the book is that “evangelical” character, by which he generally meant 
its fundamentalist orientation, was always distinct in the Korean Christian movement. 
However, Lee does not discuss whether such “evangelical” character could really fit the 
demands of Korean nationalism, nor does he pay much attention to how missionaries, the 
teachers of “evangelical” Christianity, responded this vision of unifying “evangelicalism” 
and “nationalism”.   
  In sum, the major English-language studies on Korean Christianity so far has 
presented no distinctive interpretation of the Korean Christian relation to nationalism. 
 
Japanese-language Studies   
Due to a general lack of interest in Korean studies in postwar Japanese academia, 
Japanese scholars did not produce in-depth studies of Korean Christianity until the 1970s, 
when Japanese progressive intellectuals, including some leading Christians, began to take 
interest in the democratization movement in Korea. They began to provide support for the 
                                                   
19 Timothy S. Lee, Born again : evangelicalism in Korea (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i 
Press, 2010), Ch.3.  
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Korean Christians who were the movement’s leaders, while importing knowledge from 
them about Korean Christian history.   
Sawa Masahiko’s History of Korean Christianity (Chōsen kirisutokyōshi ron) is the 
first monograph on Korean Christian history written by a Japanese scholar writing after the 
colonial period. Having studied in Korea during the 1970s, Sawa partially subscribed to the 
nation-centered view of Christian history, but qualified his agreement by clearly 
differentiating between the contributions of the Korean Church as a national institution, and 
those of individual Korean Christians, to Korean nationalism.
20  Nonetheless, his early 
death did not allow him to develop his initial question about the relationship of Korean 
Christianity to nationalism and provide a clear alternative to the conventional Korean 
scholarship.
21  Kurata Masahiko also studied in Korea after Sawa and paid much attention 
                                                   
20 Sawa Masahiko, Nanpoku Chōsen Kirisutokyōshi ron (Tokyo: Nihon Kiristuo Kyōdan 
Shuppankyoku, 1985), 106-116. 
21  After his death, Sawa’s manuscript for Korean Protestant History [Chōsen Protesutanto 
shi] was published, but its introduction and a chapter on the early missionaries were left 
incomplete and we cannot tell clearly how his understanding of Korean Christian relation to 
nationalism and the missionary role in shaping it was developed after his first publication. 
However, a chapter on the March First Movement provides a detailed analysis on the court 
testimonies by the Christian leaders to show that there were divergent views among them, 
indicating that he had become more skeptical of the simplistic nationalist interpretation of 
Korean Christian history. Sawa Masahiko, Mikan Chōsen Kirisutokyōshi (Tōkyō Nihon 
Kirisutokyōdan Shuppankyoku, 1991), 113-154.    
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to the study of Korean Christian resistance to
 Japanese imperial ideology, which eventually 
led him to stand closer to the Korean nationalist historiography than Sawa.
22 
Besides these minister-historians, Iinuma Jirō and Han Sŏk-hŭi, writing as 
Protestant laymen, have produced a series of studies on the Japanese Christian missions to 
Korea during the colonial period.
23  These studies were meaningful as they addressed a 
topic that had been overlooked by scholars outside Korea, but the crucial limitation of their 
research is that they dealt with only Japanese sources and did not consult Korean sources to 
provide a more balanced description of these missions. This is not to say that their study 
was apologetic to Japanese colonialism or too favorable to the goodwill of Japanese 
Christians. To the contrary, Iinuma and Han were so critical of Japanese colonialism that 
they simply renounced the Japanese missionaries to Korea as imperial agents who served 
Japanese colonialism, while making no investigation of why some Korean Christians, 
presumably nationalists, were attracted to the Japanese Church. Their primary interest was 
to critique the Japanese Church, not the Korean Church, and therefore they did not venture 
to challenge the dominant framework of Korean Christian history.   
                                                   
22 Kurata Masahiko, Tennōsei to Kankoku Kirisutokyō (Tōkyō: Shinkyō Shuppansha, 1991) 
23 Iinuma Jirō and Han Sŏkki, Nihon teikoku shugi ka no chōsen dendō, Tokyo (Nihon 
kirisutokyōdan shuppankyoku, 1985)  
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  A recent study by Yi Sŏng-jŏn details the development of mission education in 
colonial Korea, but focuses entirely upon mission schools and does not provide a general 
picture how Korean nationalism developed in the process of Korean Christian 
development.
24  Moreover, Yi adopts the conventional view that the mission school 
contributed to the rise of Korean nationalism by providing modern education and thus 
conflicted with Japanese colonial authority. Hence, like English-language scholarship, 
Japanese-language scholarship has not yet produced any alternative to the Korean-language 
historiographical view of the relationship between Christianity and nationalism in Korea. 
   
                                                   
24 Yi Sŏng-jŏn, Amerikajin senkyōshi to Chōsen no kindai : Misshonsukūru no seisei to 
shokuminchika no kattō (Tōkyō: Shakai Hyōronsha, 2006)  
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Chapter 1    Catholic Tradition in Korea 
   
  Historians of Korean Protestantism commonly mention Catholic history in Korea 
as a prologue for Protestant history. In their narratives, Korean Catholics are depicted as the 
harbingers of a Protestant faith introduced to Korea a century after the arrival of 
Catholicism. While the synthesis of Korea’s Catholic and Protestant history may appear to 
be the fruit of the ecumenical sprit of Christian historians, in many cases, it is rather the 
product of a nationalist inspiration that views Catholic history as a part of Korea’s national 
history. In this view, it is presumed that both Catholics and Protestants shared the same 
Korean national identity regardless of the difference in their church traditions and thus had 
to be integrated into a single national history seen from the perspective of the Korean 
minjok. 
  However, Protestant historians stress their distinction from the Catholics on one 
point: their degree of loyalty to the nation. The Protestant understanding is that Korean 
Catholics failed to develop their Christian faith along lines parallel to that of Korean 
nationalism and that Protestants succeeded this incomplete project and brought it to fruition. 
Hence, the significance of Catholic history ceases with the development of the nationalist  
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Protestant Church and in fact, Korean Protestant history no longer mentions Catholic 
history after the arrival of Protestantism in Korea, as if Catholicism itself had entirely 
disappeared from the Korean peninsula.
25  Nonetheless, Catholicism continued to grow 
alongside Protestantism and the historical precedent in Korea left many legacies inherited 
by Korean Protestantism. In fact, as this chapter makes clear, it is impossible to understand 
the genesis and development of Protestant Christianity in Korea without first examining the 
Catholic missions that preceded them.     
 
Origins of the Catholic Church in Korea 
  Catholicism was first introduced to the Korean peninsula from China where Jesuits 
priests had settled and propagated their teachings since the
 sixteenth century. Chinese 
translations of Catholic teaching and philosophy were constantly being imported into Korea 
by Korean governmental envoys making seasonal visits to present tribute to the suzerain 
state of China and bringing back various Chinese products and works of scholarship upon 
their return. In Korea, imported Catholic books were studied by Confucian scholars and 
                                                   
25 This is a common feature in the following representative works on Korean Christianity. 
Min Kyŏng-bae, Han'guk kidok kyohoesa (sin kaejŏn p'an); Hanʾguk kidokkyosa yŏn'guso, 
Hanʾguk kidokkyo ŭi yŏksa 1 (Sŏul: Kidok kyomunsa, 1989). Especially, Min stresses the 
historical discontinuity. Min Kyŏng-bae, Han'guk kidok kyohoesa (sin kaejŏn p'an), 111-112.  
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known as Western Learning (sŏhak).
26  In the beginning, Western Learning was received 
more as a new form of scholarship than as a religion. Highly educated scholar-officials 
studied Western Learning to expand their intellectual horizons and many found that it 
shared some common tenets with the state orthodoxy of Neo-Confucianism and thus could 
complement traditional Confucian philosophy rather than simply negate it.
27   
  However, there soon emerged a group of scholars who took Western Learning as a 
new guiding principle in their social and religious life. They not only held group studies of 
Catholic books but began to transform their way of life according to Catholic doctrine. 
These scholars desired to learn more about Catholic teaching and sought the chance to 
establish contact with Catholic missionaries in China. Eventually they succeeded in 
enlisting one of their group members, Yi Sŭng-hun (1756-1801), in the seasonal tributary 
envoy to Beijing in 1783. Arriving in Beijing, Yi visited the Catholic missionary in 
residence and received baptism there, thus becoming the first Korean convert to Catholic 
Christianity.
28  After returning home, Yi took a more active part in disseminating Catholic 
                                                   
26 Min Kyŏng-bae, Han'guk kidok kyohoesa (sin kaejŏn p'an),47-52; Hanʾguk kidokkyosa 
yŏn'guso, Hanʾguk kidokkyo ŭi yŏksa 1, 65-71. 
27 Yu Hong-nyŏl, Han'guk ŭi ch'ŏnjugyosa (Sŏul: K'at'ollik ch'ulp'ansa 1990) vol.1,76-80 ; 
Hanʾguk kidokkyosa yŏn'guso, Hanʾguk kidokkyo ŭi yŏksa 1, 68-72. 
28 Yu Hong-nyŏl, Han'guk ŭi ch'ŏnjugyosa, 81-83  
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doctrine and even baptized his friends in the Catholic community in the absence of foreign 
missionaries in Korea.
29 
  The fact that the first Catholic converts were born before the Catholic foreign 
mission was established in Korea is often interpreted as proof of Korean initiative in the 
church’s formation and thus as a testament to the independent spirit of the nation.
30 
However, it should not be overlooked that early Korean Catholics recognized the 
ecclesiastical authority of the Roman Catholic Church and thus desired to establish direct 
connection with the foreign Catholic priests in China. In other words, Korean converts not 
only embraced the new foreign religion voluntarily but also submitted to the institutional 
order of the Catholic Church without having to be persuaded to do so by missionaries.   
  In fact, Korean Catholic loyalty to Rome was consistent with the subsequent 
development of the Church in Korea. For instance, Yi soon stopped administering 
sacramental rites for fellow Koreans when he was told by the Catholic authorities in Beijing 
that he was not qualified to do so except for baptism.
31  Since there was no ordained priest 
in Korea, this meant that Koreans were deprived of the right to administer any sacramental 
                                                   
29  Ibid., 86-89. 
30 Min Kyŏng-bae, Han'guk kidok kyohoesa (sin kaejŏn p'an), 56-57; ; 
31 Yu Hong-nyŏl, Han'guk ŭi ch'ŏnjugyosa, 93-95.  
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rites until foreign priests would later arrive in Korea. A more revealing example is the 
abolishment of ancestral worship under the ecclesiastical order from Beijing. As mentioned 
above, the first Catholic converts did not think that Catholicism was incompatible with 
Neo-Confucianism and did not regard ancestral worship as violating Catholic doctrine. 
However, when cautioned by the Church in Beijing that ancestor worship constituted a sin 
against God’s commandment not to engage in idol worship, the Korean converts loyally 
followed these instructions and entirely discontinued practice of this social ritual. Their 
loyalty to the religious cause was most dramatically demonstrated by Yun Chi-ch’ung 
(1759-1791) and Kwŏn Sang-yŏn (1751-1791) in 1791, in the Chinsan Incident, when the 
two scholar-converts burnt the ancestral tablets of their parents in public.
32  In 
Neo-Confucian society, where filial piety was a cardinal virtue, the discontinuation of 
ancestral worship was a bold challenge to the public order. Because filial piety was also 
cherished as the foundation of the popular loyalty to the king, the father of all subjects, 
neglecting ancestor worship was taken as a treacherous act.       
  From this incident forward, the Chosŏn dynasty began to take oppressive measures 
against Catholicism. It regarded Catholicism as an anti-social and anti-governmental cult 
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manipulated by foreign priests and prohibited it under state law. Catholic leaders such as 
Yun and Kwŏn were soon arrested and executed for the violation of public law and order, 
while others were banished to rural provinces and remote islands. The state also stopped the 
circulation of Catholic books and enforced book burnings in public places.
33  Moreover, the 
state devised a new system of mutual censorship in each village and mandated that villagers 
to report to the authority.
34   
  Under persecution, many converts became apostates, including the first convert, Yi 
Sŭng-hun, but the Catholic community as a whole never died out. Rather, it survived 
underground and risked death in remaining loyal to the faith. Contemporary police reports 
show that Catholic converts were convinced that the Christian God, whom they called 
Ch’ŏnju (Heavenly Lord) in Korean, had higher authority than the state or king. Kwŏn 
Sang-yŏn, for example, stated that “the teaching of Ch’ŏnju is highly majestic, so even if I 
violate the commandments of king and parents I cannot deny the teaching of Ch’ŏnju,”
35 
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34 Cho Kwang, "Chosŏn Government’s Measures against Catholicism," in The founding of 
Catholic tradition in Korea, ed. Yu Chai-Shin (Fremont, California: Asian Humanities Press, 
2004), 104. 
35 Chŏngjong sillok, vol.33 (October, the 15
th year of the King Chŏngjong), quoted in Kŭm 
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clarifying his belief that loyalty to God held primacy over his attachment to state and 
family.   
  Korean Catholics at that time were taught that it is the duty of a believer to be 
loyal to the king and obey the orders of the
 state,
36  but Catholic loyalty to the state was 
premised on the condition that the state also fulfills its duty to provide good governance 
and protect the people’s living as well as the Church. Therefore, when the state failed to 
fulfill this duty, Korean Catholics had a basis upon which they could justify their resistance 
to state authority and follow the Church.
 37 
  Korean Catholic loyalty to the Church over the state was most clearly 
demonstrated in a famous incident in 1801, generally known as Hwang Sa-yŏng’s Silk 
Letter Incident. As the most prominent and respected scholar of the Catholic community, 
Hwang Sa-yŏng (1775-1801) was forced into hiding when the Chosŏn state began its 
persecution of Catholics. While hiding in a cave, he wrote a secret letter to the French 
Bishop in Beijing asking for help. In this letter, Hwang requested that the Bishop ask the 
Pope to influence the Qing emperor to order the Korean king to grant religious freedom for 
                                                   
36 Cho Kwang, Chosŏn hugi ch’ŏnjugyosa yŏn’gu ŭi kich’o (Seoul: kyŏngin munhwa sa, 
2010), 26-27. 
37 Ibid., 29.  
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the Catholics in Korea.
38  In addition, Hwang asked the Bishop to dispatch foreign 
gunboats to Korea and intimidate the Korean king into granting religious freedom to his 
subjects.
39  Moreover, he provided geographic and other strategic information on Korea to 
assist with this foreign intervention.
40   
  This letter clearly shows that the Korean Catholics fully trusted the ultimate 
authority of the Catholic Church above that of their own state. They understood the world 
in terms of a hierarchical system in which the Holy See was positioned on the top and the 
Chinese emperor and the Korean king were below in descending order. Hence, they 
naturally expected that the Chinese emperor would obey papal instruction and exercise his 
power over the vassal state of Korea accordingly. Moreover, if the Korean king failed to 
obey the higher order, the Catholics thought he deserved punishment and that the foreign 
conquest of Korea would bring a better day for them.   
  From the viewpoint of the Chosŏn state, Hwang’s letter provided indisputable 
proof of Catholic treason. The government was now fully convinced that Catholicism was a 
                                                   
38 Yu Hong-nyŏl, Han'guk ŭi ch'ŏnjugyosa vo.1, 168 ; Min Kyŏng-bae, Han'guk kidok 
kyohoesa (sin kaejŏn p'an), 67-70. 
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treacherous cult that had to be exterminated. Following this event, governmental 
persecution became more severe and merciless. The hard measures adopted by the 
government, however, ended up strengthening Catholic resolve to report their dire situation 
in Korea to the missionaries in China in order to petition for foreign intervention on their 
behalf. In one such attempt, a Korean Catholic leader, Chŏng Ha-sang (1795-1839), wrote a 
petition to the Pope in which he asked the Vatican to send missionaries directly to Korea 
and rescue the local Catholics suffering persecution. Eventually, the petition was heeded by 
the Holy See and the Pope ordered the establishment of the Vicariate Apostolic in Korea in 
1831, while appointing the Society of Foreign Missions of Paris [La Societe de Mission 
Etrangeres de Paris] to take charge.
41  The Society soon dispatched several missionaries to 
Korea through China and one of them, Philbert Mauban, successfully smuggled himself 
into the country in 1836 against the seclusion policy of the Chosŏn government.
42  Other 
French missionaries soon followed him and began to organize the local Catholics 
underground, giving them religious instructions and administering baptisms.
43  In order to 
avoid arrest by the police, the missionaries always disguised themselves in the traditional 
                                                   
41 Min Kyŏng-bae, Han'guk kidok kyohoesa (sin kaejŏn p'an), 73-74. 
42 Ibid., 76-77. 
43 Missions étrangères de Paris., The Catholic Church in Korea (Hongkong: Impr. de la 
Société des missions-étrangères, 1924), 25.  
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garb of Korean mourners.
44  According to Confucian custom, mourners were neither to 
speak nor to be spoken to on the street and thus provided the best means for the French 
missionaries to engage in clandestine proselytization. 
 
French and American Intervention 
  The domestic Catholic communities were greatly revived and empowered by the 
foreign missionary presence, but it naturally alarmed the Chosŏn state that Catholics were 
conspiring against the dynasty using foreign aid. The Chosŏn state thus repeatedly launched 
harsh anti-Catholic campaigns and executed many believers, including French missionaries, 
whenever their underground presence was discovered. From 1838 to 1841, more than two 
hundred Catholics were killed by decapitation, hanging, and torture.
45  All of the three 
French priests who had been underground were arrested and beheaded on the public 
execution ground in Seoul.
46   
                                                   
44 Fred Harvey Harrington, God, mammon, and the Japanese (Madison, Wis.,: The 
University of Wisconsin press, 1944), 90. For the actual picture of a priest in mourner’s 
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  The execution of the French missionaries was soon reported to the French embassy 
in China, as many Korean Catholics escaped the country and fled to find refuge there. Upon 
receiving the news, Admiral Cecille sent a letter to the Korean king to ask for an 
explanation and French man-of-war would be sent to hear his response next year. 
Accordingly, the French frigate was dispatched to Korea in 1846 with some Korean 
Catholics on board.
47  The return of Korean Catholics in the French gunboat convinced the 
state once again of Catholic collaboration with foreign aggressors and fueled its 
anti-Catholic hatred. Though the French naval demonstration did not lead to a direct 
military confrontation with Korea at this time, it led the Chosŏn state to intensify its 
persecution of Catholicism. 
  By the mid-nineteenth century, the Chosŏn state’s suspicion that domestic 
Catholics would invite foreign invasion was becoming a reality in its neighboring state of 
China. During the Second Opium War in 1857, the French and British expedition forces not 
only invaded China and occupied Beijing but also imposed the Treaty of Tianjin, by which 
the Chinese government was mandated to recognize the Christian religion, both Catholic 
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and Protestant, and also to protect Chinese converts as well as foreign missionaries.
48  The 
detailed report of the war and its aftermath was soon sent to Korea by the annual Korean 
tributary envoy to Beijing. The news of China’s defeat was a great shock to Korean elites, 
who long admired the Central Kingdom as its sovereign. According to the Catholic 
missionary report, some among Korea’s wealthy and leisure class, upon hearing the news, 
fled to the mountains thinking that foreign troops would soon arrive in Seoul.
49   
  It is in this socio-political context that the Taewŏn’gun (1820-1898), who assumed 
power in 1861 as the regent for a minor king, took a hard-line diplomatic position and 
strengthened the dynasty’s traditional anti-foreign and anti-Catholic policy. Believing that 
expulsion of all foreign elements in Korea was the best means to secure his dynasty he 
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ordered the mass arrest of Catholics in 1866. This persecution lasted for several years and 
resulted in the execution of more than 8,000 Catholics, including nine French 
missionaries.
50  The frightening news of the Catholic massacre was quickly relayed to 
Catholic authorities in China by Korean refugees and resulted in yet another French 
military intervention. This time the French government not only sent expeditionary forces 
but also demanded that the Korean government turn over the ministers who ordered the 
massacre and also enter treaty negotiations. When this demand was ignored by the Chosŏn 
government, the French forces invaded Kanghwa Island in the vicinity of the capital Seoul 
and looted the detached royal palace there.
51  However, due to the limited number of troops 
and the fierce resistance put up by Chosŏn soldiers, the French invasion did not advance on 
Seoul but instead withdrew to China.   
  Meanwhile, shortly before the French invasion, the American Commercial boat, 
General Sherman, had also entered Taedong River to approach Pyŏngyang in northern 
Korea and had a military skirmish with the Korean defense force. Korean soldiers attacked 
and set fire to the boat when the boat shipwrecked on the shallow floor of the river, killing 
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all the crew on board, including a Scottish Protestant missionary.
52  Like the French, the 
Americans also returned in four warships to protest the burning of the General Sherman in 
1871 and exchanged fire with the Korean soldiers in Kanghwa Island. The Americans 
occupied a fortress on the island, killing around 200 Korean soldiers, but soon withdrew to 
Chefoo in China.
53 
Successful defense bolstered Taewŏn’gun’s confidence in his seclusion policy. He 
commemorated the victory by building a stone stele on which he inscribed, “Expel the 
barbarians and protect Confucian orthodoxy. Those who seek peace with the barbarians 
must be killed,” and ordered the same stele to be built all over the country.
54  In this way, 
Catholicism in Korea was considered the most dangerous subversive cult and identified 
with those who would collaborate with foreign (and especially French and American) 
invasions. Hence, there was no room for Catholicism to gain governmental recognition in 
the
 nineteenth century. Catholicism was branded from beginning to end as an anti-state and 
anti-social force and strongly disdained for its foreign affiliation.   
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Catholic Status in the Chosŏn Society 
  Despite a century of bloody persecution, the Catholic communities were not 
completely uprooted. Rather, they survived underground with the support of a continuous 
supply of missionaries dispatched s from abroad. However, continuous long-term 
persecution brought significant changes to the Korean Catholic community. First, the 
aristocratic yangban Catholics, who provided leadership in the early stages, were all killed 
and eliminated from the state bureaucracy during the persecutions. Even those who 
survived were deprived of their economic wealth during exile or imprisonment and lost 
their previous social status.
55  Consequently, the majority of the community members were 
gradually occupied by the lower social status groups such as the chungin (mostly 
practitioners of skilled professions such as medicine, paintings, mathematics and astronomy, 
etc.) and yangmin class (farmers, merchants and artisans).
56  This is also evidenced by the 
fact that the royal edict of 1839 to prohibit Catholicism was written in part using the 
Korean alphabet (hangŭl), which was used primarily by the less educated class.
57  Since the 
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majority of Catholic believers were composed of those who could not comprehend classical 
Chinese, the official language and lingua franca of intellectuals at that time, the government 
had to write the edict in the vernacular, hangŭl. Second, leadership of the Catholic 
community was retained by the French missionaries as they arrived to organize the 
underground church. Since there were no Korean priests who possessed the ecclesiastical 
right to administer mass and other rituals, converts had no choice but to rely on foreign 
priests who were few in number and not always available. Lastly, we should note the 
repeated persecution of scattered Catholic communities all over the country. In order to 
escape from the constant state of surveillance, Catholics had to flee their villages and seek 
refuge in the mountains and other remote areas in the rural provinces where they lived a life 
of seclusion.
58  The first Catholic community was originally formed in Chŏlla, 
Ch’ungch’ong and Kyŏnggi Province in the south, but it was scattered to other provinces 
such Kangwŏn and Kyŏngsang by persecution and the number of Catholic converts totaled 
around 17,000 by the middle of the nineteenth century.
59   
   
Freedom of Religion under Unequal Treaty 
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  The anti-Catholic atmosphere subsided after King Kojong (1852-1919) replaced 
the Taewŏn’gun in 1873. The new king soon abandoned the traditional seclusion policy due 
to increasing pressure from the surrounding powers and signed Korea’s first open port 
treaty with Japan in 1876 and then with the United States in 1882. Nonetheless, the Chosŏn 
government was determined to maintain its anti-Catholic policy even after opening the 
country to foreign intercourse. It actually made efforts to exclude any provision from the 
US-Korean treaty that would guarantee freedom of religion. Later, it permitted foreigners to 
practice their own faith in the designated foreign concessions in the Anglo-Korean Treaty 
of 1883,
60  but it never recognized the right of foreigners to disseminate their religion to 
Koreans. In short, the new treaties opened up Korea to foreign trade, but not to Christianity, 
and the American Protestant missionaries, who began to arrive in Korea from 1885 onward, 
had to remain in the treaty port and wait until the Chosŏn government lifted the ban on 
Christianity. But the lack of a treaty between Korea and France meant that Catholic 
missionaries on the peninsula were technically still at risk of punishment for their illegal 
residence, while other foreign citizens were not. French missionaries in China had 
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requested the French government to sign a treaty agreement with the Chosŏn government in 
order to secure the legal status of missionaries in Korea, but actual negotiations did not 
begin until May 1886, when the French Minister in Beijing, Congordan, was dispatched to 
Korea and met with the Korean Foreign Minister, Kim Yun Sik.
61 
  As the security of the catholic missionaries was at stake, the French government 
did not easily concede the right of its citizens to propagate religion in Korea. Instead, the 
French Minister made this issue the main agenda of negotiations and made several specific 
demands that would facilitate the French Catholic mission: To grant freedom for Koreans 
to practice Catholicism; allow the missionaries to travel freely in the country and purchase 
land; permit Catholics to build churches, schools, hospitals and cemeteries in sufficient 
number that corresponds to the Catholic population ratio; and pay financial compensation 
of one million franc for the damages incurred upon the Catholic Church in Korea during the 
past persecutions and build a memorial stone at the expense of the Chosŏn government as a 
means to express the official apology for the martyred French missionaries.
62  Such 
demands were too radical and humiliating for the Chosŏn government to accept. Adopting 
all of them would have required the complete revision of its century-long anti-Catholic 
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policy and the virtual recognition of French jurisdiction over domestic Catholics in Korea. 
The Korean Minister rejected the French demand at once and negotiations were suspended 
for almost a month without any further development. In the event, when negotiations came 
close to breaking down, the French government made a concession and gave up the treaty’s 
clause for religious freedom. Instead, it prioritized securing the legal right of residence of 
missionaries by inserting the following article. 
 
Subjects of either nationality who may proceed to the country of the 
other to study or teach [note -- professer in original] its language, 
literature, laws, arts or industries…shall be afforded to every reasonable 
facility for doing so.   
 
    This article was a copy of article nine of the Anglo-Korean Treaty, ratified the 
previous year, with an addition of “teach” after “study.” The French intention behind this 
minor revision was to provide an official and legitimate reason for missionaries to enter 
Korea as teachers of the French language and allow them to disguise their religious 
proselytizing under the pretense of language teaching. While there was no consensus 
between the two governments over the meaning of this article, the French Minister was 
confident that the Korean government could no longer persecute the missionaries once they 
retained the legal status of language teachers, and encouraged Bishop Blanc, the head of the  
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French Catholic mission in Korea, to obtain an official passport from the Korean 
government and travel the country under the protection of the new treaty.
63   
  Besides freedom of travel, the greatest benefit the French obtained by this treaty 
was the right of extraterritoriality, which was stipulated in previous treaties between the 
Chosŏn government and other powers and thus automatically extended to French citizens 
by virtue of the most-favored-nation clause. Consequently, French missionaries were 
exempted from Korean jurisdiction and no longer punishable by Korean authority, even if 
they were charged with disseminating the illegal religion of Christianity. Instead, they were 
to be judged in the French consular court where they could expect lenient treatment since 
their home government was fully supportive of their mission work. In sum, the 
Franco-Korean treaty did not win freedom of religion per se, but granted missionaries a 
legal safeguard, while allowing the Korean government not to permit Christian 
propagation. 
    Unaware of the French intention to use the “language teaching” clause to justify 
mission work, the Chosŏn government was upset when French missionaries came out of 
hiding with the ratification of the treaty in 1887. Accordingly, it attempted to prevent 
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missionaries from openly traveling around the country. For instance, the magistrate of 
Wŏnsan, one of the first three treaty ports, did not permit a French missionary, Father 
Deguette, to enter the city regardless of his having an official passport. Moreover, the 
magistrate ordered the arrest of a dozen local Catholics for their affiliation with Deguette 
and sent them to Seoul for trial.
64   
  The expansion of the Catholic mission without the consent of the Korean 
government resulted in more violent conflict between the missionaries and local residents. 
In Chŏnju, Chŏlla Province, some local leaders agitated the anti-Catholic mob and beat a 
French missionary, Father Baudounet, who visited the town with two Korean Catholics.
65 
Similarly, in the vicinity of Taegu, Kyŏngsang Province, a local mob stormed and 
destroyed an inn where Father Robert was staying. When the French missionary fled into 
Taegu city to ask for governmental protection, the magistrate rejected the request. 
Consequently, the missionary and his followers were chased by hundreds of rioters and 
narrowly escaped death.
66  With the report of this incident, the French Legation demanded 
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the Korean government punish the responsible officials, compensate the missionary and 
force the local governments to respect the treaty rights.
67   
However, the Chosŏn government held that it had the right to punish those who 
violated Korean law and rejected the French demand for the abolishment of anti-Catholic 
law.
68  Moreover, the Korean government also sabotaged efforts to stop anti-Catholic 
violence and local authorities continued their anti-Catholic agitation. In 1891, the 
magistrate of Kijang, Kyŏngsang Province, posted an official notice on the public bulletin 
board that all foreign missionaries should be killed for disseminating their evil religion.
69 
This incident again caused a strong protest from the French legation and the Korean 
Foreign Office promised to investigate the case. Nonetheless, a similar incident occurred 
the following year in Ichŏn, Kyŏnggi Province, where the magistrate officially denounced 
Catholicism as a subversive cult and warned the populace not to follow it.
70  Such explicit 
instigation at the government level appears to have encouraged anti-Catholic violence at the 
popular level. In fact, the following year, in Suwon, not far from Ichŏn, Father Wilhelm 
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was beaten by a local thug without cause, while Father Lafoucade in Kangwŏn Province 
was attacked by members of the local merchant guild (pobusang), who were often hired to 
execute private revenge at that time.
71     
  The growing visibility of French missionaries and their interaction with local 
Catholics reaffirmed the prevailing common perception that Catholics were subverting 
society using foreign aid. Therefore, Korean Catholics became easy prey for local violence, 
especially when they were seen with French missionaries. In 1891 alone, anti-Catholic 
violence was reported in Changsŏng (Chŏlla Province),Yŏmp’o (Kyŏngsang) and 
Yangyang (Kangwŏn).
72  Also, in Samga (Kyŏngsang) in 1892 and Puyŏ 
(Ch’ungch’chong) in 1893, Catholic families were robbed by villagers and even though 
they sued the violators, their appeal was dismissed.
73  When the Tonghak, the followers of 
an anti-foreign indigenous religion, rose up against the Chosŏn government in 1894, they 
targeted Catholics as well as corrupt officials. The major cause of the rebellion was heavy 
taxation and abuse of power by the local government, but the peasant rebels also 
maintained a strong anti-foreign posture and united under the slogan, “Expel Western and 
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Japanese barbarians.” One of the appeals they posted on the street in Seoul clearly 
designated Catholics as “beasts” and demanded that they should abandon the heterodox 
teaching.
74  Actually, the rebels often attacked local Catholics during their campaigns 
against the local government. They burnt and sacked the missionary residence and many 
Catholic households in Yangchŏn, Nosŏng and other towns in Ch’ungch’ong Province.
75 
Even after the rebellion was suppressed by government forces, some surviving Tonghaks 
continued to attack Catholics individually in places such as Suwŏn and Poŭn.
76   
  In sum, the treaty did not change traditional anti-Catholic sentiments either at the 
government or popular levels, nor did it produce any right to freedom of religion. Rather, 
the growing visibility of missionaries acting without legal sanction exacerbated traditional 
fear and prejudice against Catholics and ignited anti-Catholic violence across the country. 
   
The Church as Refuge 
  In spite of the persisting anti-Catholic climate, the French missionaries no longer 
accepted the limitations imposed on them as quietly as they did during the era of open 
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persecution. Even if they were still vulnerable to uncontrolled violence at the local level, 
they now possessed at least the legal right to stay in Korea and demand that the Korean 
government provide due protection through the French legation. They could even demand 
compensation for damages they suffered at the hands of local mobs. In fact, as they kept 
filing official protests against the Korean governmental negligence for protecting the 
missionaries, the Korean government gradually came to terms with their demand and 
instructed local governments in 1893 not to abuse local Catholics on the reasoning that they 
too were the “children of His Majesty.”
77  Though such orders did not have an immediate 
effect in subduing anti-Catholic violence, it was gradually recognized by the local populace 
that the missionaries held power to negotiate with the government and could bring 
punishment against local persecutors of Catholics.     
  As the foreign privilege of extraterritoriality was recognized, native Catholics who 
had long been abused by the local anti-Catholic forces began to seek refuge in the Catholic 
missions. They flocked around the missionaries in the hope that they too could be exempted 
from Korean jurisdiction if they came under foreign authority. Thus, there were even some 
cases in which former members of the anti-foreign Tonghaks joined the Catholic Church to 
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disguise their identity and avoid government suppression or evade taxation.
78  In fact, the 
French missionaries embraced such Catholic refugees on principle and shielded them from 
Korean government persecution. Moreover, whenever local officials imprisoned Catholics, 
French missionaries would demand the release of the native Catholics to the government 
and often won them back with support from the French legation.
79   
  On the other hand, as missionary power gained social recognition, some Catholics 
took advantage of the foreign presence to assert their interests against non-Catholics. For 
instance, Catholics brought in French missionaries in land disputes and threatened their 
non-Catholic counterparts in 1893.
80  Next year, in Sŏnchŏn, a Catholic lynched the 
non-Catholic neighbors in the village, claiming that he was granted the right to do so from a 
missionary.
81  These cases were recorded on local government reports to the central 
government. As such, there may be some exaggeration or bias in their description. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that Catholics were no longer silent sufferers. In theory, 
foreign privileges were not to be extended to Koreans, but in reality there were many cases 
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where Catholics attempted to use foreign protection to escape from or confront those in 
power at the local level. As a result, the chain of violence and animosity between Catholics 
and non-Catholics was constantly perpetuated. The resilience of grassroots anti-Catholic 
persecution continued to drive Catholics to seek foreign protection and alienate them from 
the rest of society. 
  In conclusion, the political tension between Catholics and non-Catholics remained 
and even intensified after the ratification of the Franco-Korean treaty. Continuous violent 
clashes between the two parties illustrate that the rise of Catholicism in Korea was a 
contributing fact,or to social disintegration rather than integration. Catholics in Korea had 
long valued the Church over the state and continued to hold that belief even after the treaty. 
To them, the forces of anti-Catholicism, whether private or governmental, were simply 
enemies of the Church to be resisted to the very end. To non-Catholics, the subversive 
nature of Catholicism was common sense reconfirmed by the fact that Catholics continued 
to affiliate with foreign missionaries and in doing so became more confrontational toward 
non-Catholics.   
  The profound schism between Catholicism and anti-Catholicism in late Chosŏn 
Korea also clearly shows that there was no sense of unity that derived from belonging to the  
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same race or nation. Even if there was “proto-nationalism,” as some scholars have 
suggested,
82  it did not provide any means of practical arbitration between the two groups 
divided by different ideological beliefs. After all, Catholics in Korea gave their loyalty to a 
universal church that transcended both state and nation. Thus, it inevitably came into 
conflict with the Chosŏn dynasty, which demanded the highest loyalty to the state. 
Catholics did not hesitate to rely upon French power and authority in order to defend 
themselves, because they considered France to be the agent of the Catholic Church, rather 
than a foreign aggressor. It thus makes little sense to criticize Korean Catholics for their 
lack of nationalism as some Korean nationalist historians have done.
83  Rather, we should 
pay attention to the fact that Catholics in Korea consistently desired freedom from state 
persecution and wanted to establish an autonomous Catholic community, where believers 
would be free from local tradition and state jurisdiction. In ways that anticipate and perhaps 
influenced the story of Protestant Koreans that follows, what Catholics strived for was not 
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to identify themselves with state power and national tradition, but rather to detach 
themselves from both.   
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Chapter 2    Protestant Missions and Power 
 
  Conventional Protestant history centers on a narrative that stresses the 
“subjectivity” of Koreans in adopting the Protestant faith. Specifically, it highlights the 
uniqueness of a historical situation in which Protestant Christianity was introduced to 
Korea by Koreans before the Protestant foreign Missions entered Korea. This claim is 
based on the fact that the first Korean Protestants were converted in Manchuria beyond the 
Korean peninsula. They lived in the northern edge of the peninsula and engaged in 
cross-border trade between Korea and China. They met the Scottish Presbyterian 
missionaries, John Ross and John MacIntyre, on the Chinese side of the border and upon 
converting to Christianity helped them to translate a portion of the Bible into the Korean 
vernacular script of hangŭl. These missionaries then dispatched these Korean converts back 
to Korea with the translation and had them distribute it and proselytize the fellow Koreans 
in a clandestine manner.
84   
It is true that these early Korean Protestant agents contributed to some extent to the 
early evangelization of Korea. However, the subsequent development of Korean Protestant 
                                                   
84  Hanʾguk kidokkyosa yŏn'guso, Hanʾguk kidokkyo ŭi yŏksa 1, 142-156.  
58 
 
Christianity was not led by these early converts on the periphery of the Korean peninsula, 
but by the foreign Missions who occupied the capital Seoul and reached out to other parts 
of Korea. As a matter of fact, the key members of the early Korean evangelists from 
Manchuria such as the Sŏ brothers, Sŏ Sang-ryun and Sŏ Kyŏng-jŏ, reported their presence 
to the American Presbyterian Mission when it arrived and worked for the Mission. 
Moreover, it took Sŏ Kyŏng-jo another twenty years of training under the American 
Mission before he received official ordination as the first Korean Presbyterian minister in 
1904 (as discussed in Chapter 3).   
This chapter reveals that the Korean reception of Protestant Christianity was much 
less “subjective” than has previously been claimed. It argues that the development of the 
foreign mission is the key to understanding the early development of Korean Protestant 
Christianity, which relied heavily upon the foreign privileges of the Mission as much as the 
Catholic predecessors.   
 
Genesis of the Protestant Mission in Korea 
In 1882, the United States became the first western power to sign an open port 
treaty with Korea. American Protestant missionaries arrived in Korea as soon as this treaty  
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was ratified in 1884. Prior to the treaty, the foreign mission boards of the Presbyterian 
Church of the United States of America (Northern Presbyterian Church, hereafter “NP”) 
and the Methodist Episcopal Church, United States (Northern Methodist Church, “NM”) 
had received substantial information about Korea through its missionary agents in China 
and Japan and had been seeking the chance to extend their mission to Korea.
85  However, 
they were more careful than the French Catholic mission and did not dare to send 
missionaries to Korea without treaty protection. Missionary security was a priority for them 
and hence they waited to see the American flag raised on Korean soil before opening the 
door to mission work. 
However, the treaty was commercial in nature and made no mention of religion. 
American missionaries could therefore enter Korea and receive protection as United States 
citizens under the treaty, but had no legal right to preach Christianity to Koreans. The 
foreign mission boards of the U.S. Churches were fully aware of this treaty restriction but 
they thought it better to dispatch their missionaries to Korea in any way possible to prepare 
for the day when Christian religion would be tolerated. Hence, the Northern Presbyterian 
mission board reassigned one of its China missionaries, Horace N. Allen (1858–1932) to 
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Korea in the summer of 1884, while appointing Horace G. Underwood (1859-1916) and 
John Heron (1856-1890) as the first Korea missionaries, who landed in Korea in April 1885. 
Likewise, the Northern Methodist mission board selected and dispatched Henry G. 
Appenzeller (1858-1902) and William B. Scranton (1856-1922), who arrived in Korea with 
the Presbyterians in 1885. As their birth years show, these missionaries were all young and 
in their twenties when they arrived in Korea in the 1880s, coming straight from the 
seminaries or colleges and had little knowledge on Korea.   
The foreign mission boards were optimistic about the future prospects of the 
mission in Korea. Their Japan missionaries had already established friendly relations with 
some influential Korean officials, such as Kim Ok-kyun (1851–1894) and Pak Yŏng-hyo 
(1861-1939), who had made repeated visits to Tokyo from 1881 to study western 
scholarship and technology, and had now returned to the Korean government to launch their 
pro-modernization and pro-Western policy against the conservative opposition. The 
reformist agenda of this group, which was known as the “Progressive Party” in Korea, had 
advantages for beginning mission activities in Korea. In fact, a veteran Japan missionary of 
the Methodist Mission, Robert MacLay (1824-1907, NM) had received a royal permit to 
start a hospital and school in Korea through the auspices of Kim Okkyun in 1884. This led  
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to the board decision to dispatch the first missionaries to Korea.
86  In other words, the plan 
of the foreign mission boards was to ally itself with progressive forces in Korea and 
gradually move Chosŏn policy in a pro-West and pro-Christian direction.   
  These optimistic hopes were dashed before Protestant missionaries even reached 
Korea. In December 1884, the Korean Progressive Party, with support from the Japanese 
government, staged a palace coup to take over power from the conservatives, but their 
efforts failed in only three days due to Chinese military intervention. As a result, 
progressive leaders such as Kim and Pak were ousted from the court and fled to Japan to 
seek exile, leaving no chance for the Korea missionaries to ally with the progressives in the 
court. The only good fortune to come out of the unfortunate event was that Horace N. Allen, 
who was the only missionary already present in Korea, was able to win court favor by 
saving the life of a conservative Korean official who had been attacked and seriously 
wounded during the coup. Allen was a physician-missionary and, because he could not 
practice mission work in Korea, he had been working as a doctor to the U.S. legation since 
his arrival. The U.S. Ambassador had introduced Allen to the Korean court as a physician, 
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not a missionary.
87  The foreign court advisor, Paul von Molldendorf (1847 -1901), had met 
Allen in person and he called the American doctor to treat the badly wounded official on 
the night of the coup. 
The official whom Allen saved was the leader of the conservative party, Min 
Yŏng-ik (1860 -1914), the cousin of Queen Min. Royal gratitude to Allen as well as Min’s 
personal favor soon made him a court physician holding official rank. Taking advantage of 
this breakthrough, Allen soon petitioned the king to allow him to establish a hospital to care 
for the sick. His petition was accepted and resulted in the Royal Hospital where Allen was 
allowed to practice western medicine. The hospital also provided a temporary workplace 
for newly arrived missionaries in the absence of the right to engage in direct mission 
work.
88 
Superficially, Allen’s success as a court physician may seem to suggest the Korean 
court’s recognition of Protestant mission work and de facto toleration of Christianity. In fact, 
the reality was entirely different. Court patronage for Allen was for his medical practice 
only and neither King Kojong nor Min Yŏng-ik had any intention of tolerating Christianity. 
In the first place, Allen continued to suppress his missionary profile and tried his best to 
                                                   
87 Harrington, God, mammon, and the Japanese, 12. 
88 Ibid., 49.  
63 
 
avoid conflict with the Korean court over the matter of his faith. Moreover, Allen’s petition 
to build the Royal Hospital was permitted because he proposed that it be a royal institution, 
entirely funded by the Korean court, with its ultimate purpose being to provide free care for 
the sick and “endear the people to their monarch”
89  rather than to advance the Christian 
cause. Though Allen hired fellow missionaries as hospital workers, he explained to the 
court that they had been sent by “a benevolent society in America,” and came as Korean 
court employees, thereby concealing the church and missionary support they received.
90  In 
short, Allen’s success was the result of camouflaging his Christian identity rather than 
winning royal recognition of it.   
 
Franco-Korean Treaty and Its Effect on the Protestant Mission 
  Allen justified his establishment of the Royal Hospital as a nominally 
non-missionary institution as an expedient adopted in light of anti-Christian policy in Korea. 
He imagined he could change this policy by cultivating the maximum extent of royal favor. 
Other missionaries, however, did not share this view and thought Allen was simply working 
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for his own interest and prestige, while neglecting his missionary duties. Such frustration 
was strong among evangelical missionaries such as Underwood and Appenzeller, who 
considered a hospital without Christian agency to be worthless.
91  Moreover, Underwood 
and Appenzeller were ordained ministers with no medical skills to establish their careers in 
the hospital. Finally, they grew personally weary of Allen’s high-handed manner and 
leadership, taking advantage of his personal connection to the court. They saw Allen as 
being no different from themselves, a young man in his twenties with little professional 
experience as a missionary.
92  Thus, they had all the more reason to reject Allen’s methods.   
  Unable to wait any longer, these frustrated young missionaries began to seek the 
chance to start their own mission work in violation of the treaty restrictions. Fortuitously, it 
was also precisely at this time that they heard the news that the Franco-Korean Treaty was 
about to be negotiated and that “the French… will insist upon the right of their priests to 
work here.” As rivals of the Catholic faith, these American missionaries observed unhappily 
that the “Romanists have a large Korean following” and worried that “if the Protestants do 
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not do their duty, we will have a Romish instead of a heathen people to convert.”
93  They 
were thus concerned that if the French won the right of religious freedom in Korea, the 
Catholic mission would prevail there. On the other hand, they also knew that any treaty 
privilege gained by the French would be extended to American citizens by virtue of the 
most-favored-nation clause. Hence, the American missionaries desired to see the French 
win the right of religious freedom, calculating that, “if they do this [win religious freedom], 
it will at once give us the right also.”
94  Behind the scenes, however, they did not miss the 
chance to defame the Catholics in the eyes of the Korean court whenever the opportunity 
arose to do so. For instance, when Horace Allen was consulted by the Korean court during 
Franco-Korean negotiations and asked for his opinion about the teaching of Catholicism, he 
did his best to list the reasons that the Koreans should reject Catholicism. First, Allen 
warned that, in accepting Catholicism, Korea would be politically subservient to Papal 
authority, a point he contrasted with Protestant America. 
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Americans are an independent people and look with disfavor on anything 
that tends to curtail our power. Were we Catholics, our President would be 
under the power of the Pope.
95 
 
Allen also elaborated on what he saw as the social dangers of Catholicism by appealing to 
the Korean Confucian ethical views of gender.   
 
First, we are opposed to praying idols or anyone but the Creator of the 
Universe. The Catholics worship and pray to the Virgin Mary, Mother of 
Christ, a woman. Secondly, we think no one but God can forgive sin, 
they give this power to corrupt priests to whom all Catholics must 
confess their most private thoughts. Third the priests are men with the 
same organs and passions as other men, they are not eunuchs, and we 
claim that it is not safe for women to go and confess to these men their 
secret thoughts and faults.
96   
 
It is not clear how this vicious anti-Catholic propaganda by a Protestant missionary affected 
Franco-Korean treaty negotiations, but as seen in the previous chapter, even the French 
government failed to win the explicit religious freedom clause due to the staunch Korean 
opposition.   
  In the event, Protestant expectations that the French would win the right of 
freedom of religion were betrayed. Nevertheless, Protestant missionaries soon found that 
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French priests were traveling to the Korean interior and giving religious instructions to 
Korean Catholics under the pretense of “language teaching.” As detailed in the previous 
chapter, this unilateral action on the part of the French missionaries angered the Korean 
government, who saw it as a treaty violation, and also triggered a series of violent 
anti-foreign and anti-Catholic incidents across the country. But the American missionaries, 
who had long been frustrated over the treaty restrictions placed on their missionary rights, 
took the French aggressive action as a good excuse to claim the same right for Americans 
as a most-favored-nation. Thus, Horace G. Underwood and Henry G. Appenzeller decided 
to do as the French were doing and ventured to make a joint trip outside the foreign 
settlement to the Korean interior in 1888 and, when occasion allowed, did preach to the 
locals and even baptized some.
97 
Needless to say, the Korean government was greatly offended by American 
missionary actions and sent an official objection to the US legation to the effect that “It is 
well known to the Korean Government that Americans residing in Korea are engaged in 
disseminating the doctrines of the Christian religion.” The government also made clear that 
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mission work was not permitted under the current treaty and that such actions “not 
authorized by the treaty… shall cease.”
98  Upon receiving this notice, the United States 
Minister adopted the Korean objection and recalled Underwood and Appenzeller from the 
interior to Seoul and ordered them to “refrain from teaching the Christian religion and 
administering its rites and ordinances to the Korean people.”
99   
  While illicit evangelism by Protestant missionaries ceased temporarily, 
Underwood was unwilling to accept any legal restrictions. Despite the warning from the 
Korean government, he claimed that the missionaries “were under higher orders than that of 
a Korean king” and therefore “our duty was to preach and take the consequences, resting 
for authority on the word of God.”
100  With such self-assigned divine prerogative, 
Underwood was not deterred by the Korean government order and continued to “teach and 
preach, in public and private, singing hymns.”
101   
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  There is no doubt that Underwood’s religious convictions are what drove him to 
take such aggressive and bold action. However, he would not have dared to do so had it not 
been for the treaty right of extraterritoriality. All American missionaries knew that they 
were exempt from Korean jurisdiction despite whatever illegal act they might commit in 
Korea and were ultimately protected by the consular court under the American flag. In fact, 
the U.S. legation, despite its official stance against illegal evangelism in Korea, did not 
deport or punish missionaries for their transgressions. Rather, when any trouble took place 
between the missionaries and Korean authority, the U.S. government always did its best to 
protect the missionary interest as an American interest.
102   
  On the other hand, the Korean King, Kojong, wanted to maintain friendly relations 
with the United States and desired its protection from the Chinese and Japanese power.
103 
As a result, while the Korean government was never willing to permit Christianity officially, 
it tended to acquiescence to the missionary work. The missionaries could feel the effect of 
this change in the 1890s, observing that, “The Christian religion is nominally under the ban, 
but, practically missionaries may do religious work as long as the attention of the 
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government is not directed to their operations or political complications do not arise to 
compel a protest.”
104   
   
Popular Opposition against Christianity 
Despite the real sense that the Chosŏn government was turning a blind eye toward 
missionary work suggested in the above observation, its optimism was nevertheless 
unfounded and did not reflect the reality of the foreign mission in Korea. The extension of 
Protestant mission work without official government sanctioning caused as many political 
complications with the Korean government and society as the Catholics. The Protestant 
followed the Catholic’s lead to justify its illegal mission work under the unequal treaty and 
there was no difference between the two missions in terms of their neglect of Korean 
sovereignty and local jurisdiction. 
  In fact, anti-missionary opposition was conspicuous from the very beginning of the 
Protestant missions. When the Presbyterian mission began a hospital and an orphanage in 
Seoul, a vicious rumor soon spread among the local populace that the missionaries were 
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“sending them [Koreans to] America as slaves” and “fattening them up for the table.”
105 
This kind of rumor was observed in China as early as 1850s and it seems that the Koreans 
were influenced by anti-missionary sentiment in China. Such anti-foreign sentiment soon 
took the form of direct demonstration. In February 1887, street shops in Seoul closed in 
unison—a traditional means of expressing popular dissatisfaction—and Seoul merchants 
demanded the removal of all foreigners from the city center to suburban Yongsan, outside 
the city gate.
106   
    The shop closure was followed by an anti-Christian decree in April 1888, in 
which the Korean government made clear its will to maintain its proscription of Christianity. 
Protestant missionaries at that time and Protestant historians later explained that the decree 
was directed against the Catholic missionaries who had embarrassed the king by building a 
Cathedral on a hill that looked down upon the palace.
107  However, the official note of 
objection that was sent to the U.S. legation specified the American Protestant missionaries 
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as the violators of law
108  and there is no doubt that the Korean government made no 
distinction between Protestantism and Catholicism but wanted to keep both in check as 
subversive forms of heterodoxy. As mentioned above, royal patronage was given only for 
the medical and diplomatic services of the missionaries, whom the Chosŏn government 
considered as no more than court employees.   
The anti-Christian decree appears to have incited the grassroots anti-Christian 
movement. Shortly thereafter, another grotesque rumor was disseminated claiming that 
missionaries had kidnapped Korean babies and killed them to use their eyes for 
medicine.
109  This rumor caused a mass hysteria that turned into a violent anti-missionary 
mob, later known as the “Baby Riot” in 1888. The frightened missionaries quickly fled into 
the U.S. legation and “lost sleep… took turn about one night watching for the outbreak” on 
that night, while the U.S. Navy squadron off the Inch’ŏn port was quickly mobilized to 
defend the legation building.
110  The riot was pacified in two weeks through Korean 
government intervention without any missionary casualties. Nevertheless, this incident 
furnished convincing proof that Korea was not yet open to Christianity. 
                                                   
108 See note 97 in this chapter. 
109 Underwood, Fifteen years among the top-knots; or, Life in Korea, 15. 
110 "Historical Sketch of the Korea Mission," Korean Repository (July 1898):261.    
73 
 
    While the “Baby Riot” subsided in Seoul, the anti-foreign movement was 
spreading in the rural provinces beyond the city gates of Seoul. This was around the time 
that French Catholic missionaries began open proselytizing and emerging Protestant 
missionaries were naturally identified with the former. For instance, when William Baird 
(1862-1931), a Presbyterian missionary (NP), traveled to Kyŏngsang Province in 1893, he 
found that people feared him as a Catholic priest and he could not approach them closely, a 
circumstance he decried: “people in this country shun us.”
111  The same year Daniel Gifford 
(n.a -1900, NP) and George Heber Jones (1867-1919, NM) found an anonymous 
anti-Christian edict posted on the wall of their residence, while James Scranton was robbed 
on the street one night.
112 
  The more fearful experience missionaries suffered at this time was when the 
Tonghak staged a mass rebellion in 1894 under the slogan of anti-foreignism. Upon 
receiving news of the uprising, the Protestant missionaries in the region all retreated to 
Seoul and thus saved their lives, but many Catholic villages were burnt and destroyed in the 
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southern provinces, while scathing anti-foreign edicts were posted on the streets in Seoul to 
scare all foreigners, whether Catholic or Protestant.
 113   
 
Extraterritoriality and Converts 
  Given the strong anti-foreign and anti-Christian atmosphere, it was inevitable that 
Protestant missionaries would rely on their home government’s power, whether political or 
military, in time of need. An instance of persecution in Pyŏngyang in 1894, shortly before 
the Tonghak Rebellion, provides a good case in point. At that time, Pyŏngyang was not a 
treaty city and foreign residence was not permitted there, much less the Christian religion. 
Yet, both the Presbyterian and Methodist missionaries had visited this city and made 
several converts there. Their justification for their activities was that the Japanese were 
already there and that Americans should deserve the same rights of residence as citizens of 
a most-favored-nation.
114  Moreover, they purchased property in the name of local converts 
and made it into a clandestine church. However, the illegal Christian intrusion was soon 
detected by local residents and reported to the local authorities. The governor of Pyŏngyang 
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quickly arrested and jailed the native Christians who had helped the foreigners, while the 
missionaries were saved from the same fate due to their extraterritorial status. Missionaries 
responded to local Christian requests “to secure protection for them,”
115  by sending an 
urgent telegraph to the American and British legations in Seoul to press the Korean Foreign 
Ministry to release the Christians in Pyŏngyang. The Korean government responded 
quickly, but the governor, who possessed considerable power as a close relative of the 
current Queen, resisted the release order from the central government and continued 
torturing the Christians in prison. To make matters worse, the missionary residence in the 
city was sieged by a local anti-Christian mob. The house was stoned and the wall was torn 
down, while native water carriers were blocked from supplying water to the foreigners.
116 
In the event, the governor surrendered to the central government and the Korean Christians 
were released, but the “Pyŏngyang Persecution” in 1894 provides further proof that there 
was no official or legal sanction for Christian mission work in Korea. 
  Meanwhile, the “Pyŏngyang Persecution” left a significant impact upon the 
popular perception of the foreign missionaries and the subsequent development of the 
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Protestant Church. To draw upon a contemporary missionary’s testimony, “this victory 
made the people generally realize that missionaries were their friends and that behind the 
missionaries was a Power which could overcome even magistrates and governors.”
117  This 
impression is further endorsed by the Korean Christian historian, Paik Nak-chun 
(1895-1985), who was born and brought up in Chŏngju, P’yŏngan Province in the 
aftermath of this event.   
 
This single episode made a profound impression on the minds of the people. 
Even the governor had to yield when he came to deal with missionaries. 
The people who had been oppressed and subjected to extortion by the 
governor turned to the missionary and his religion as a measure of 
protection and personal safety.
118 
 
This description of the oppressed Koreans who turned to the missionaries for protection and 
safety was no different from that of the Korean Catholics under the French mission. In the 
Korean context, where there was no governmental recognition for Christianity, it was 
impossible to carry out the mission work without relying on the privileges of 
extraterritoriality. 
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      Given that “extra-territoriality ensures the safety of the missionaries, but adds 
nothing to the security of its converts,”
119it was inevitable that missionaries would attempt 
to extend their privileges to local converts. As a contemporary foreign observer put it, 
“while foreigners are not subject to the native laws, they yet have influence in securing 
mitigation of punishments or release of prisoners held under the operation of those laws” 
and therefore there were cases where “the missionaries secured the release of men who had 
been imprisoned on grounds which to the missionaries seemed unjust.
120 
Once the Korean populace recognized the superior power of missionaries to 
provide protection from the law, many soon came to flock around the missionaries either 
for conversion or for employment. According to Franklin Ohlinger (1845-1919), a 
Methodist missionary (NM), it was already a common idea in 1892 that, “A Korean who is 
in any way connected with foreigners, especially with missionaries, is perfectly free from 
the restraints of Koreans as well as all other law” and “That is their interpretation of 
ex-territoriality.”
121  Horace N. Allen (NP) agreed, observing: “This [extraterritorial right] 
places great power in his [missionary] hands… is pretty sure to be led into a greater or less 
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number of cases where in a native desires to profit by his Christian connection and obtain 
foreign protection…The hope of this sort of assistance some times induces people to flock 
to the Church.”
122  In short, the missionaries were well aware that their privileged status 
was as much appealing to the Koreans as their religion. Whether the missionaries were 
comfortable with such Korean expectations or not, they were bound to be identified with 
foreign power as long as they possessed privileges of extraterritorial status that oppressed 
Koreans could never dream of. The Protestant Church appeared to Koreans as a political 
refuge as much as the Catholic Church. 
   
Conflicts with Local Customs and Society 
    The Korean Christian sense of enjoying the extraterritorial privileges of the 
missionaries also enabled their bold challenge to local religious traditions, including 
ancestral worship and other practices. Like the early Catholic Mission, the Protestant 
Missions, both Presbyterian and Methodist, defined the Confucian-style ancestral worship 
as idol worship and required the converts to discontinue the practice as a requisite for 
church membership. Naturally, Korean Christians were persecuted and they were often 
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ousted from their family and the local society they belonged to. Daniel Gifford (NP) 
testified to the hardships faced by Korean Christians: 
 
 From the moment the man decides for Christ, a complete revolution in the 
tenor of this life begins. One of the great days for the worship of ancestors 
arrives, and on conscientious grounds he refuses to join in the worship. 
Immediately he finds himself in trouble, and this is especially true to the 
Yangban, or aristocratic claims to social superiority depend so largely upon 
the universally strict adherence to the system of Confucius…Hence our 
Christian finds himself opposed by the bitter anger of the men of his family, 
and all his near and distant relations, not to mention the dislike and ridicule 
of the rest of the community.
123 
 
It was not ancestral worship alone but all indigenous religious practices that had to be 
abandoned completely as “demon worship.” The missionaries encouraged the Christians to 
show their determination in action and to perform the burning of traditional religious 
elements in their house, which was “assailed by the tears and imprecations of the female 
part of his household” as the cult of non-Confucian miscellaneous deities were more a 
religion of women in traditional Korea. Such provocative idol destruction was often carried 
out under missionary supervision. In her diary, Mattie Noble (NM) provides the following 
account of one such mission-sponsored ritual. 
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At one home where the mother had been a Christian a few days, we were 
invited in to help destroy the fetish… Seeing one fetish on the wall, I 
asked its meaning and was told that it was the fetish to the spirit 
protecting the house building… In one room on a shelf were three 
baskets full of clothes that had been made for offering to different evil 
spirits. In a crock was some old cooked rice. She desired to burn them 
all… we took them away to be used for the poorer children of the 
Church , as outside of the Church no one would use then for the fear of 
the wrath of the Evil One.
124 
 
Noble also intervened in non-Christian life and did her best to eliminate any “fetishes” that 
came within her sight. When she saw Koreans in her neighborhood called sorcerers to drive 
away the evil spirit of a sick child, she took her native Christian woman with her and “went 
to the open courtyard of the house to see if we might possibly talk to the mother about the 
Great Physician.” Though she could not make herself heard, “amid the noise and confusion,” 
she “sent two Christian women some other time to teach them.”
125 
    The Presbyterian, Samuel F. Moore (1860-1906, NP), was more confrontational. 
When he made a visit to a Buddhist monastery in 1900, he lost his patience and smashed 
some temple idols. Though he later explained that he had merely “lightly tapped one [idol] 
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as illustrating their inanity,”
126  his bold action came to be known by the British 
representative in Seoul who, fearing a Korean reprise of the previous year’s anti-Christian 
Boxer Rebellion in China, demanded the American government take “drastic measures in 
punishment” of Moore.
127  Horace N. Allen, who had by that time left the Presbyterian 
Mission to serve as a U.S. Consular representative in Seoul, took up the matter with the 
State Department and could placate Moore only by threatening him with imprisonment.
128 
    Allen himself defended other missionaries as men of “common sense with superior 
mental quality,”
129  but iconoclasm against local deities was copied and widely practiced by 
Korean Christians, for which Christians were targeted by anti-Christian mobs. A detailed 
account of the cases is omitted here, but let it suffice to quote a few pages from the first 
official annul of the Korean Presbyterian Church in the Korean language, published in 1928, 
in which many cases of anti-Christian persecution were reported as a result of iconoclastic 
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acts of destruction carried out against local traditions. For instance, in P’yŏngan Province 
alone, the following cases are reported for the year 1894.   
 
In Yŏngch’ŏn, a Christian believer, Paek In-gyŏl, demolished the head 
part of an idol in the local shrine [sŏnghwangdang]. Villagers were 
excited to rise up and lynched Paek harshly, prohibiting other Christians 
to reside in the village any more. This caused a huge uproar for a few 
months but eventually solved by the intervention by government officials. 
In Sŏnchŏn County, when Koŭp Church was just established, an 
evangelist, Chŏng Ing-no stepped in a local shrine building and pulled 
down the divine tablet. Thereupon, villagers were excited to beat our 
believers and banned our believers from farming in the village, causing 
another huge uproar for a few months. Government officials intervened 
and settled it down.
130 
   
The two cases quoted above are those that are clearly recoded
 as having been triggered by 
Christians’ acts of icon destruction. If we include other cases of trouble that are recorded 
without a clear explanation of the cause, we can add a few more cases of severe 
anti-Christian violence such as beating, lynching in detention, and arson of church 
buildings by non-believers.
131  Even without Christian provocation, anti-Christian 
sentiment prevailed in the countryside and violent clashes were frequent in other regions. 
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The above-mentioned Presbyterian Annul describes the general state of anti-Christian trend 
in Hwanghae Province in 1896 as follows. 
 
Non-believers persecuted us on the ground that Christians are immoral 
meeting men and women together and that we discontinue ancestral 
worship and abandon lineage traditions. They caused many difficulties 
for our Church in various ways. For instance, in T’angp’o, Pongsan 
County, our meeting place was destroyed because we did not participate 
in the Confucian worship in the village; In Imdong, Pongsan County, our 
believers were beaten; In P’yŏnchŏn, P’yŏngsan County, they 
[non-Christians] banned us to sing hymnals and reported to the police to 
file a lawsuit against us because we did not give a heed. Besides, there 
were frequent incidents in which the stubborn and wandering delinquents 
formed a flock and demolished our church gates, beat our believers and 
humiliated us.
132 
 
Needless to say, this series of Christian conflicts with the local society completely concurs 
with the case of Korean Catholics in its early development as described in the previous 
chapter. Regardless of the institutional and doctrinal differences between the two Churches, 
both Catholics and Protestants were perceived as a dangerous social heterodoxy under 
foreign control and were thus attacked and ostracized by local society at large. There is no 
doubt that their belief in transcendental God and new Christian principles led converts to 
make a radical departure from Korean social conventions. We should not overlook, 
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however, the fact that their destructive actions were often taken under the encouragement 
and support of foreign Missions who enjoyed extraterritorial protection. In this regard, the 
Protestants shared a common culture with the Catholics and their radical departure from 
social convention must be explained not only by their religious belief in a transcendental 
God but also by their sense of socio-political empowerment under the foreign Mission.   
 
Catholic-Protestant Conflicts 
    This common reliance on foreign power among early Korean Christian converts is 
also evidenced by the fact that there were many disputes between Korean Catholics and 
Protestants in which both sides claimed that they had a sovereign right in the local society 
and were not to be disturbed by any other party, whether government or private. The most 
famous case of Catholic-Protestant conflict is one that occurred in Hwanghae Province in 
1898. The Korean Presbyterian Church records the following account of this incident. 
 
In Chaeryŏng in 1898, when our believers were building a church, more 
than one hundred Catholics came to us out of blue and announced that 
they will also use the church. When we rejected, Catholics were greatly 
angered and tried to stop our construction work. Since we were 
outnumbered, we had to stop it and sent a messenger to P’yŏngyang to let 
the [Presbyterian] missionaries heed our grief. However, there was no  
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effect [of the missionary intervention] and Catholics threatened us so 
fearfully that our believers were depressed to the extreme. Then, Ch’oe 
Pyŏng-sa and Kim Chae-hwan could not endure the plight anymore and 
filed a suit in the court against Father Wilhelm [the head of the Catholic 
Church in that region]. On April 2 in the same year, the court trial began 
and two hundred and more Catholics appeared to demonstrate [their 
power] against our two Protestant believers. Given that scary condition, 
we never thought of winning the case, but with only our Lord’s help, the 
Head of our Church, we were able to win and complete the construction 
of the church…
133 
 
What is important to note in this passage is that both Catholics and Protestants took 
enlisting missionary support for their case for granted. Unlike the Catholic Father, the 
Presbyterian missionaries did not represent Koreans directly in court this time, but they 
were still the first authority to receive the report from Korean Christians before the local 
police. In another Catholic-Protestant conflict in Charyŏng in 1900, in which Protestants 
were beaten by Catholics for not contributing money for a Catholic church building fund, 
the Protestant missionaries pressed the U.S. Minister in Seoul to intervene and let him 
negotiate with the French Minister to stop the French Fathers behind the scheme. When the 
issue was brought to the local Korean court, Presbyterian missionaries, Horace G. 
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Underwood and Samuel A. Moffett attended the trial as observers, which eventually judged 
in favor of the Protestant cause.
134   
    By the end of the
 1890s, it was common sense among Koreans that Protestant 
missionaries held the same power and privileges as Catholic priests. As a result, Protestant 
missionaries were embarrassed at times to find that their converts also came to the Church 
to receive protection. James E. Adams (1867-1929, NP) testifies to one such experience in 
his field in Kyŏngsang Province in 1901.   
 
The immediate and urgent motive for this [visiting of local Christian 
groups] was that one of them was reported to be going over, bag and 
baggage, to the Roman Catholics, who would give help in a civil suit in 
the native courts when we would not. This group was a sort of family 
group, almost all the members being in one relationship… They were 
quite frank to admit that they did not think much of the doctrines of that 
church, but it was essential that they should have protection in order to 
live, and that was the only place they could get it. We labored with them 
for several days but without great apparent effect…
135 
 
It was not only the common people who sought foreign protection. Even among Korean 
officials, who had witnessed the superior power of the missionary to their own government, 
there were a few who began to seek Church membership as a better means of security. Yun 
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Ch’i-ho, one of the first Korean Methodist converts, found one such person among his 
friends and wrote in his diary.     
 
Called on Rou Chai Hion [sic], the Vice Minister of Law. He desires to 
join either the Catholic or the Protestant Mission, as one of the means of 
protection in this land of oppression and disorder. He is, by the way, one 
of the smartest and straightest men in the Corean officialdom.
136 
 
As discussed below, the conversion to Christianity by high-ranking officials was rare, but 
this testimony shows how missionary power was generally perceived by the Koreans. It 
also shows that for seekers of political asylum the decision to go to the Protestant Church 
or Catholic Church was rather a random choice. The important thing was whether the 
foreigners could protect them in exchange for their association to the Church.   
 
The Mission and Material Opulence   
  In addition to extraterritorial privilege, the Protestant missionaries also used their 
material wealth as another means to impress Korean converts. The American foreign 
compound became a major venue for the exhibition of this material wealth. During the high 
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tide of western imperialism in the late nineteenth century, it was a universal practice for 
colonialists to form a foreign compound in which they could maintain their home culture 
and lifestyle in the colony. The American missionaries in Korea, though they were not 
formal colonialists, were in no way different in following this social convention. For 
example, Henry G. Appenzeller, the first Methodist missionary to Korea, was gratified 
when he first saw a foreign compound in Yokohama en route to Korea.   
 
The first thing that impressed me on landing in Yokohama was the 
“foreign concession”, a section of the city set aside exclusively for 
foreigners. Here I found myself practically in an American or English city. 
Good substantial buildings, wide streets and the quick, lively step of 
European. Then the “compound” system was novel to me.
137 
 
Appenzeller’s view was not unique. As soon as they settled in Seoul, and regardless of 
denominational affiliation, American Protestant missionaries together began constructing a 
foreign compound in the proximity of the U.S. Legation. Mrs. Ella Appenzeller wrote 
happily her family: “We, with the Presbyterians and the Legations, are making this end of 
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the city a miniature America. We can show thousands what a home is like, and have made 
ours as pleasant as possible.”
138 
  As the last part of Ella Appenzeller’s statement reveals, the missionary house was 
not merely a place of residence, but an exhibition center where missionaries introduced 
Koreans to the merits of Christian civilization, which Koreans naively identified with the 
American way of life. With this purpose, the missionaries had little hesitation about making 
every aspect of their home life as American as possible. Typically, a missionary house was 
furnished with American desks, chairs and carpets they had sent from home. As for daily 
food, they relied heavily upon imports from home.
139  According a missionary wife, “Rice, 
chickens, and eggs could be bought at the Korean market, which was held every five days, 
but other supplies had to come from San Francisco.”
140 
  To maintain a comfortable living, it was a common missionary practice to hire 
many domestic servants. Back home, a private servant would have been a luxury to most 
missionaries, but in Korea they could use their decent salary to hire a number of them. 
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According to Horace Allen’s testimony, the average market price for servants varied 
depending on their nationality: “A first-class Chinese boy (all Chinese male servants are 
called boys, irrespective of age) can be obtained for about twelve to fifteen dollars a month; 
a Japanese cook and his wife can be hired for about fifteen dollars a month; while Korean 
man or boy will serve for from four to six dollars.”
141  Allen himself hired a Korean waiter, 
a gate boy, sedan chair carriers, and several other helpers, in addition to a Chinese nurse for 
his child and a Japanese cook.
142  As domestic servants were considered a commodity, it 
soon became common that the missionaries prearrange servants for the newcomer 
missionaries. Upon first arriving in Seoul in 1893, O.R. Avison (1860-1956), a Presbyterian 
doctor (NP), was surprised to find a Japanese amah, a Korean cook, and, an errand man, 
waiting to serve him in his residence.
143 
  The justification for hiring so many servants varied among the missionaries. Miss 
Barlow, a Methodist missionary, said it was a substitute for modern infrastructure. 
 
Servants in the Orient are not a luxury but a necessity. In the West you 
also had servants, in the form of running water, electricity, gas, and such 
fixtures as washers, sweepers, and flush toilets… In Korea there are not 
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such conveniences to save both labor and precious time. Yes, here, in 
order to accomplish anything worthwhile, one has to have servants. It is a 
clear “must.”
144 
 
Others said that studying the native language and teaching their children at home left them 
too busy to do household work,
145  while some others retrospectively excused themselves 
by saying that “untrained servants of that day were unable to handle more than one kind of 
a job…an oriental servant is apt to have a very definite idea as to what he will do and what 
he will not do.”
146  Considering the gap in living standard between Korea and America at 
that time, these statements may have an element of truth. But there was another reason for 
having so many domestic servants, which few missionaries were willing to mention--- their 
desire for material wealth and power. Annie Baird (1864-1916, NP), a wife of the pioneer 
Presbyterian missionary, William Baird (NP), was exceptionally honest on that point. She 
admitted that the missionaries in Korea were constantly exposed to a strong temptation to 
employ more servants than actually necessary because “it comes so easily and cheaply.”
147 
She also observed that a young missionary couple to Korea who “came out keyed up to 
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endure physical hardship of any and every description” usually felt that their “occidental 
conscience” was not satisfied when they saw “missionaries living for the most part in 
comfortable houses, surrounded by bevies of yellow, black or brown servants... and 
presenting an appearance of astonishing ease,” and they even thought of dispensing with 
servants altogether.
148  Yet, as time went on and their “mental vision clears,” they also 
ended up in conceding their lofty ideals and adopting conventional missionary practice, 
acquiescing in the observation that “the cheapest and most plentiful thing under heathen 
skies is human manual labor, and the scarcest and most precious is missionary time and 
strength.”
149 
  It is in such homes of “astonishing ease” surrounded by “bevies of servants” that 
many Koreans were invited to learn the essence of Christian civilization in its American 
expression. The missionaries were generally confident and positive about the evangelizing 
effect of such visual opulence upon the Korean mind.   
 
Koreans are fond of visiting the homes of foreigners. They admire the 
comfort…of the home life of the strangers. They go home to ponder on the 
religion which takes hold of the present life of man… They mark our 
cheerful faces and our enjoyment of life, and wonder at the cause. They 
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listen to the tales of achievements of Western science. The huge cities, the 
wonderful railroad, the marvelous steamboat, impress them with a sense of 
the lifting power of our civilization. When they realize that all this is the 
outcome and development of our religion, the practical value of Christianity 
makes a powerful appeal to them.
 150 
 
In fact, material superiority was the common answer to the most frequently asked questions 
by the Koreans--- “What good it is going to do [to become a Christian] or “in what respect 
Christianity is superior to Confucianism and Buddhism?” To these questions, the typical 
missionary answer was to “point to the superior comforts which Christians enjoy, to detail 
the advantages of a distinctively Christian civilization.”
151 
  The affluent and conspicuous foreign lifestyle of the missionaries stood in stark 
contrast to the poor living standard of the Korean Christians who came under missionary 
care. On the one hand, the gap in material living standards convinced the poor Koreans of 
the power of the foreign missionaries and the superiority of the Christian religion. On the 
other hand, such material wealth also carried a danger of alienating Koreans from the 
missionaries physically, culturally, and, psychosocially. Nonetheless, the general view 
among the missionaries is that placing an affluent lifestyle on display had a more positive 
impact on winning more converts. The effects of this practice had been tested and verified 
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in neighboring mission fields such as China. On this reasoning, the Korea missionaries 
insisted that “the case is the same in Korea” and the Presbyterian mission board raised their 
salaries “taking into account of the great advantage of this argument.”
152  In sum, Protestant 
missionaries from the beginning put great emphasis on the promise of material wealth, 
which they considered a good expedient means for Christian propaganda in Korea.   
 
Missionary Adaptation to Social Hierarchy   
  Using extraterritoriality and material affluence, missionaries constructed their 
image as a new ruling class in Korean society. In their home residences, missionaries were 
surrounded by a number of servants who were dependent upon their foreign masters for pay 
and protection. American missionaries, many of whom came to Korea in their twenties 
straight from college or seminary, did not enjoy commanding positions in their own 
society.
153  Once they crossed the Pacific and reached Korea, however, they were treated as 
masters without any qualification. Being an American missionary secured them 
considerable social privilege and the young missionaries soon learned the joy “to be lord 
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over a little crowd of underlings” and embraced “a pleasant feeling of power and 
position.”
154   
  It is important to note here that the occupation of domestic servant was held in the 
lowest esteem in Chosŏn society, where the institution of slavery still existed and little 
distinction was made between servant and slave.
155  Thus, servants in the missionary house 
followed the social convention of making themselves absolutely subservient to their 
master’s will and served their foreign masters loyally as they would do to the Korean 
aristocratic class called yangban. Servants, for examples, addressed the missionaries as 
“yŏnggamnim”(master) or “taein” (great man),
156  which were the honorific titles for social 
superiors in the Korean language. Likewise, missionary wives were called “taepuin”(great 
lady) as the spouses of honorable men. This social convention gladdened many American 
missionaries of common origin, who could never expect such a high title at home, and they 
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often reported this home proudly: “The foreigners here are highly respected… We are here 
called “the great man” or “the great lady.” 
157 
  The missionary desire to hold and perpetuate their superior position to the Koreans 
was also manifest in the Korean language they learned to use. The Korean language is 
sensitive to distinctions of social status, and the mode of speech depends on the relation of 
power between the speakers. The missionaries often complained that the Korean language 
was so foreign and difficult to learn, but they scarcely made a mistake when it came to 
whom they should use panmal, the language seniors use to address juniors, which the 
missionaries called “low talk.” The first missionaries perhaps learned this linguistic practice 
naturally through the real-life experience of being a master, but using “low talk” to Koreans 
soon became such a common habit that it was actually taught in the Korean language 
manual compiled by veteran missionaries. The manual instructed the missionary learner to 
use “low talk” to “children, boys, and, in general, to servants,” adding a special note, “do 
not be afraid of often using something a little higher” to servants.
158  It also taught 
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missionaries proper manners expected of a Korean nobleman: “Do not, as a rule, salute to 
children or servants first, but expect and return their salutations.”
159   
  Having received such training, the missionaries did not hesitate to demonstrate 
their superior position to Koreans in public just as yangban aristocrats did. For instance, 
when the missionaries walked on a crowded street with servants, they let the servants “tell 
them [people] avoid pressing near us and to make way for us.”
160  The missionary ladies 
avoided traveling horseback, because in Chosŏn society “only the low dancing girls travel 
in this way.”
161  So, they used sedan chairs as this was the primary means of transportation 
for high-class women. And, when they went on sedan chair for evangelical purposes, they 
made their servants follow on foot after the chair carriers.
162  Later, some male missionaries 
gave their servants a more difficult time by traveling fast on a bicycle. In this case, the 
missionary did not travel with the servants but went ahead to the villages and the towns of 
his destination to attract a crowd with this strange locomotive and waited for his servants to 
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catch up with him and follow up his gospel teaching.
163  In the 1920s, missionaries began to 
drive T-Fords,
164  a mode of transportation too luxurious to afford not only for Koreans, but 
also for most Japanese colonialists.   
  The social conduct of the missionaries was so perfectly in accordance with that of 
the traditional yangban aristocrats that local Koreans soon coined the new idiom, yang taein, 
meaning “western yangban.”
165  Contemporary missionary reports and writings are inclined 
to depict their self-image as benevolent and egalitarian servants to the heathens, but their 
image in the Korean eye was quite different. No matter how benevolent they were when 
compared with the local yangban, they were nonetheless masters and identified as such in 
the local context. 
 
Servants-turned-Christian Leaders 
  The master-servant relation was originally shaped in the domestic sphere of the 
missionary residence but was soon carried over into the ecclesiastical sphere. This is 
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because many of the early Korean converts, including Korean pastors, were actually 
produced from among missionary servants. The missionaries, especially in the early stage 
of the mission, regarded these servants as the primary target of conversion since they were 
within reach and more receptive to missionary influence, being protected in their foreign 
residence and free from governmental and popular harassment. In fact, in 1893, the 
Methodist Mission reported that out of sixty-two Korean members of their Church, 
one-third of them were under missionary employment.
166  In this context, it was a natural 
consequence that the servant-turned-convert did not enjoy an equal status with the 
missionaries. Even after conversion, they remained as servants under missionary pay. Some, 
however, were assigned as “helpers” to provide assistance to missionary work. To take a 
few examples, Kim Chang-sik (1857-1929), who later became the first Korean deacon in 
the Methodist Church in Korea, was originally a gatekeeper, hired by Franklin Ohlinger 
(NM).
167  Chŏn Tŏkki (1875-1914), who was later known as a representative anti-Japanese 
Christian nationalist, was a cook for William Scranton (NM), the first Methodist medical 
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missionary.
168  Yi Ki-p’ung (1865-1942), one of the first seven Korean Presbyterian 
ministers, ordained in 1907, and the first Korean missionary to the Quelpart Island (Cheju 
Island) was also a cook for William Swallen (1865-1954, NP).
169  In the case of Walter 
Erdman (1877-1948, NP), his female servant was such an excellent cook that he hesitated 
to use her as an evangelist.   
 
My cook has been a great help. She is unusually bright and quick to 
understand my meaning, so I often ask her to “translate” my words to 
others. She is a very good cook, too, but the fear is growing upon me that 
she is too bright to be a cook all her life and some day [sic] I will have to 
make her into a Bible woman, or my conscience won’t be easy! Good 
servants are very important in a missionary home, but in the ultimate, 
good Bible women are probably more so.
170 
 
The “amahs”, nannies, in the missionary home, were also mobilized for evangelical 
purposes. One such amah at the Swallens (NP) residence was recruited as an evangelist and 
later sent to Cheju Island as the first woman missionary. The Swallens were particularly 
fond of recruiting Korean evangelists among their servants and thus Mrs. Swallen 
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continued to practice the same method and still advocated it in the 1930s, recommending it 
to young missionaries: “Let the new missionaries try it out. Train your servants to be 
helpers and workers.”
171 
  How this subservient status of the early Korean Christian leaders affected the 
formative process of the Korean Church will be discussed later; let it suffice here to note 
that the missionaries in Korea did not attempt to change traditional status society by 
applying the Christian egalitarianism they advocated to the reality they encountered in 
Korea. Rather, they established themselves as “high” status teachers with respect to the 
“low” status converts and thus generally adopted and smoothly fit the traditional social 
hierarchy based upon the Confucian notion of an absolute status distinction between the 
gentleman and the ignorant.   
     
Missionaries and the Korean Aristocracy 
The Korean ruling elites who suppressed the Catholics for so many years in order 
to protect the Confucian orthodoxy could not favor Protestantism. Not only were the major 
teachings the same in both religions but the Korean Protestant converts were no different 
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from the Catholics in terms of their class background and their relation to the foreign 
missionary. In their eyes, Christians were all an impoverished, ignorant mass who blindly 
followed foreign authority for money and protection. This image was not entirely 
unfounded. High-class yangbans naturally scorned the subservient status of Korean 
converts to the Protestant missionary and despised them for it. Even though they soon 
learned that the treaty condition of extraterritoriality meant they could not quell Korean 
Protestants by force, yangban nevertheless maintained an antagonistic attitude toward the 
missionaries and Christians, harassing them when occasion allowed, and few of them dared 
to join the Church. 
  The absence of upper-class Koreans in the Christian constituency was conspicuous 
from the beginning. After the first decade of missionary work, the Methodist mission 
admitted that “most of our work has been among the poorer class, and I believe that our 
work among this class has proved far more successful and its results far more lasting than 
among the class of nobles."
172  The Presbyterians had the same impression. According to 
Lillias H. Underwood, the wife of Horace G. Underwood, the early members of the 
Saemunan church, the first Presbyterian Church in Seoul in 1890s, “were all poor” and their 
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occupations were “carpenters, merchants, farmers, policemen, interpreters”, whose 
technical labor was considered “low” in the Korean status society, and “none of them 
earned much over five dollars a month.”
173 
  Consequently, the yangbans disdained the Church as the gathering place of the low. 
Even in the 1920s, the descendants of the yangbans “largely considered Christianity as the 
religion for coolies and beggars.”
174  The lack of social dignity and respect for the Korean 
Christian image, which was established at the beginning of the mission, left a profound 
impact on subsequent Korean Christian development. It completely alienated the status 
conscious Korean elites from the Church and thus Christianity spread mainly among the 
socially weak. Protestant Christianity, then, did not break traditional social status 
distinctions in Korean society. Rather, it underscored existing status distinctions by 
infiltrating into the lower classes only, while alienating the upper class.   
Finally, the missionaries’ failure to attract yangbans to the Church soon led them to 
consider the yangban persona non grata. They often took the yangban’s resilient opposition 
to Christianity as a challenge to missionary authority and identified them more or less as 
enemies. Their anti-yangban sentiment was no secret and publicly disclosed, especially to 
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American Christian audiences at home. According to Daniel Gifford (NP), a typical 
yangban had the following traits.   
 
He has, in a measure, the intellectual power of a man, with the actual 
knowledge of a child… [He] has become so self-conceited that Socrates 
himself could not convince him of his ignorance. He is color-blind to 
everything modern… He is slave to the traditions and customs transmitted 
from antiquity. His thinking has no breadth nor originality… [He] displays a 
ceremonious politeness that is certainly charming. But do not for a moment 
be deceived. There is very little heart in it.
175 
 
The missionary-yangban relation thus was mutually antagonistic from the early days of the 
mission and stood in stark contrast to the subservient but intimate master-servant 
relationship shared between the missionaries and lower-class Korean Christians. This 
class-biased structure of the Korean Church continued for many years to come and kept 
Koreans from being united under the cross. 
 
Protestant Social Elites: Two Notable Exceptions 
  The absence of yangban Christian in the early Korean Christian development was 
a general rule but there were always some exceptions. In Korea in the 1890s, there were 
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only a few such exceptional individuals who were elite yangban and Christian at the same 
time. Here it is worth noting about the two names, who played an inproportionately large 
role, Yun Ch’i-ho (1864-1945) and Sŏ Chae-p’il (1864-1951).
176   
  Yun was born in Asan, Ch’ungch’ong Province, in 1864 as son of wealthy yangban, 
Yun Ung-nyŏl, who then served as a high-ranking military official in the Chosŏn court. Yun 
was known for his intellectual excellence from an early age and selected by the court as a 
member of a special envoy to Japan in 1881, when he was only seventeen. His mission was 
to accompany Kim Okkyun, the head of the Progressive Party in the Korean Court, and 
master the Japanese language as well as modern scholarship and technology. While in 
Japan, he not only mastered Japanese but also learned some English and thus employed by 
General Lucius Foote (1826–1913), the first American Minister to Korea, as his translator 
and returned to Korea with him to work in the U.S. Legation. 
  Sŏ Chae-p’il came from a very similar background to that of Yun. He was from a 
yangban family and was also dispatched to study in Japan at a young age. He was enrolled 
                                                   
176 For the summary of Yun’s life, “A Short Sketch of Dr. T. H. Yun’s Life,” The Korean 
Mission Field (March, 1935): 45-52. For So’s life, Philip Jaisohn and Sŏn-pʻyo Hong, My 
days in Korea and other essays (Sŏul: Institute for Modern Korean Studies, Yonsei 
University, 1999), xiii-xvii, 3-39. The following summation of their life paths in this 
section relies on these sources and Yun Ch’i-ho’s Diary unless noted otherwise.  
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in Japanese Military Academy and studied modern military technology there. Also, like Yun, 
Sŏ was a protégée of Kim Okkyun and closely associated with him as a member of the 
Progressive Party. Therefore, it was natural that, when Kim Okkyun staged a place coup in 
1882 in order to oust the conservatives from the Chosŏn court, Sŏ would take an active part 
in it as a military specialist and command the armed units to occupy and defend the royal 
palace. Yun Ch’i-ho himself, though a progressive, did not play an active part in the coup, 
although his father Ung-nyŏl was involved in the coup on the side of the Progressives. Thus, 
when the coup failed due to Chinese intervention, Sŏ and Yun, were forced into exile.   
Sŏ fled to Japan and then to the United States in exile, while his family including 
his wife and children were all executed by the Chosŏn court. Subsequently, Sŏ migrated to 
the United States. While in the States, Sŏ studied medicine and obtained a medical degree 
to be a professional physician. He then married with an American woman and naturalized 
to obtain U.S. citizenship with a new Anglicized name, Phillip Jaisohn. It was through his 
direct American experience that he came to adopt the Christian way of life and he was 
baptized as a Methodist.   
By contrast, Yun fled to Shanghai through the good offices of Lucius Foote and 
enrolled in Anglo-Chinese College, a Southern Methodist mission school. During his  
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studies, Yun was inspired by intellectual and kind missionary teachers and after a long 
period of contemplation, he agreed to receive baptism as a Southern Methodist. Because of 
this denominational connection, he proceeded to pursue advanced studies in Methodist 
college in the American South. He first studied religion and theology at Vanderbilt College 
in Tennessee and then proceeded to study the same at Emory College, Georgia. Upon 
graduation in 1893, he still could not return to Korea as the conservative was still in power. 
Instead, he returned to Shanghai to teach at his alma mater, Anglo-Chinese school and 
married with a Chinese Christian woman there.   
The Japanese victory over China in 1894 led to the collapse of the conservative 
cabinet in the Korean court and a new government was formed under Japanese tutelage by 
the surviving members of the former Progressive Party. With this dramatic change of 
Korean politics, Yun and Sŏ were finally able to come back to Korea after a long period of 
exile, where their former colleagues were now in power. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Yun and Sŏ soon established the Independence 
Club to promote Korean nationalism, while publishing the first Korean newspapers in 
vernacular, Tongnip sinmun [The Independence]. They taught at mission schools and made 
various efforts for the dissemination of modern education. Yun and Sŏ happened to be  
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Christians, but the current literature on Korean history often identifies them as 
representative Korean Christian leaders. However, as this chapter demonstrates, the life and 
career of Yun and Sŏ were so different from those of ordinary Korean Christians at that 
time that it is completely misleading to view them as the product of a Korean Christian 
movement pioneered by the American Protestant Missions. They were not led to the 
Christian faith by the young conservative American missionaries in Korea, who used their 
imperial privilege to win the souls of the oppressed. They were not intellectually inspired 
by most American missionaries in Korea, who came straight out of college or the academy 
to Korea, but by well-trained college professors in Shanghai or in the United States. While 
most Korean Christians had no direct access to western scholarship, Yun and Sŏ had easy 
access to it
, being well versed in Japanese and English as well as Classical Chinese. In the 
case of Yun, his command of English was so sophisticated that he won a prize in an 
oratorical contest in his college days in the U.S. and kept his diary in English, from which 
more will be quoted in later chapters.   
In sum, there were no other Korean Christians besides Yun and Sŏ who had a 
comparable social status and breadth of knowledge in western civilization in Korea at the 
end of the nineteenth century time. Unlike Christian leaders in Meiji Japan, most of whom  
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studied abroad and competed with missionaries in the intellectual arena, Korean Christians 
had no equal opportunity because Korea had long been a secluded country and was just 
beginning to open outside world. In this sense, Yun and Sŏ were not merely exceptional 
Christians. They were exceptional Koreans who had no parallel in Korean society at that 
time.   
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Chapter 3  Church Formation under Missionary Control 
 
  The previous chapter examined the formation of power relations between foreign 
missionaries and Korean converts and found that a highly asymmetrical relationship existed 
between the two parties. The missionary always held controlling power over the Korean 
convert, who was dependent upon economic, social, and political support from the 
missionaries. Moreover, the missionaries effectively fit themselves into the traditional 
social hierarchy and presented themselves as aristocratic rulers to instruct lower-class 
Koreans, who made up the majority of converts.   
  Despite these observations, previous studies have commonly emphasized that the 
Korean Church had been formed under the Korean Christian leadership because the 
Missions, the Presbyterian one in particular, adopted a distinctive mission policy, called the 
“Nevius Method,” that granted more freedom to local initiative and prioritized   
self-government (in church management), self-support (in finance), and self-propagation  
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(in evangelism) in the Church.
177  The exponential growth of the Korean Presbyterian 
Church has been largely attributed to success of the Nevius Method.   
This chapter analyzes how the asymmetrical relationship of power between 
missionaries and local converts was reflected at the level of church organization and argues 
that Korean initiative along the lines of the Nevius Method was actually impracticable since 
the missionaries carried their power over Koreans into the realms of everyday life and the 
Church. By institutionalizing their superior status in the Korean Church, the missionaries 
perpetuated their rule over Korean Christians without granting Korean autonomy. 
 
Christian Growth without Church Organization 
  As freedom of missionary work was gradually secured under the protection of 
extraterritorial rights, the Protestant missions expanded their evangelistic campaigns from 
Seoul to the countryside. Officially, missionaries could not travel freely in the interior and 
were supposed to live on designated foreign settlements, but missionaries were not 
constrained to obey this rule as long as the Korean government acquiesced. And despite the 
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general anti-foreign and anti-missionary sentiment that was widespread among the Korean 
populace, once the power and authority of the missionaries became generally recognized 
they were able to attract many Koreans from the lower classes who needed protection. As a 
result, all Protestant missions could increase their church memberships relatively easily, 
especially after the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. But the Presbyterian Mission won the 
largest number of converts. The statistical record shows that the Mission had 3 organized 
churches, 300 unorganized churches with 4,793 communicants and 12,694 adherents under 
its jurisdiction in 1900.
178   
  Numerical growth, however, was not accompanied by the formation of an 
independent Korean Church governed by local Christian leaders. This is because Protestant 
missions did not pay due attention to the training of Korean Christian leaders and pass 
ecclesiastical authority into Korean hands. In fact, the Mission did not ordain even a single 
Korean pastor for more than two decades after the beginning of missionary activities. As a 
result, in 1900, there were 23 Korean evangelists but all were unordained helpers to the 
missionaries and had no ecclesiastical power to examine baptismal candidates, administer 
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sacraments or discipline Korean congregations. All of these important powers were 
monopolized by the ordained missionaries, whose number counted only 29 in 1900. As a 
matter of fact, Sŏ Kyŏng-jŏ, one of the first Korean Protestant Christians, who received 
baptism from a Scottish missionary in Manchuria in 1882 and had worked as an active 
evangelist in Korea ever since, was still an unordained assistant to the missionary and paid 
by the Mission in 1902.
179  He had to wait another five years before he was finally ordained 
as a minister of the Korean Church in 1907, a point which will be discussed later. In short, 
even after two decades of missionary work, there was still neither a Korean minister nor 
Korean Church with a capital “C”, i.e. as an institutionalized and unified religious body 
represented by Koreans. Instead, what existed were dozens of local evangelists and 
hundreds of churches, both in the city and countryside, all of which were under missionary 
jurisdiction. According to missionary statistics taken in 1900, the majority of local churches, 
300 out of 303 churches, were “unorganized,
180  meaning they possessed no resident leader 
and steady organization, and were often called “outstations” of the Mission, rather than 
                                                   
179Minutes and Reports of the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the Korea Mission of the 
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“churches,” where the missionaries were supposed to reach out on regular basis from their 
“station” in the city.   
  In reality, however, such a small number of missionaries could not provide 
adequate pastoral care to the increasing number of congregations scattered across the 
country. Since missionaries mainly lived in the foreign compound of Korean cities and 
visited churches in the countryside only at times of occasional itinerating, it was impossible 
to visit and provide sufficient instructions for rural congregations. Samuel A. Moffett 
(1864-1939, NP) reported this difficulty in 1901.   
 
In the ten trips of 86 days, all the time which I was able to spare from 
the city work, so much of the time was necessarily taken up with the 
urgent and important work of examination of candidates for baptism that 
too little time was left for instruction and for more thorough 
organization… I have been able to provide for the administration of 
Lord’s Supper in but six of the churches this year, a fact I very deeply 
regret...
181 
 
The missionaries were aware that they lacked the power necessary to supervise the 
numerous Korean churches. They therefore made some Korean Christians their personal 
“helpers” (chosa) and dispatched them to take care of local churches on their behalf. 
                                                   
181 S. A. Moffett, “Clippings from October Reports,” Korea Field (November 1901):14.  
115 
 
However, these helpers were not granted the power to manage the local churches, and their 
main duty was to relay missionary instructions to local congregations. As Samuel Moffett 
admitted, “Efficient as the helpers are in their sphere of service… they have not the 
missionary's power of organization of new work,”
182  and thus could not serve as ministers. 
In addition, even the combined force of the missionaries and helpers was still too small to 
cover all the work in the assigned missionary territory, called “the circuit,” and even 
Korean helpers, being committed to other duties, were not always available. In a report 
from 1903, William Baird (NP) described the difficulty of managing the circuit with limited 
manpower.   
 
[My] circuit has received less attention from me than I should have 
desired. The two helpers, Pang Ki Chang and Kim Hyo Syun, have 
continued to travel on regular circuits, visiting each group about once a 
month, when not prevented by class work... Pang has given a part of the 
time to studies in preparation for the ministry. The circuit has therefore 
not received as much of his attention as formerly.
183 
 
Samuel Moffett had the same problem. He had 33 outstations under his charge and assigned 
his helpers to take care of “from four to twelve outstations with their tributary groups of 
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believers in many villages.” Still, his burden was too heavy to carry out and he had to state 
in his annual report that he had “not been able to visit all the outstations, seven of them not 
having received even one visit during the year” and “there are a number of places in which 
interested inquirers are only waiting for a visit from the missionary.”
184   
  Closely observing the mission field, the missionaries understood well that, “In all 
the region there is a pressing need for [Korean] leaders or pastors” with the growing 
number of Christians in Korea, but they were reluctant to produce Korean ministers and 
delegate their ecclesiastical power to them because “administrative problems and the duties 
of real spiritual leadership fall heavily upon those who were capable of the simpler labors 
of gathering the first converts about them.”
185  In other words, the missionaries did not 
believe that Korean leaders could do more than the “simple labor of gathering” people to 
the church and had no intention of delegating their ecclesiastical power to the local 
leadership. At best, then, Korean Christian leaders were supposed to remain “helpers” to 
the missionaries.     
  Leaving aside the question of whether missionaries made a fair judgment of 
Korean leadership, let us note here that the division of labor and the hierarchical 
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relationship between the missionary and the Korean helpers resembled that of an absentee 
landlord and his peasant. Developing this analogy, we might say that the missionaries 
possessed the Korean “outstations” as property and cultivated them from afar by means of 
“helpers,” but they never missed the chance to harvest the “converts” of these areas by 
dictating baptismal rights and report to the mission board the number of Koreans souls they 
had won on Korean soil. It may be said that the missionaries were the commanders in the 
mission field and enlisted Korean evangelists as their subordinates, without paying due 
respect to them as the same workers of God.   
 
Salary Gap between Missionary and Korean Evangelist 
  The missionary’s lack of respect for the Korean mission workers is also evidenced 
by their pay rate, especially when compared with the missionary’s salary. During the period 
from 1900-1905, Presbyterian missionaries received their annual salary from the mission 
board according to the following formula: Married male missionary, $1,250 (= 2,500 yen); 
single male missionary, $833.33 (1,666 yen); single woman, $650 (1,300 yen) ; Per child,  
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$100 (200 yen).
186  Thus, the average missionary family with two children, for instance, 
received 2,900 yen a year. In contrast, the Korean helpers received only 130-180 yen per 
annum from the mission, while male colporteurs and Bible women, who travelled widely to 
sell Bibles and distribute religious tracts, received even less, 50-70 yen and 40 yen 
respectively.
187  On average, the basic income of the missionary was twenty times higher 
than that of the Korean helper.   
  To some extent, the salary gap between the missionary and the Korean worker was 
inevitable and corresponded to the general economic gap between the United States and 
Korea. It is important to note, however, that the Korean church worker’s pay was kept as 
low as that of an average servant or manual laborer of the day. According to the Japanese 
governmental survey in 1906, the average daily wage for a Korean carpenter (daiku/moksu), 
construction worker (dokata/nogada), and domestic servant (genan/hanam) was estimated 
around 1 yen, 0.6 yen and 0.5 yen.
188  Assuming that each laborer works at least twenty 
days a month, this would make their annual salaries 240 yen, 144 yen, and 120 yen 
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respectively. According to missionary testimony from 1910, a peasant’s daily wage was 20 
cents (=0.4 yen), making an annual salary of 96 yen a year, based upon the same 
assumption.
189  This salary range was exactly the same as that of Korean evangelists under 
missionary pay. The Korean evangelists were rated the same as the manual worker in the 
Korean labor market.   
The breakdown of annual expenditures for an average single male missionary 
proves this point. As seen below in the “servant” column of Table 1, the missionary 
calculates the average pay for a house servant at 75 yen per person. This sum almost equals 
that of the Korean colporteur and is even higher than that of the Bible woman. Also, 
because servants were usually boarded in the missionary’s house and there were no 
independent costs for food and lodging, their 75 yen salary can be taken as their net income. 
It is thus likely that missionary servants were much better off, and perhaps, closer to the 
income level of the Korean helper, who received 130-180 yen, from which they had to pay 
for the daily necessities. While this point cannot be proven conclusively, it would be no 
mere coincidence if the net income of a domestic servant and a Korean evangelist was the   
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Table 1    Breakdown of a Single Male Missionary’s Annual Expenditure 
190 
Items of Expenditure    Total (Yen) 
Board @1.75 yen per day  638 
Laundry  20 
Lights  13 
Fuel, Wood and Coal  75 
Clothing  185 
Servant 1&1/2@ 75yen per year  112 
Books, periodicals, Stationary, postage  100 
Furniture, matting and Repairs  25 
Dentistry  40 
Public subscription(tract society, YMCA)  35 
Charity, one tenth  125 
Sewing and mending  6 
Linen, bedding, towels etc.  15 
Insurance  50 
Itinerating outfit and repair  10 
Supplies, toilet, blacking, watch repairs 20  20 
Total    1469 
   
OTHER LEGITIMATE EXPENSES   
Annual Meeting expense  50 
Tracts and deficits in evangelistic work  50 to 150 
Summer vacations, health trips  25 to 150 
Bicycle and repairs, horse and feed, 
    
30 
  Total    155 
Grand Total  1624 yen 
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same because they came from identical backgrounds and the former could become the latter 
upon the missionary’s personal nomination.   
  The above chart also illuminates how different the quality of life was between the 
missionary and the Korean workers. To take a few examples, the single male missionary 
expended 638 yen for “Board”, but this item alone is four to five times as large as the 
Korean helper’s total salary per year. Even if the missionary heavily depended upon the 
expensive imported food from abroad,
191  the gap in food expenses is significant. Similarly, 
“fuel, coal and wood” were necessities for both the missionary and the Korean alike, but 
the missionary’s annual expenditure of 75 yen exceeds the annual salary of a Korean 
colporteur. Lastly, the vacation fee from 25 to 150 yen is considered “legitimate” and no 
equivalent reward was offered the Koreans. Of course, the Korean Christians were the 
natives and used to the local environment, but if refreshment was the reward for labor, the 
Koreans might have shared in it as they did almost the same labor.   
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  Whatever justification there may be for such differential treatment, the obvious 
consequence was that many poor Koreans flocked around the missionary for material gain. 
Edwin Kagin (NP) testifies,   
 
Many Koreans have the idea that the "Moksa"[minister] is a sort of 
inexhaustible supply of ready cash. Says your [Korean language] teacher, 
"Please loan me $200.00 to put out on interest so I can pay my 
daughter's expenses at the school in Seoul…” [A Korean Christian] 
Choe sends a friend and she stands up before the missionaries and with a 
flowing introduction… eloquently pictures her friend’s need and asks 
for a loan of $5.00 for him in order that he may buy materials to put up a 
new house”… Helper Kim’s wife has just had an operation performed… 
He has no money, no house of his own, and has been asked to move out 
of the house he is in. There is no way out of it says he, than that the 
“Moksa” lend him $40.00 to buy a house. And so it continues---requests 
for money come from all sources and for all manner of things. The 
problem is to give wisely and to those who are worthy.
192 
 
Hence, the Korean evangelists who received regular pay from the mission were considered 
“worthy” from the missionary viewpoint, working for the Christian cause rather than mere 
material gain. However, the fact that they received as little as the average wage for a house 
servant or day laborer of that day made it a disrespectable occupation and degraded the 
popular image of Christians. Even if Korean church workers were satisfied with their work 
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and pay, they were seen, in the eyes of other Koreans, as simply in need of money and 
dependent on the foreigners. Eva Field (NP) testified to this effect about her 
servant-evangelist. 
 
Sometimes the impudent question "how much money do you get for 
preaching this doctrine?" is asked [for my preaching servant], and then 
she replies "I am not paid for preaching. I 'm only the lady's servant, and 
I’m telling you of Jesus because He has taken away my sins…As yet she 
has not been employed as a Bible Woman, and does not wish to be, her 
reason being that she wishes to be in a position where she cannot be 
accused of preaching for money.
193 
 
This anecdote was, of course, intended to highlight the genuine faithfulness of the Korean 
servant. At the same time, however, it also reveals that the Bible woman under foreign pay 
was a socially despised occupation. The position of missionary servant was little better. The 
popular Korean perception was that Christians were affiliated with the missionary primarily 
for money, a view based on the known fact that they were hired by the missionaries.   
 
Exclusion of Korean Leadership in the Formation of the Presbyterian Church 
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  While the Presbyterian Mission controlled all phases of mission work and kept 
Korean workers under their command for the first two decades of the mission, it was not 
without a formal vision to establish a Korean Presbyterian Church as an independent body 
run by ordained Korean ministers. Nevertheless, they were very slow to move in that 
direction. In 1893, the four Presbyterian Missions—U.S. North and South, Australian and 
Canadian—jointly established the Council of the Presbyterian Mission, which aimed at 
coordinating efforts to prepare for establishing an independent native Church in future. It 
was stipulated, however, that the Mission hold the “controlling ecclesiastical powers in 
relation to the native Church until the organization of latter in accordance with Presbyterian 
usage” was created and that no ecclesiastical authority would be granted to Korean 
congregations.
194  Moreover, the Council was composed entirely of male missionaries and 
no Korean leaders were allowed to sit in at the sessions of the Council. In other words, the 
Council continued to discuss the issues of the Korean congregation and prepare for the 
future independence of the Korean Church without having any Korean representative hear 
their voice. In 1901, the Council for the first time allowed several Korean leaders to sit in 
on part of the session, which was conducted in Korean, but the Korean-language session 
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had no legislative power and all such power was exercised by the English language sessions 
of the missionaries.
195  In sum, Koreans were completely excluded from the 
decision-making process of the Council, where the future independence of the Korean 
Church was discussed over many years.   
  The Presbyterian Mission’s unwillingness to include Korean leaders in the church 
administration was based on their low view of Korean qualifications. Thus, the Mission 
held that “ecclesiastical and administrative responsibility should not be laid upon the people 
until men truly qualified to discharge such responsibility have been raised up, and the 
spiritual state of the Christians warrants and invites it.”
196  In this age of imperialism, such 
a low view of the native converts was nothing new in other mission fields and contained 
some truth, especially in the case of Korea, where the majority of the converts came from 
the poorest and least educated class. However, the Korean Mission’s fault lay in the fact 
that they took no action to improve the situation, knowingly neglecting the education and 
training of the future leaders of the Korean Church. 
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  The absence of a qualified native leadership in the Korean Church was well known 
to the Board and was the cause of some concern. Robert Speer (1855–1918), the Secretary 
of the Presbyterian Foreign Mission Board, who visited Korea for field inspection in 1897, 
generally agreed that the Mission should hold ecclesiastical authority over the immature 
Korean church and admitted that “this caution in ordaining men and in establishing a native 
ecclesiastical body, like a Presbytery, lessens and postpones certain dangers.” Nevertheless, 
he did not forget to point out the danger of maintaining such practices since “the times of 
delicacy will arise when natives are ordained and ecclesiastical authority passes into their 
hands.”
197   
  Five years later in 1902, the new Board Secretary, Arthur Brown, also visited 
Korea and found the Mission was still wanting in a unified church organization. He also 
observed that this absence of church organization was due to “the lack of duly qualified 
men for church officers.”
198  Unlike Speer, however, Brown was not entirely persuaded by 
the Mission’s everlasting excuse that there was no suitable men in Korea. Rather he 
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suspected the real reason might be the too rigid qualifications the missionaries imposed 
upon Koreans. In his official report, Brown questioned: 
 
What is meant by “suitability”? I cordially agree with the Korean 
missionaries that an office-bearer in the Church of God should be a man 
of more than ordinary wisdom and spiritual character. Undoubtedly, the 
missionaries are right in saying that comparatively few such men have 
yet been developed in Korea… [but] in my brief contact with the Korean 
Christians, I got the impression that, from the viewpoint of spiritual life, 
they averaged as high as an equal number of American Christians…Is 
there not risk of going to an extreme in deferring organization of the 
already numerous and rapidly increasing Christians of Korea until ideal 
church officers can be found?
199 
 
Nonetheless, Brown’s high estimate of the Korean potentials conflicted with the majority 
view of the Mission. The missionaries in the field knew how hard the Korean Christians 
were struggling in dire poverty and few of them were trained to take any leadership role. 
William B. Harrison (Southern Presbyterian Mission, hereafter “SP”
 200) in Chŏlla Province 
saw that most of his Christian constituency was “poverty stricken” and observed that “they 
cannot buy books, they cannot give much time to study.” Understandably, he felt 
                                                   
199 Ibid., 15. 
200 Southern Presbyterian Mission (The Foreign Mission of the Presbyterian Church in the 
United States, South) began its mission work in1892 and occupied the two southern 
provinces of North and South Chŏlla Province as its exclusive mission territory. See the 
following discussion about the territorial division in this chapter.   
128 
 
despondent, observing that “the amount of patient laborious teaching that it takes to make 
of these men strong intelligent workers who can be trusted to build alone is appalling.”
201 
It is beyond doubt that the paucity of “intelligent workers” was a structural 
problem rooted in the fact that the Christian constituencies were predominantly 
undereducated and even illiterate. Such paucity, however, was also in part the result of the 
Presbyterian policy of keeping their intellectual standards for the Korean Christian 
leadership only slightly above that of the lay believers. The background and problems 
inherent in mission education policy will be discussed in the next chapter. Suffice it to note 
here that the Mission was in no position to bemoan the paucity of qualified leaders among 
Korean Christians when the missionaries themselves made no systematic effort to train 
Korean ministers.   
Nonetheless, pushed by Brown’s report, the Presbyterian Mission at last began to 
move toward organizing an independent Korean Church. In 1902, the Council finally voted 
for a resolution stating that, “Where there shall be at least twelve churches with one or 
more ordained Elders each, and at least three Koreans whom the Council deem ready for 
ordination to the ministry, a Presbytery shall be organized as the Supreme Ecclesiastical 
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Court of the Presbyterian Church of Korea.”
202  This resolution was significant in that the 
missionaries clarified specific conditions that would allow Korean congregations to 
organize an independent Church. Their conditions, however, were still too demanding 
given that there was not a single ordination yet.     
  Moreover, along with the above resolution, the Council passed another important 
resolution, this time determining the future missionary relationship to the Korean Church 
when it became an independent body. The resolution read:   
 
The ministers who are members of Presbytery shall be members of the 
same only as far as concerns the rights and privileges of voting and 
participating in all of its proceedings, but ecclesiastically they shall be 
subject to the authority and discipline of their home churches, retaining 
their full ecclesiastical connection with those Churches.
203   
 
The significance of this article was two-fold. First, the missionaries were already 
determined to stay in the Korean Presbytery and exercise their power as voting members 
even after the native Church was formally organized. Second, while they retained 
ecclesiastical power over the Korean Church, they did not transfer their membership from 
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their home church to the Korean Church. In so doing, they could be subject to the 
ecclesiastical authority of their home church in North America, but exempt from the local 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Korean Presbytery. In other words, the missionaries could 
enjoy a sort of “ecclesiastical extraterritoriality” that would allow them to govern the 
Korean Church but never be governed by it. Just as the missionaries possessed 
extraterritorial privileges in Korean society, they also wanted to enjoy a similar status in the 
independent Korean Church that they were making.   
       
Abrupt Preparation for Independence   
  In 1903, the Presbyterian Mission officially asked for the Board’s approval to 
organize an “independent Korean Presbyterian Church” according to the plan adopted by 
the Council in the previous year.
204  The Executive Council of the Board approved the plan 
of organizing a united native Presbyterian Church with other corporation Missions but 
raised strong doubts about the absence of ordained native leaders and the continuing 
dominance of the proposed native Church by the missionaries.   
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We question whether the time has yet come for the proposed 
organization in Korea. In all the Mission, we have not a single ordained 
native minister and only three regularly organized churches; all the rest 
of our large number of Christians being in groups with leaders appointed 
by the Mission--- but without an ecclesiastical organization or ordained 
officers.
205   
 
The Board was clearly aware that the proposed independent Korean Church would place no 
Koreans in administrative positions. To this criticism, Samuel Moffett, representing the 
Korean Mission, urged that “another three years will probably see from twenty to thirty 
churches with elders and five or six men ready for ordination.” The Board, however, 
rejected this argument on the grounds that 
 
Even then it is manifest that a Korean Church organization in the near 
future would be so largely composed of missionaries that it would be a 
distinctly foreign church rather than a native Korean Church. The 
Korean ministers coming into it slowly and one by one are to be 
completely overshadowed by the foreign membership, and we might 
thus at the outset hamper even if we did not indefinitely postpone the 
very purpose we have in mind; namely, the founding of a 
self-governing as well as a self-supporting and self-propagating native 
church.
206 
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Moreover, the Board criticized the idea that missionaries could become voting members of 
the native Church, while retaining membership in their home church.     
 
Would not the missionaries… be in an anomalous position in that they 
would really control the native Korean Church and at the same time be 
themselves primarily responsible to the separate jurisdictions. It would 
apparently place the Korean Churches under the complete domination of 
the foreigners, who would control alike the mission and the church and 
thus leave the Korean ministers and elders no sphere whatever for the 
development of individual responsibility and life.
 207 
 
In conclusion, the Board suggested that “it would be wiser to defer the organization of the 
proposed Korean Church until there shall be a sufficient number of Korean elders and 
members to form at least a considerable majority of the church and that it would be well for 
the Mission to carefully consider whether the relations of the foreign missionaries to the 
church when formed might not wisely be those of corresponding members rather than those 
of voting members.”
208 
Facing opposition from the Board, the Mission suddenly sped up its training of 
native leaders and administered a series of ordinations of local leaders, which they had long 
either neglected or paid minor attention to. The Council Report in 1904 announced its plan 
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to start belated theological training for native leaders, with the expectation to accept 26 
students.
209  Also, it gave statistical evidence that the number of ordained Korean elders 
had more than doubled from 5 to 11 and that the native “helpers”, who could become 
candidates for eldership in the future, had increased from 66 to 86 in the past year.
210  In 
this way, the Mission attempted to convince the Board that the native church was quickly 
moving towards self-government.   
  While the Mission complied with the Board’s suggestion to increase native 
ordinations, it did not change its position that the missionaries should preside over the 
native Church even after independence. In fact, the Mission was quite bold in defending 
their privileged position. 
 
We believe it is necessary for the proper development of the native 
church that we who have fathered the flock be privileged to help direct its 
affairs for a time when it starts off independently. From complete 
dependence in ecclesiastical affairs to complete independence is too great 
a step for the Korean church to take in a day. It is better for the youth to 
enjoy authority, real authority, soon, but autonomy needs a little 
postponement.
211 
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By the time of this statement, not “a day” but two full decades had passed since the 
beginning of the Korean Mission and the Korea missionaries at times propagated to the 
home audience through missionary media that Korean Christians were becoming 
increasingly self-governing, self-supporting and self-propagating. However, their candid 
views were different. They were still wary of Korean Christian qualifications for 
independence and thus believed that Koreans should “enjoy authority” of the foreign 
fathers of the church. Simply put, the missionaries knew that the independence of the 
Korean Church was only nominal and they were determined to maintain controlling power 
over the Korean Church.   
  Because church independence was only nominal, it is hardly surprising that other 
ecclesiastical procedures for organizing the Church were also handled without Korean 
involvement. For instance, the Confession of Faith, which in theory had to be made by 
Korean Christians as their subjective and voluntary confession of faith, was actually 
prepared by the Council of the Missions, without any Korean involvement. The Confession 
used in Korea was actually a pure recycle of the Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian 
Church in India without preamble, the only difference being that “India” in the text was  
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replaced with “Korea.”
212  The Form of Government, which defines the polity of the 
Church, was also drafted by the missionaries. They first thought of modeling this document 
after the Westminster Form of Government, but soon dropped the idea because “it was 
better not to put upon the infant Church such a wrought out Form of Government.”
213   
  On September 17, 1907, the Korean Presbyterian Church finally came into being 
as an independent native Church. The membership of the new Presbytery was composed of 
twenty-eight missionaries and forty Korean elders with the Korean majority. Not 
surprisingly, however, missionaries occupied the key administrative positions. Samuel 
Moffett, who had advocated for the need of prolonged missionary guidance, assumed the 
chair of Moderator, to preside over the general management of the Church, while Graham 
Lee was elected as Treasurer to control its finances.
214  Under foreign leadership, three 
Koreans, Pang Ki-ch’ang, Han Sŏk-chin, and Song In-sŏ were installed in the offices of 
vice-moderator, clerk and assistant clerk.
215 
  This prolonged missionary dominance over Korean Church offices did not reflect a 
gradualist approach to the transfer of power to a native leadership. The offices of 
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Moderator and Treasurer of the Presbytery continued to be occupied by missionaries, and 
even when the organization of the Korean Church was expanded to include plural 
Presbyteries under the General Assembly in 1912, the Assembly itself was still presided 
over by Horace G. Underwood as the Moderator, and William Blair, the treasurer.
216  The 
missionaries saw no problem in monopolizing the highest church offices because “none of 
the Koreans has as yet had sufficient practice in leading such large bodies in parliamentary 
practice work, such that they felt willing to accept the office of Moderator.”
217  It goes 
without saying that the missionary’s privilege of “ecclesiastical extraterritoriality” went 
unchallenged and that they governed the Korean Church without being governed by Korean 
Christians.   
  It is true that the number of Korean delegates to the Assembly continued to grow 
and outnumber the missionaries. However, the missionaries soon introduced a new rule to 
reduce the number of Korean delegates to the Assembly at one in every five “Sessions”.
218 
The “Session” was a congregational meeting at the local level and one delegate from five 
sessions meant that only one Korean pastor from five local churches could attend the 
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Assembly as a voting member, while each individual ordained missionary could attend and 
vote in the Assembly.
219  In short, one missionary vote weighed five times more than the 
Korean votes.     
   
Korean Acceptance of Missionary Authority 
  As we will discuss later, there were sporadic bursts of Korean frustration against 
missionary rule over the Korean Church, but the majority of the Church leadership 
remained loyal to missionary authority. Far from rebelling, they took missionary authority 
for granted and made little effort to reduce missionary influence even when given the 
opportunity to do so. For instance, in 1913 and 1914 the missionaries asked the General 
Assembly if the Korean members desired the missionaries to attend the Assembly only as a 
delegate body, one or two in every five missionaries according to the same formula used for 
selecting Korean delegates. After much deliberation, however, the final decision was 
postponed for a year, and the issue was eventually voted down the following year.
220 
Missionaries repeatedly suggested reducing the number of missionary delegates in the 
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General Assembly, but this suggestion was repeatedly rejected by the Church’s Korean 
membership.
221   
  The currently available sources do not reveal what kind of discussions was held 
over the issue of missionary presence in the Assembly. According to missionary testimony, 
however, the main source of Korean objections was that they were concerned that “it might 
look to outsiders as though there were friction between the missionaries and the Korean 
Christian, which was not a fact.”
222  If this statement is true, it indicates that Korean 
Christians wanted to present themselves as close affiliates or even subordinates to the 
foreign missionaries rather than independent-spirited church leaders who sought to promote 
more Korean autonomy in the Church. To them, the missionaries were still the guarantors 
of their status in society. Thus, the more missionaries there were occupying governing 
positions in the Church the better. It seems that their subservient attitude had much to do 
with their low social-status and their former careers as missionary servants and other 
employees. Missionaries took such attitudes for genuine Korean appreciation of their 
presence. This missionary belief in Korean gratitude for their presence in the Church 
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continued for some time. Thus, when Charles A. Clark (NP) recalled his missionary years 
in 1930s, he proudly stated that “there has never been a movement among the Koreans with 
a view to demanding from the mission more control” and “it has always been offered them 
before they sought it.”
223   
  In fact, Clark’s statement was quite self-deceptive, as missionaries at that time 
were facing powerful demand for more control over the Church by some Korean Christians, 
especially after March First Movement (see Chapter 8 and Epilogue). For instance, the 
manuscript of the Annul of the Korean Presbyterian Church, prepared in the 1920s by Ham 
T’ae-yŏng (1873-1964), one of the Christian leaders who played central role in the March 
First Movement in 1919 (Chapter 8), contained the following passage:   
 
After the formation of the General Assembly of the Korean Presbyterian 
Church [in 1912]… it is clear that the Church does not belong to any of 
the Missions and it must be clear to the missionaries. [But] They have not 
transferred [their church membership] from either the Mission or from 
their home Presbytery [in North America] for some reason, yet they have 
apparently become a member of the Korean Presbytery and its Assembly. 
Moreover, if they became a member of the [Korean] Presbytery, there is 
no doubt that they [now] belong to it, but for some reason, the Korean 
Presbytery and its Assembly had no jurisdictional power [ch’irikwŏn] 
over the missionaries. How great this contradiction is! It is nothing but 
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that the missionaries do not see the Korean Church as equal and do not 
treat us as brothers. Instead, they see us as barbaric and slave-like.
224 
 
For some reason, this manuscript was not printed at that time, perhaps due to missionary 
censorship, yet it would indicate that there was a growing criticism against the privileged 
missionary status within the Korean Church prior to the 1920s. At least, the missionary’s 
predominance in the Korean Church was obvious to the contemporary foreign observers in 
the 1910s. William Adams Brown, theological professor at the Union Theological 
Seminary in New York, who visited Korea in 1916, had a strong impression that the 
missionaries still holding the controlling power of the Korean Church and did not cover up 
the fact in his report that “in Korea we have self-support and self-propagation, but 
self-government only in name.”
225   
   
Discriminatory Practices against Koreans   
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  The unequal status of the Korean Church and the Mission was also manifested in 
qualifications for the Holy Communion. The Mission made a unique rule in Korea to 
distinguish the baptism of a convert and his admission to the Lord’s Supper. According to 
this rule, Korean converts could receive baptism “on simple profession of faith,” but could 
not partake in the Lord’s Supper until they fulfilled “more rigorous requirements” and 
received the ministerial approval.
226   
  It is important to note here that the separation of baptism and the admission to the 
Lord ’s Supper would have been an abnormal practice in the missionaries’ home church as 
it was believed that all baptized Christians were equal before God and thus sit together at 
the Lord’s table. In fact, the missionaries knew the universal rule that “if he is truly enough 
Christ’s disciple to be baptized into His body, he is entitled also to partake of that body 
provided for him” and that there is no “scriptural or reasonable right to deny one of these 
ordinances to a man to whom we allow the other.”
227  Yet, they did not apply the rule to 
Koreans. Arthur Brown, another Secretary of the Presbyterian Board, who toured to Korea 
in 1902, observed the practice and admitted that “from the view point of ecclesiastical 
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organization, the Korean Church is an anomaly.”
 228  Nevertheless, he still found it 
justifiable because “some stability in character should be attained before [Korean] believers 
are formally constituted a church.”
229   
Some missionaries did not share the Lord’s Supper even with qualified Koreans. 
Horace Underwood, the first missionary to Korea, was shocked to see that his fellow 
missionaries declined to sit with Koreans “for fear of contracting disease” in 1894.
230  The 
missionaries may have had some reason to be worried, given the very low standard of 
public hygiene and prevalence of cholera in Korean society at that time. However, it is 
likely that their prejudice against Koreans accentuated these fears. In fact, Underwood was 
more sympathetic to the Koreans, and was critical of the missionaries’ overreaction the 
missionaries questioning, “of what service can we be if we cannot sit down at the Lord’s 
table with these Koreans?”
231 
 
Denominational Rivalry and Territorial Division 
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  The fact that the missionaries in general neglected the individual rights of Korean 
Christians is also evidenced by the “territorial division” of the missionary field. This 
division was made in order to avoid denominational rivalry and overlapping of evangelical 
efforts between the Missions. Such territorial arrangements, called “comity,” were made 
constantly from the 1890s through the 1910s and each mission enjoyed the exclusive right 
of occupancy in their assigned territory, shutting out the entry of other missions. (Figure 1) 
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Figure 1    Map of Territorial Division  
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  To Korean Christians, however, this arrangement was quite unfair and 
discriminatory because missionaries made decisions without consulting with Koreans, even 
when they knew it would impact the Korean Christian’s life in significant ways. The most 
significant impact of this arrangement was that some Korean Christians were forcibly 
transferred from one denomination to another. This was the consequence of transferring all 
local Korean churches in a given region to the jurisdiction of a different mission after the 
renegotiation of missionary territories. Hence, Korean Presbyterians in one region were 
made Methodists overnight, and vice versa, when the two Missions traded a portion of their 
original constituencies to redefine their exclusive territories according to the comity 
agreement. 
The missionaries were aware that this practice was unfair and antagonized the 
Koreans, yet they believed that the ends would justify the means. For example, when the 
Methodist and the Presbyterian mission exchanged forty converts in a part of Anju area in 
the northern province in 1904, Arthur Becker (1879-1978, NM), reported to the Board that 
“not all exchanged persons are satisfied with their transport, yet I am sure the cause of  
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Christ has been strengthened and glorified by the arrangement.”
232  The next year, when the 
entire Anju area was retransferred to the Presbyterians, William Blair (NP), also noted that 
“At first, the Methodist Christian in Anju objected, being prejudiced against us just as our 
people had been prejudiced against them.” However, the Korean opposition was suppressed 
as “Mr. Morris, the Methodist missionary in charge, showed them that it was necessary for 
the good of the whole church.”
233 
  The missionaries were pleased that the Koreans surrendered to their authority 
despite initial opposition. At the same time, however, they also knew that they could not 
have acted in the same way in their homeland, where the denomination was cherished as 
the most fundamental identity of Protestant Christians. Thus, Miss Helen Taylor (NP) could 
not help thinking what if the same had happened to an American church, when she visited 
an ex-Presbyterian church in Hwanghae Province that had been recently turned over to the 
Methodist Mission.   
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Imagine the furor in America if all the Presbyterian churches in one 
county were by act of General Assembly, turned over to another 
denomination, no matter how good, without consulting them or 
giving them any vote in the matter. Fancy the reception the new 
Bishop would get as he made a tour of his new charges! It would be 
anything but a triumphal procession.
234 
 
This statement clearly shows that the missionaries were clearly aware of practicing 
a double standard. As long as the Koreans showed themselves adaptive to this practice, 
missionaries did not see this as a problem. In fact, Miss. Taylor herself was happy to see 
that the Presbyterian-turned-Methodists still “welcomed [her] most heartily.”
235  The 
missions had made constant efforts to implant American denominational culture in Korea 
and told the Koreans to maintain loyalty to their denominational Church, but when it 
caused the slightest inconvenience to the missions, they did not hesitate to order Koreans to 
sacrifice their denominational loyalty. The missionaries explained that Korean obedience to 
their order was an expression of Christian tolerance, but the major reason was simply 
Korean subservience to missionary authority. To draw an analogy, Korean Christians were 
pawns on the mission field. They were often used, traded, or even abandoned at the will of 
the master players: the missionaries.     
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    The division of missionary territory also meant that the Korean Christians had no 
opportunity to promote a common identity for themselves under a single national 
organization. As Korean Christians were separated from each other by 
regional-denominational divisions under different missionary jurisdictions, they were not 
given a chance to establish a unified Korean Church that would place the entire Korean 
peninsula under its jurisdiction. In other words, none of the denominational Korean 
Churches possessed a geographical basis on which they could claim to be the national 
Church. If Korean Christians had wanted to pursue national integrity under the name of a 
Korean Church, they needed to first break the denominational borders delineated by the 
Missions. This never happened and most Korean Christians remained loyal constituents of 
their mission-granted denomination.   
    Overall, the Korean Church was established in such a way as the Mission could 
maintain controlling power over it. Korean Christians certainly played a large role in 
evangelizing Korea, but their efforts did not make themselves the managers of the Church. 
They remained subordinates to the mission-dominated Church and were not allowed to 
stand on par with the missionaries that ranked above them within their own Church.     
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Chapter 4  Mission School Management 
 
In mission fields where Christianity was prohibited, it was common for 
educational and medical work, often called “indirect evangelism,” to precede direct 
evangelism. Thus, the Missions often built schools and hospitals before church and tried to 
disseminate Christian message in a form of western scholarship and medicine. This was the 
case in Korea where anti-Christian law was still in effect in the early stage of the mission.   
Of these “indirect” mission institutions, schools had a larger impact on the 
formative process of Korean Church because they produced a new generation of Korean 
Christians who were supposed to lead the subsequent development of the Korean Church. 
In the existing literature, mission education has generally been positively evaluated not 
only because it produced Christians but also because it provided modern education through 
which Korean Christian youth acquired new knowledge about the world and consolidated 
their intellectual base for Korean nationalism.   
The mission schools, however, were just as much under the Mission as the Church. 
Because the Mission had controlling power over school management and its curriculum, 
Korean Christians could not always learn what they wanted to learn. This chapter examines  
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the formative process of the mission schools in Korea analyzes how missionary power 
affected Christian education in Korea and the course of Christian development in Korea at 
large. 
 
Presbyterian School 
  The Presbyterian Mission conducted its educational work on two principles. These 
principles are well summarized by Richard Baird (1898-?, NP), who was born and brought 
up in Korea as the son of a long-time educational missionary, William Baird (NP), as “the 
gospel for the heathen and education for Christians” and “no institution before church.”
236 
The former principle meant that the Mission should prioritize converting Koreans through 
direct preaching and then provide education in order to guide their incipient faith. The latter 
principle meant that church formation must precede the establishment of other mission 
institutions such as school and hospitals. The underlying assumption of this peculiar policy 
is that education in itself was not the purpose of the Mission and should be provided only 
for Christians. In short, a mission school should not be used as an expedient mechanism to 
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draw in non-Christians and broaden their intellectual horizons by exposing them to western 
education. Rather, the mission school had to be a thoroughly religious institution where the 
children of Christian converts were gathered to study the Bible and receive regular religious 
instruction so that they could succeed the faith of their parents. 
  Presbyterian policy, however, was infeasible in Korea, especially during the first 
few years of the mission, when there were no Christians educated in mission schools yet. 
To implement Presbyterian policy, missionaries had to preach and win converts first before 
providing them education, but they could not do so in Korea because freedom of religion 
was not tolerated even after the treaty. Compelled by the realities of this situation, 
Presbyterian missionaries had to concede principle and start a school before any church was 
officially established.   
  Nonetheless, due to the deeply embedded anti-Christian and anti-foreign prejudice 
among the Koreans, the missionaries were not able to recruit any children to their schools. 
In 1886, Horace G. Underwood first thought of enticing poor Koreans by making school 
tuition free, but soon gave up the idea on the grounds that “there is a danger of giving the 
Koreans the idea that we are backed by a rich board at home, and that it would be a pretty  
152 
 
good idea to become Christian.”
237  Underwood instead decided to gather street children 
in Seoul, who were “homeless and destitute… of illegitimate birth,” so that “they would be 
taken and clothed and fed and trained up in a right way to love the Savior.”
238  In other 
words, orphans were selected to be the first pupils of the Presbyterian school not because 
they were recognized as having positive potential, but simply because they were the only 
ones whom missionaries could place under their full-time control without encountering 
parental opposition.   
    The orphan-school, which started with 36 pupils in 1886, soon proved to be a 
dismal failure. The orphans had neither any previous education nor the will to study. As 
they had simply been brought to the school by the missionaries, it was natural that they had 
no clear purpose of being in school except for promise of food and clothing. To make 
matters worse, the xenophobic feelings of the orphans did not disappear so easily. In fact, at 
the time of the Baby Riot in 1887, the orphans took the prevalent rumor of baby-eating at 
face value. Underwood sadly reported to the Board. 
 
The poor little fellows, frightened… wanted to run away and many of 
them did. One poor little fellow, only eight years old, ran away one night 
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and all alone managed to find his way home a distance of some 90 or 
100 miles and reached there foot sore and almost famished with 
hunger.
239 
 
By this time, the orphans had spent almost two years at the school. If two years of teaching 
failed to convince them that foreigners were not cannibalists, we can reasonably estimate 
how poorly the missionary teachers taught, how little the pupils actually learned, and, more 
than anything, how superficially the missionaries cultivated the hearts and minds of Korean 
children. In any case, there is no question that the Presbyterian school did not start as a 
modern educational institution and it was quite dubious if it deserved to be called school at 
all.   
  In 1891, the newly arrived missionary, Samuel A. Moffett, succeeded the school 
management from Underwood. To make it a proper Christian mission school, Moffett first 
renamed it Jesus Doctrine School (yesugyo haktang) and required students to pay for a part 
of their school expenses.
240  His reform measures, however, had adverse consequences. 
First, the new school name marked it as so distinctively sectarian that it even further 
alienated Koreans, especially those among the educated classes, who were strongly 
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anti-Christian.
241  In the first place, Christianity was not officially legalized but only tacitly 
tolerated because of its presence under the foreign extraterritoriality. Hence, few Koreans 
dared to send their children to such a “strange” and illegal school. Second, the required 
tuition placed a heavy burden on enrolled students, the majority of whom were orphans or 
the children of impoverished families. It seems that Moffett soon realized that his school 
would not survive under the new policy and resumed granting material and financial 
support to the students in order to keep them enrolled. According to school records in 1891, 
the Jesus Doctrine School had only 24 students, of which 19 were still fed and clothed,
242 
as had been the practice at the orphan-school. Even after two years, the students remained 
“a selected band of boys of the lower class,” though it is doubtful if they were “selected” in 
any significant sense.
243   
  Another reason that missionaries failed to attract students of a higher caliber is that 
they did not teach English. By that time, the Chosŏn dynasty had installed its first 
Government English School (kwallip yŏngŏ hakkyo) in 1886 and began to provide 
English-language training for a group of selected officials. However, the Presbyterian 
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Mission stopped providing English-language teaching for a brief trial period and concluded 
that teaching English to Korean Christians was an “error” to be “rectified.”
244  The reason 
given for this decision was that “when they [Korean students] learned a little English they 
would go off to the Ports or the Mines and there become interpreter[s] and those were bad 
places for young folks.”
245  In other words, the missionaries saw English education as a 
distraction from their purposes of keeping the students under their Christian influence and 
making them into devout churchgoers. They wanted to bar students from seeking secular 
jobs and taking advantage of the opportunities that fluency in English could offer. They saw 
the students as investment assets and expected them to be faithful, if undereducated, 
Christian assistants to the missionaries. Thus, missionaries took their prerogative to control 
the career paths of Korean students for granted and did away with the teaching of English 
entirely in 1890 so that they would lose the chance to get a secular job. To make this policy 
a rule, the missionaries passed an official resolution in 1895 that “the Mission does not 
believe in Schools for the teaching of English---at least for themselves.”
246   
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But job opportunity was not all that Korean students of the Presbyterian mission 
school lost. Without knowledge of English, the students lost direct access to western 
scholarship. In Korea in the 1890s, the modernization movement was just beginning after 
the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and few western books had been translated into Korean, 
much less school textbooks. English was thus a necessary means for any Korean to acquire 
new knowledge of the modern world. If the Presbyterian Missions wanted to uplift the 
intellectual standards of Korean Christians, English language education should have been 
considered indispensable. However, the Mission had the opposite objective in mind and 
wanted to keep the convert’s knowledge at the same level as that of the average Korean. 
William D. Reynolds (1867-1951, SP), known as the most scholarly Presbyterian 
missionary for his strong background in Greek and Latin and Classics and his pivotal role 
in Korean Bible translation,
247was one of the strong advocates of this Presbyterian policy. 
In 1896, he publicized his view on the proper education for future Korean Christian leaders, 
in which he articulated the following points. 
 
Don’t send him [a prospective Korean Christian leader] to America to be 
educated, at any rate in the early stages of Mission Work. Don’t train him 
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in any way that tends to lift him far above the level of the people among 
whom he is to live and labor. Missionaries often deplore the chasm in 
modes of thinking and living between them and the natives. Don’t cleave 
chasm where as yet none exist.
248 
 
Instead, Reynolds insisted that the missionaries should instruct Koreans so as to “seek to 
lift [them] to high plane of spiritual experience”, and “ground [them] thoroughly… in the 
cardinal facts and truths of Christianity”, and “endure hardness as…good soldier[s] of Jesus 
Christ.” Moreover, educational standards should be raised “as Korean Christians advance in 
culture and modern civilization” and even when the missionaries made “ his education 
sufficiently in advance of [the] average education of his people to secure respect and 
prestige” education was still to be restricted so as not to go “enough ahead to excite envy or 
a feeling of separation.
249  In sum, the Presbyterian Mission had no intention of making the 
mission school into a threshold to the new modern world for Korean Christians. Rather, 
they wanted to contain Korean Christians in the school to indoctrinate them with Christian 
theology, while keeping them insensitive to the changing intellectual trends of the time.     
    Combined with this education policy, the lack of qualified teaching staff also 
curbed the steady intellectual development of the school. In the first place, most 
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missionaries came to Korea without any teaching experience. Moreover, they were far more 
interested in winning converts than in teaching children and believed that preaching was 
their sole duty as missionaries. Especially the ordained ministers, whose profession was to 
preach from the pulpit, held the belief that “ordained men [are] not to be asked to teach 
boys” in school.
250  Thus, school work was quite unpopular among the Presbyterian 
missionaries. Richard Baird (NP) attests to this point.   
 
The school became a sort of football that was kicked around at every 
annual meeting [of the Mission]. Its existence was contrary to the 
Mission’s philosophy [of prioritizing evangelism to education]. Its 
oversight was a burden no one wanted. Messrs. Gale, Moffett, and 
F.S. Miller, with varying degrees of unwillingness, each carried the 
load till it could be shoved off onto some missionary newer than 
themselves.
251   
 
Yet, the new missionaries were, of course, even worse than their predecessors as they had 
no knowledge of Korean language and culture. No doubt this vicious cycle completely 
demoralized the teachers as well as the students and worsened the school’s condition. 
  As of 1897, the Presbyterian mission had two boarding schools in Seoul, a Boys’ 
school with 35 pupils, and a Girls’ school with 38 pupils, and ten day schools with 166 
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pupils.
252  Among these schools, the two boarding schools were under direct missionary 
management and provided a little better education than day schools, where no missionary 
teachers were regularly attached. Nonetheless, none of these schools in Korea, including 
the boarding schools, were above the elementary level and its educational impact on 
Korean society at large was trivial, having only less than 250 pupils in all of Korea. The 
fruitless educational endeavor soon made the missionaries weary of carrying it on and 
many of them began thinking of withdrawing from the school’s management entirely. The 
Annual Meeting of the mission in 1897 officially voted for closing the Boys’ school on the 
grounds that “only a few boys…capable of receiving advanced instruction [were enrolled in 
the school]” and “there is little demand from the native Christians as yet for higher 
education.”
253  Subsequently, the missionaries decided to hand over the school work to 
“one of the Seoul Churches as a day school, to be supported by it.”
254  Over a decade of 
trial, the Presbyterian Mission concluded that school work was not worthy of investment 
and stopped educating the Korean Christian youth altogether. 
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Evangelism before Education 
  The Presbyterian Mission stressed that the school closure was inevitable because 
there was little “demand among the Korean Christians for a higher grade of education.”
255 
The Mission was also responsible, however, for the situation because it made no effort to 
convince Korean Christians of the need for a higher grade of education. It was the 
missionaries themselves who discouraged Koreans from engaging in intellectual pursuits 
beyond what they considered appropriate and suppressed the development of intellectual 
excellence among the general populace. In short, the Presbyterian missionaries’ decision to 
close the mission school perpetuated a vicious circle: they closed the school while they 
suppressed the Korean demand for higher education and then used this lack of demand to 
justify their decision. In the end, educational work was no more than a spare job for the 
early Presbyterian missionaries during a period when their real profession of public 
preaching was prohibited.   
Thus, it was natural that missionaries shifted their focus of investment from 
education to evangelism once the governmental ban on Christian propagation was loosened. 
“At present the field seems white,” the Presbyterian missionaries judged the situation in the 
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immediate aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. Based on this perception, they drew 
up an important resolution that “all available men, with the language and experience, 
should go out among the people.”
256  With this decision and the school closure that 
followed, the reluctant missionary teachers were happily decommissioned from school 
work in Seoul and transferred to the evangelical frontline in the countryside. For instance, 
William Baird was transferred to Pyŏngan Province, F.S. Miller (1866-1937, NP) to 
Hwanghae, and S. L. Swallen to Hamgyŏng.
257  This restructuring of personnel prepared 
the Mission to implement its ideal policy, where direct evangelism would always be held 
primary in the mission field and conversions would come before education. Such 
restructuring did not entirely exclude the possibility of starting “a new and real high school” 
in the future, on the condition that this would be undertaken only “when the Mission is 
ready for it.”
258  As a matter of fact, it took five years before the Mission resumed school 
work in Seoul in 1901 under James Gale, as subject that will be discussed in greater detail 
later.   
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Management of Day Schools 
With the school closure in 1897, the Presbyterian Mission had no school above the 
primary level, and elementary education for Korean Christian children was taken charge of 
by local churches under their church schools, which were referred to as “day schools.” 
While on the surface this might have appeared to offer Korean churches the opportunity to 
run their own schools independently and without missionary interference, in fact, the 
Mission drafted a set of new rules for church schools and kept them under missionary 
control. The Mission’s resolution in 1897 read:     
 
That in place where there is sufficient Christian constituency, private 
schools should be organized and supported by the native Church, and 
should be under the supervision of the missionary in charge of the 
district. That in exceptional cases assistance may be given by the 
Mission, but not to exceed more than one-half the expense of the 
school.
259   
 
The Mission established the Educational Committee as a supervising agency “which shall 
act as an advisory board, with whom the various superintendents of individual schools shall 
consult, and whose special duty it shall be to see that the general policy of the Mission with 
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reference to school work is upheld; who shall… report to the annual meeting of the Mission 
immediately after the reports of the superintendents of various schools have been heard.”
260 
  What these rules suggested is that the missionaries should place the financial and 
administrative responsibilities of running the day schools on the local Korean churches but 
hold controlling power over school policy through the Educational Committee. Therefore, 
even though Korean teachers or superintendents could in theory “have the entire charge of 
such [a] school,” they would “of course [have to follow] the general policy laid down by 
the Mission.” Moreover, “unexpected visits” by the missionaries were recommended as 
they would “serve to keep the Korean teacher up to his work.”
261   
  The essential reason that the Mission desired such strict supervision was their 
distrust of the Korean teacher’s qualifications. Considering “that the religious and spiritual 
influence brought to bear on the pupils is the most important thing in the school,” the 
missionaries thought the Koreans were not deserving of the task as they were 
“comparatively ineffectual in moral influence and in power to affect the character of the 
pupils.”
262  The Mission’s conviction was that “sufficient missionary supervision cannot be 
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made too strict… If a school cannot be made what it should be, it may not be best always at 
once to discontinue it, but the presumption is adverse to its continuance.”
263   
    It is easy to see the bias inherent in the Mission’s judgment of Korean ability. It 
should be remembered, however, that the Korean churches were composed of the poorest 
class that had received no modern education and that adequate teachers were hard to find 
among the Korean Christians. In fact, prior to the closing of the mission school, the 
missionaries had drawn up a plan to “qualify young men in our boys’ school and to send 
them out as teachers” to local elementary schools in country towns.
264  The fact that the 
graduates from the mission school recently closed down for poor performance were 
designated as teachers to the local church schools reveals much about the general standard 
of education in the local Christian constituency. As William Baird (NP) admitted frankly,   
 
These schools were for the most part very elementary and scarcely 
worthy of the name. They consisted usually of a few little boys pursuing 
elementary studies with a Korean teacher of the old type, who, except in 
the subject of the Chinese character, knew very little more than the 
pupils.
265 
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Little wonder, then, that the Mission had to adopt the following set of regulations on 
admissions in order to save the schools from a hopeless situation.   
 
Art. IX    Save in exceptional cases, children whose parents are beggars, 
or such as send their children to school solely to escape their 
maintenance, shall not be received as pupils. 
Art. X    Dull and stupid boys should not knowingly be received into a 
school, nor retained there as a matter of charity to them or their parents.   
Art XII    No more shall be done in the way of board, clothing, etc., than 
is absolutely necessary to secure the end purposed by the school.
266 
 
These regulations indicate that the missionaries were still greatly troubled by the poor 
educational qualifications of children of Korean Christians even after a decade of 
educational enterprise. This was the reason why the mission stopped any further investment 
in schools and transferred educational responsibility to local churches, which were actually 
even less capable of conducting educational work for children.   
 
Resumed Mission School in Seoul 
The Presbyterian Mission resumed school work above the elementary level in 
Seoul in 1901 under James Gale’s supervision, who showed keen interest in studying 
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Korean language and history and was well-known for his scholarly researches on Korea 
even outside the missionary society.
267  Certainly, he was a good scholar, but it seems he 
was not as good a teacher for school children.
268  In any case, the school faced the same 
difficulty in recruiting good students as the previous Presbyterian school. According to 
Gale’s report in 1902, the school had only “six boys” due to various oppositions from 
within the Christian population. Some Koreans, Gale noted, still believed Confucianism to 
be superior [to Christianity], demanding “You ought to teach the Confucian classics", while 
others objected, declaring “We want the Bible; nothing more” and "I will not send my boy 
unless you teach the Bible and the Bible only.” These religious devotees did not understand 
the merits of modern education and held that “there is no sense in all this figuring and 
geography and history” and asked Gale “What's the use of studying about flower[s]." There 
were also those who frankly asked for something in return for their child’s attendance: "If 
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they'll feed my boy, I'll let him go."
269  Gale tried to persuade such Christians to cooperate, 
stressing that "This is not our school: this is yours: lend a hand” but such pleas fell on deaf 
ears as “they had taken Christianity for what they could get out of it.”
270   
Despite such obvious failure, the Presbyterian Mission did not take any radical 
measures to fix its failing educational project. They continued to neglect the importance of 
general education and paid scant attention to it. Even after Korea became a Japanese 
protectorate and the Korean desire for education was rising as a means to national 
empowerment, the Presbyterian attitude toward education remained unchanged. In 1910, 
the mission had 542 church schools under its jurisdiction, and ran them "primarily for 
evangelization... secondarily, the establishment of an indigenous church” rather than for the 
general uplift of the Korean Christian intellect because “the educational responsibility finds 
its place in this second aspect of the mission work.”
271  Thus, the Presbyterians continued 
to reject the idea that “the Mission has any responsibility for the education of 
non-Christians” and “the Mission's educational responsibility is in the children of the 
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Church alone.”
272  This meant that the educational responsibility for non-Christians, who 
constituted the vast majority of the Korean population at that time, largely fell in the hand 
of the Japanese government and the Mission expected the Japanese to do so. 
In sum, the conventional image of the mission school as a harbinger of modern 
scientific education in Korea does not always apply to the Presbyterian schools of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They provided mainly religious education for a 
limited number of Korean Christians, while putting little emphasis on general subjects. As 
the Presbyterian Mission board summarized, the Presbyterian Mission in Korea was “not 
willing to adopt a program of secular education divorced from the life of the Church” and 
even if Koreans wanted to receive a general Western education of the West, it was not 
“willing to yield to the popular demand for new fads.”
273  The Presbyterian schools were 
for Christians only and their major aim was “not to develop a great system of general 
education”
274  but to “send them back into their home churches as strong evangelical 
Christians.”
275  After all, the sole purpose of Presbyterian education was to make Christians, 
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not nationalist leaders who would use his advanced knowledge as a major means of 
national self-strengthening and independence.   
 
Some Representative Presbyterian Graduates 
In Korean history, the period from 1894-1910 is known as the moment when 
popular interest in modern education first began to surge. The Presbyterian Mission, 
however, went against the trend of the time and withdrew itself from the educational 
enterprise. Little wonder, then, that the Presbyterian school did not produce Korean 
Christian leaders who could stand on par with non-Christian leaders in disseminating 
modern education in the national arena. Instead, it mainly raised a group of Korean 
Christians who would devote themselves to religious service within the Church and 
continued to live under missionary guidance.   
A typical example is the case of Song Sun-myŏng, who became the first ordained 
Korean church Elder. Song was an orphan who was taken to the orphan-school by Horace 
G. Underwood around 1887. Presumably, he received education at the elementary level, as 
this was the standard of the school, and hired as a colporteur and then as a helper. His 
faithful service was soon recognized by the missionary he served and Song was  
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recommended for ordination. In 1904, he became the first Korean Elder. Thereafter, he 
served in the Saemunan Church for over fifty years until his death in 1954.
276 
Despite his historical significance as the first Korean Elder and his leading status 
among Korean Christians, however, Song is hardly remembered in Korean Christian 
historiography today. This is because he did not participate in any significant event or make 
any noteworthy contributions either within or without the Church.
 277  A representative 
Korean church leader who was hand-picked by a missionary and raised in the Presbyterian 
school was not the type of person to leave a profound impact upon the subsequent 
development of the Korean nation. And this was an intended result of early Presbyterian 
education policy, which aimed at producing a religious devotee who would disengage 
himself from secular society and devote himself to church service under missionary 
tutelage. 
On the other hand, one of Song’s classmates, An Ch’ang-ho, pursued a totally 
different path, and is today remembered as an iconic figure in the Korean nationalist 
movement. However, An’s life and nationalist career cannot be taken as a result of his 
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Christian background for the following reasons. First, An did not have a regular affiliation 
with the Korean Church.
278  He was a wandering youth from a farming family from 
Pyŏngan Province and enticed to join the Presbyterian school “for the rumor of free lodging 
and food” when he came down to Seoul.
279  Then, he became a Christian but he soon 
migrated to Los Angeles to work among the Korean immigrants, where he was deeply 
involved in the Korean nationalist movement, and lost contact with the Korean Church. He 
did not reconnect with the Korean Church after his return to Korea in 1906 because he held 
a pantheistic idea and did not want to commit himself to the Christian faith.
280  Second, 
since the Presbyterian school provided only primary level education, it is unlikely that An’s 
one year of study there transformed him into an intellectually strong national leader. It is 
more likely that his experience in the United States had more influence over his intellectual 
development. In any case, as we will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 7, the fact that he 
was involved in politics against the missionary expectation that Christian pupils in the 
school should work for the church after graduation was a good indication that An was not a 
typical alumnus of the Presbyterian school. He was not at all a representative Korean 
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church leader and his political commitment was not the intended result of mission 
education, but of his resistance against it.   
 
Methodist Mission School: Paejae School 
  The Methodist Mission opened its first school in 1886, around the same time that 
the Presbyterian Mission started its orphan-school. Unlike the Presbyterians, who began the 
school without any educational objective other than to Christianize orphans, the Methodist 
Mission had a clear purpose of “placing within easy reach of Korean youth the essentials of 
American educational institutions and methods” and “to give to Korean students thoro[ugh] 
training in the curriculum of western science and literature, uniting with it the essential 
features of the native school system.”
281 
  As this statement of purpose reveals, the Methodist Mission did not plan to make 
its school an evangelizing agency to provide religious education for Christian converts, 
though some evangelical missionaries did teach Christianity in a clandestine manner when 
occasions allowed. Rather, the mission recognized the usefulness of general education 
based on modern science, as was common in America, and was also willing to coordinate 
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its program to fit the government educational system. Hence, its admission policy was not 
limited to Christian converts but open to anyone eager to study. According to this policy, 
the Methodist Mission selected pupils only from among those who had previous education 
and showed a willingness to learn, an approach which stood in stark contrast to the 
Presbyterian method of randomly recruiting street children. The Methodist mission also 
differed from the Presbyterian in its policy toward teaching English. It considered English 
as a requisite in acquiring western knowledge and thus taught it to the Korean students. 
Given that there was no Korean textbook on western science and literature at that time, the 
Methodist decision to educate its students in the English language was quite reasonable.     
  It should also be mentioned that the Methodist emphasis on general education in 
Korea was not an original innovation. Rather, this policy was in accord with the general 
education policy of the Methodist Church in the United States in the late nineteenth century. 
A resolution adopted by the Methodist General Assembly in 1890 stated that “The first duty 
of the Church is to convert the world; the second duty is to educate the world” and 
“Education often needs to precede conversion.” This idea was exactly the opposite of the 
Presbyterian philosophy --- “gospel to heathen, education for Christians” and “No  
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institution before Church.” To the Presbyterians, education was a privilege to be granted for 
the already saved. To the Methodists, it was the pathway to salvation. 
Since Methodist school policy was not focused on Christian indoctrination, but on 
the acquisition of western knowledge, the school was welcomed by the Korean government. 
In fact, in 1887, when Henry G. Appenzeller asked for governmental recognition of the 
school, the Korean king not only approved but also bestowed the school name, Pai Chai 
Haktang or “the Hall for the Training of Useful Men” (hereafter, spelled as “Paejae” 
according to the contemporary standard spelling), as a visible sign of royal recognition.
282 
As the school name suggests it was authorized by the Korean government not for Christian 
education, but for general education that would raise pupils useful to the Korean 
government, not to the mission. In other words, the Methodist mission did not hesitate to 
compromise Christian education for royal recognition and adopted a positive approach to 
providing general education to the broader Korean public.   
   
Modern Educational Institution 
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  Gaining royal recognition had a significant impact on the development of the 
Paejae Haktang. Recognition granted security for students who were eager to learn from 
western scholarship but often worried about the possibility of governmental punishment for 
being enrolled at a foreign school where some missionaries did on occasion clandestinely 
teach Christian doctrine. Paejae students were more encouraged when one of their 
classmates was hired to be an interpreter at the royal palace soon after the school obtained 
royal recognition in 1887.
283 Six other students also received similar appointments later 
that year.
284  Although these appointments were to minor positions in the government, they 
marked a great step forward that showed that even a foreign school could now function as a 
gateway to officialdom. In Chosŏn society, where appointment to government positions had 
been so highly valued, any educational institution that would open the door to officialdom 
could gain social prestige. Methodist missionaries were a little concerned that their pupils 
left school for governmental appointments without enough training in English, but that did 
not discourage them from encouraging their students to seek governmental employment, 
nor did they stop teaching English as the Presbyterians did. To the contrary, the Methodist 
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missionaries were “glad to see the work appreciated by the Government”
285  and gained 
confidence in their school policy.   
  Encouraged by initial success, the Methodist Mission also invested in school 
facilities. As soon as it won royal recognition, the mission built an impressive western-style 
school building, the first of its kind in Korea, on one of the most commanding sites in Seoul. 
According to the official description, “the hall is a substantial brick building 76 x 52 feet, 
one story high, built in renaissance style of architecture” and “contains a chapel, four 
lecture-rooms, a library, the principal’s office, and a basement under half the building, to be 
devoted to the industrial department.”
286  This was quite a contrast to the poorly equipped 
Presbyterian orphan school. Certainly, such an impressively western appearance would 
have appealed to the Korean who took a growing interest in western civilization, if not 
Christianity.   
  The steady advancement of Paejae Haktang was duly recognized by the 
government. This is indicated by the fact that within a decade of the school’s opening 
“thirty three men [had] gone forth to take positions in one and another department of 
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government.”
287  Moreover, in 1895, the Korean government entered contract with the 
Mission to dispatch 200 students to the school to train future officials in western- style 
education,
288  and continued to send students there every year. Considering that this 
decision was made by the new Korean cabinet, backed up by the Japanese in the wake of 
the Sino-Japanese War, it seems that the Japanese victory had some influence on this 
contract. In any case, the school’s social prestige was greatly elevated and its financial 
position stabilized as tuition was paid in full by the government. This practice of receiving 
governmental trainees was continued until 1902.
289 
  By 1896, the Paejae Haktang had two departments, Chinese and English, and 60 
and 106 students in each and they received no financial assistance from the Mission.
290 
Instead, those in financial need were given a chance to earn money on campus, mainly in 
the printing workshop.
291  The Methodist mission introduced the first modern press 
machine in Paejae and it printed religious tracts, missionary newspapers and reports. The 
workshop established in 1890 evolved into the Trilingual Press, where Korean, Chinese and 
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English types were prepared and dominated the early stages of the printing industry in 
Korea.
292  The New Testament was also incorporated into the curriculum and worship 
service in school chapel was no longer concealed and made mandatory.
293 
       During this time, the missionaries invited Sŏ Chae-p’il (1864-1951) and Yun 
Ch’i-ho (1864-1945), two of the few Korean intellectuals at that time who had studied in 
the United States, as lecturers. Sŏ and Yun had lived a life of exile in the United States after 
the failed coup in 1882 where they obtained degrees in medicine and in theology 
respectively (see Chapter 2). Upon returning to Korea in 1895, they devoted themselves to 
educational work and established the Independence Club, through which he aimed at 
disseminating modern education and reforming the dynastic government. With their 
knowledge of modern scholarship, they taught various subjects, including geography and 
world affairs.
294  As both Sŏ and Yun belonged to the aristocratic yangban, their presence 
attracted many students of their class. In fact, it is around this time Syngman Rhee [Yi 
Sŭng-man] (1875-1965) and Cynn Hung-wu (Sin Hŭng-u] (1883-1959), two eager yangban 
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children, both of whom later became national leaders of post-liberation Korea, studied in 
this school and learned English as well as other forms of western scholarship, which later 
led them to pursue higher education in the United States.
295   
    Reviewing the development of the Methodist mission school, we may note that, 
along with other government schools, it consistently maintained the same purpose of 
raising the intellectual standards of the Korean people and thus provided them with general 
education. The Methodist mission did not hide its Christian purpose and actually proposed 
that its students adopt it. At the same time, however, it neither imposed Christianity nor 
rejected admission for lack of faith. This was consistent with its philosophy that education 
sometimes needed to precede conversion and that general education of good quality would 
serve Koreans even if they did not adopt the Christian faith. If some did adopt faith along 
with knowledge, that would be ideal from the missionary point of view. Hence, a Methodist 
missionary fervently enthused in 1895 that, “The school has grand opportunities… of 
preparing Christian secular teachers for Korea. The country will soon demand them. It has a 
grander work in training Christian workers for our lay and full ministry.”
296  Though it may 
sound somewhat contradictory, the title of “Christian secular teacher” was a keyword for 
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understanding Methodist education policy. Methodist missioanries wanted to educate 
Koreans who would lead others in secular knowledge, but also maintain their commitment 
to the Christian cause.   
     
Methodist Church Schools 
  The Methodist mission was successful in establishing a prestigious school in Seoul, 
but it failed to achieve the same success elsewhere. Like the Presbyterian mission, the 
Methodist mission concentrated its forces in Seoul and few resided outside the capital, 
where foreign residence was legally prohibited. Even if given the possibility of neglecting 
the law and attempting to reside in the countryside, missionaries still preferred to stay in the 
capital, which they considered a vital home base. Thus, when the Methodist mission began 
to expand its education work to the countryside, it let the local church run the school as day 
schools under its management. Though the doors of these schools were widely open to 
non-Christians, unlike the Presbyterian Day schools, they “were seriously handicapped 
because of lack of teachers, textbooks and facilities”
297  and also of “prejudice against the 
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Christian religion taught there.”
298  Thus, attendance at these schools was constantly low 
and “unsatisfactory.”
299 
  In comparison, the Methodists were certainly more successful than the Presbyterians 
but their success was limited to the case of Paejae Haktang. It is true that the Methodist 
Mission later built more schools of a similar standard in other regions as the mission 
territory expanded, but the basic Methodist policy was to “concentrate resources on a few 
schools of outstanding quality”
300  in urban centers such as Inchŏn and Pyŏngyang and did 
not penetrate into the rural areas beyond the city gate. In fact, the general state of Methodist 
day schools was so miserably low that one Methodist missionary had to lament that many 
schools were allowed to exist simply because they were “better than none.”
301   
    Such dysfunctional schools were not limited to the Methodist mission, but also 
included Presbyterian ones. Yet, as the missionary stated, they were certainly better than 
none because there was no universal education system yet in Korea and there were many 
rural areas where there were no schools at all. The church school thus represented the only 
means of getting an education for the general Korean populace. Expectedly, as the general 
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Korean interest in education began to rise under the Japanese protectorate, many Koreans 
turned to the church schools, not necessarily for religion but for education. The atmosphere 
of the time was well captured in the following missionary article. 
 
The whole nation is awake hungry for kaiwha [enlightenment], 
determined to getting an education, that open sesame as they think, to 
greatness, power, wealth, independence, all sorts of material blessings. 
They are considering favorably the Yesu Kyowhay [Protestant Church] 
too, as a possible means for the attainment of these same desired material 
blessings thro[ugh] the favor of placated Heavenly Powers. An education 
they will have, Christian or otherwise, whatever can be got, if not one 
another, religion they are ready to consider.
302 
 
This education fever was a great incentive for conversion as Christians were given priority 
for the limited enrollment in church schools. Especially in the case of Presbyterian schools, 
enrollment was limited to the children of Christian families on principle and thus 
conversion appeared a ticket to admission, which often perplexed missionaries like W. L. 
Swallen (NP). 
 
The school problem is great, at almost every point…The churches will 
get mixed up with the heathen on the school question, because the 
heathen want what the Christians have without giving up the devil. The 
heathen are offering the Christians their money and their old defunct 
Confucian school properties, and promise obedience to all the rules of the 
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Christian school, even to the sending of their children to the service on 
Sabbath, if only the church will provide the Christian teacher.
303 
 
Hence, church schools continued to grow in number and its total enrollment being a greater 
gap between demand and supply for school due to the absence of universal education 
system in Korea.   
     Nonetheless, the poorly equipped church schools could not respond to the sudden 
increase in enrollment. As a Methodist missionary reported, “the growth of educational 
work and the amount of money that the Koreans are giving for schools is very gratifying 
and yet perplexing, because of the scarcity of good teachers and the inadequacy of 
text-books.”
304   
    It is reasonable, then, to conclude that, for at least the first two decades of the 
Mission, the majority of Koreans Christians, regardless of denominational affiliation, 
received at best only a minimum standard of education. Most schools were crippled by a 
lack of facilities, teachers and textbooks. Consequently, Korean Christians were left 
undereducated about modern science and technology or western civilization as the average 
Korean of that time. With the exception of the Methodist Paejae School, then, mission 
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education made a limited contribution to the molding of intellectually advanced national 
leaders.   
   
    
185 
 
Chapter 5  Church and Korean Politics 
 
  From the beginning of the mission, the Protestant missionaries saw the world in 
terms of a binary system of sacred and secular and rejected political and social issues as 
belonging to the latter. This view was representative of conservative Protestantism in 
America and explains why missionaries in Korea were “comparatively indifferent to the 
educational and social application of the gospel in Korea.”
305  Given that many Korean 
missionaries came from such a conservative Christian background in America,
306  it was 
natural that they taught Korean Christians to keep their distance from politics and devote 
themselves to religious salvation alone. While it is true that missionaries occasionally 
intervened in Korean political matters through the US legation when they deemed it 
necessary to protect Korean Christians from persecution, this was primarily a defense 
measure compelled by the on-the-ground circumstances (Chapter 2). As the Korean 
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government gradually acquiesced in the missionaries’ freedom of religion, especially after 
the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, the missionaries tried to maintain their neutrality or 
aloofness from politics. Under missionary supervision, disengagement from politics soon 
became a common practice in the Korean churches.   
 
Attitude toward the Independence Club 
  The separation of the church from politics became a keen issue for the Mission for 
the first time in the late 1890s, when the Independence Club began to demand political 
reforms to the government. This Club was founded in 1896 by two leading Korean 
intellectuals, Sŏ Chae-p’il and Yun Ch’i-ho, to promote the Korean independence cause 
among the general populace. They took the advantage of China’s defeat in the 
Sino-Japanese War and sought to disseminate the nationalist ideal of standing independent 
without relying on foreign power. As a symbolic action, the Club members disestablished 
the traditional “Welcome Gate” in Seoul, the site where Chinese imperial delegates were 
hosted, and replaced it with a new western-style stone arch, the “Independence Gate.” They 
envisioned constitutional monarchy as the future form of the Korean government and tried  
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to move the Korean Court toward that direction.
307  To win the royal confidence, the Club 
leader, Sŏ Chae-p’il organized a public celebration for the King’s Birthday and some 
missionaries such as Horace G. Underwood (NP) mobilized Christians in Seoul to attend 
the ceremony and pray for him.
308  For this kind of activities, some scholars interpret the 
Club’s movement and the Christian involvement as a proof of the Christian “loyalty to the 
king and the nation” (ch’unggun aeguk).
309 
    Nonetheless, the Club’s relation to the King and the Korean Court was not without 
tension. In the beginning, the Club was supportive of the Korean Court policy of moving 
away from Chinese tutelage after the Sino-Japanese war, but it became critical of the Court, 
when it showed a growing reliance on the Russian Empire in 1896 in order to hold the 
victorious Japanese in check. To sustain Korean independence, the Club proposed that the 
Korean government implement various reform measures such as prohibiting the sale of 
national resources for foreign concessions and punishing corrupt officials who placed their 
personal gain over the national interest.   
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Yet, King Kojong was by no means determined to adopt the progressive agenda 
proposed by the Club, though he was leaning more toward western ideas and technology 
after the Sino-Japanese War. Hence, when the conservative anti-Club officials conspired to 
disseminate a false rumor that the Club was plotting a revolution to make Korea into a 
Republic, the indecisive king was panic-stricken and ordered the arrest of the Club leaders, 
while announcing royal edict that the Club be disestablished at once.
310  As a result, Sŏ 
Chae-p’il and Yun Ch’i-ho were hunted by the government and had to take refuge using 
their foreign contacts. It was the second time for them to be wanted by their own 
government since the failed coup in 1882. Because Sŏ had acquired United States 
citizenship, he could ask the U.S. Consul-General for diplomatic protection and flee to the 
United States. Yun went into hiding at the house of his missionary friend Henry G. 
Appenzeller.
311  While Sŏ and Yun were exceptional Christian intellectual elites and did not 
represent the majority of Korean Christians, it is nevertheless interesting to note that their 
political behavior was in complete accord with the Korean Christian tradition of seeking 
refuge under foreign protection in time of need. 
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  With the suppression of the Independence Club, Yun lost confidence in the Korean 
monarch as a potential reformer. In his diary, Yun cursed King Kojong as “the deteriorated 
edition of King Charles I” and when he heard the news of the forced dissolution of the Club, 
he burst into anger: “This is a King! A smooth-lying treacherous coward could not have 
done anything meaner than this… Great Emperor of Korea!!!”
312  But what disheartened 
Yun more than the king was the “abominable indifference of the general public” to the 
Club’s struggle.   
 
They [Korean people] look on the struggle as a personal quarrel of some 
Independents with the government. These children of oppression and 
slaves of centuries fail to see that the six Articles [of the Club’s reform 
proposal] touch the national and personal interest of every one of them! 
To have based any hope on a people of this sort—we have been greater 
fools. As the king, so is the people! They deserve to be nothing but 
slaves!
313 
 
This statement clearly shows the sense of isolation that Christian intellectuals like Yun felt. 
Behind them was no mass support from Korean Christians at all. The nationalist aspiration 
that drove the Club had no appeal to the “children of oppression and slaves” to which the 
majority of the Christian population belonged. They were struggling to make a living and 
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had neither extra time nor resources to make engage positively in political affairs and 
received little education. Moreover, the missionaries instructed Korean Christians to stay 
aloof from politics, while encouraging them to divert their interests and resources to the 
religious cause of the Church. 
  In fact, the missionaries were generally inimical to the Club’s political activism. 
The Presbyterian missionaries in particular dismissed the Independence Club’s cause as 
having nothing to do with the religious salvation of Korean souls. To the contrary, they 
frowned upon the Korean Christians’ association with the Club and tried to keep them away 
from the Club. For instance, Samuel F. Moore (NP), ministering at Yon Mot Kol Church in 
Seoul, was annoyed when he found that some of his congregation were “engrossed with the 
‘Independence Club’” and renounced them as having “little thought or purpose in the work 
of the Church.”
314  In other words, the missionaries were largely responsible for producing 
such politically passive Korean Christians, whom Christian intellectuals like Yun Ch’i-ho 
disdained as “slaves.”   
  Nonetheless, the government crackdown of the Independence Movement brought 
about an unexpected positive impact on the subsequent Korean Christian development. 
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Among some reform-minded and elite yangban members of the Club who were deprived of 
their government positions and jailed in Seoul prison were born a group of Christian 
converts. Their conversion was led mainly by Dalziel A. Bunker (1853-1932, NM) , James 
S. Gale (NP) and Horace G. Underwood (NP), who made a regular visit to these noted elite 
yangban officials in prison for consolation and provided religious tracts and Bible in 
classical Chinese. Also, Syngman Rhee (1875-1965), a Paejae graduate and the young 
activist in the Independence Club, who was imprisoned himself, was instrumental in 
proselytizing his senior prisonmates.
315  Gradually, many of them believed the new 
teaching and converted, which include prominent senior officials. They included the 
following figures: Yu Sŏng-jun (1860-1934), a high-ranking official and a younger brother 
of Yu Kil-chun, a well-known scholar who had studied in the United States and authored 
Sŏyu kyŏngmun, the first book on the West published in Korea in 1895; Yi Sang-jae 
(1850-1927), former secretary cabinet and later became an executive leader of Seoul 
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Y.M.C.A.; Yi Wŏn-gŭng (1849-?), one of the most noted Confucian scholar at that time; 
Kim Chŏng-sik (1862-1937), former chief of police of Seoul.
316 
In career, status and age, this group of converts had a totally different caliber from 
the majority of the Korean Christians at that time. By the time of conversion, they had been 
ruling the country as high officials and concerned about the future of the Korean state and 
nation as their own concerns. Their participation in the governmental and social reform 
through Independence Club shows they were the leaders of incipient Korean nationalism. 
There is little document to show their internal motive for conversion, but, considering their 
socio-political background, it was likely that they received it not only as a means for 
personal salvation but also national. In any case, this yangbans’s conversion in prison, 
though a few in number, was a historic moment in Korean Christian history, where ruling 
elites within Korea turned to Christian faith for the first time.
317  How their peculiar 
presence in the low-class dominated Korean Church, after their release from prison, 
affected the subsequent development of the Church will be discussed in the next chapters.   
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The Separation of Church from Politics 
    The Presbyterian principle of absolute separation of church and politics soon 
became a formal policy of the mission. In the Mission Council in 1901, the Presbyterian 
missionaries adopted the following resolution and delivered the Korean translation to the 
local Korean churches under its jurisdiction. 
 
1. We resolved that our ministers shall never interfere with affairs of state 
(nara il), government (chŏngbu il) and officials (kwanwŏn il) of Korea 
(Taehan) 
2. There are treaties between the Korea and our [missionaries’ home] 
countries and we have to handle political affairs according to the 
treaties… What we teach our [Korean] congregations is that Church is 
not the organization that should take responsibility of state affairs or 
interfere with it. 
3. Korean people remain as Korean people even after becoming a 
member of the Church. What we teach you is to serve the emperor with 
loyalty, to obey officials, and to observe the government laws according 
to the word of Gods. 
4. Our Church neither forces nor prohibits its members to take part in 
state affairs or join any political party. [But] we would not take any 
responsibility nor make defense for the mistakes and crimes that might be 
committed by the church members while involved in state affairs. 
5. Our Church is the Church where Holy Spirit resides, not the Church to 
take care of state affairs. Thus, the church buildings, minister’s 
guestrooms and church schools should be used for church activities 
(kyohoe il) only, and never for the discussion about state and political  
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affairs… Also, whoever becomes a church member, he shall not bring in 
his minister’s guestroom such topics as cannot be discussed publicly in 
other places.
318   
 
This policy is quite distinctive in that it demanded more than a separation of church and 
state as was commonly practiced in the United States. It mandated that Korean Christians 
refrain entirely from engaging in politics regardless of purpose. The fact that even 
discussion of political affairs was banned in church buildings shows how strongly the 
missionaries wanted to insulate Korean Christians from political entanglement. At that time, 
the Korean Church was relatively free from Korean government censorship through the 
extraterritorial rights enjoyed by the missionaries. Within the Church, however, the 
missionary practiced another kind of censorship and political discussions were strictly 
suppressed. The missionaries adopted Koreans who needed political refuge in the church, 
but once Koreans entered church doors, they were expected to forget about politics and 
remain silent about it. Korean Christians might have learned some elementary ideas about 
democracy in sermons or classes at the mission schools, but were expected not to practice it 
in public. Therefore, there was no place in the church for politically-minded Korean 
Christians who wanted to reform the corrupt Korean government and share political ideas 
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with their fellow Christians. In other words, for the Korean Christians, simultaneously 
being a church leader and also a political leader was impossible as long as missionary 
censorship prevailed in the Church. 
 
The Japanese Protectorate 
  The missionaries continued to discourage Korean Christian involvement in politics 
even when Korean sovereignty was endangered by the Japanese empire. When Japan 
imposed the Protectorate Treaty on the Korean government in 1905 and made it into a 
semi-colonized state, the missionaries did their best to keep Korean Christians calm and 
refrain from raising voices of opposition against the new Japanese regime.   
  The endorsement of Japanese rule in Korea was in accordance with the United 
States diplomatic policy under Theodore Roosevelt, who wanted Japan to check the 
Russian expansion.
319  Also, the missionaries wanted a more functional local government 
so that their mission work would not be disturbed. This view was represented by Arthur 
Brown, the Secretary of the Presbyterian Foreign Mission Board, who made an inspection 
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trip to Korea in 1902 and predicted that internal corruption in Korea would soon lead it to 
be taken over by foreign powers.   
   
It is totally destitute of the moral fiber needed in Korea at this time, and the 
prevailing corruption is as among the officials in the Imperial Palace as 
anywhere in the Empire. The people are taxed beyond all reason… Offices 
are sold to the highest bidder, or given to dissipated favorites…So rotten is 
the entire system that one marvels that the nation has not fallen to pieces 
before this. Only the stolid apathy of the Asiatic and the rival claims of 
foreign Powers have held it together at all.
320 
 
Based on this cool and pessimistic observation, Brown concluded, “It is evident that Korea 
is too weak to maintain her independence much longer. She is sure to fall at no distant 
day.”
321  For the American Protestant missionaries, then, the Japanese takeover of Korea 
was an expected scenario. 
Some missionaries optimistically believed that the loss of national independence 
would turn Korean minds more toward religion than politics and thus make for more 
devoted evangelists. Interpreting this political event in religious terms, one Methodist 
missionary thought that “God is forming out of Korea an instrument for the evangelizing of 
the yellow races” and prophesized that, “The day will come when we shall see the Korean 
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evangelists working with as much power and force among China's millions as among his 
own people.”
322  Hence, from the missionary point of view, Korea’s loss of independence 
was a positive development that would lead it to become “the Palestine of the Far East” 
where Christian converts were commissioned to disseminate the gospel to neighboring 
great nations just as the Jewish Christian converts evangelized the Romans. 
Such a missionary view was also endorsed by a Korean Christian, Syngman Rhee, 
a Paejae graduate, who had been an active member of the Independence Club and known as 
a young nationalist leader. In 1908, he had a chance to attend the American Methodist 
Convention at Pittsburg and delivered the address to the missionary audience in which he 
mentioned the present state of Korea. 
 
So you see, the Koreans to-day have not country to live or die for, and no 
longer homes in which to enjoy peaceful life… Parden[sic] me, friends, I 
mention it not with unpleasant feeling at all. On the contrary, I am glad of 
it. I thank God for that, because this is Korea’s opportunity… In the 
lowest pitch of their national humility, the Koreans at once realize the 
need of some great power to life them up. They know well enough that 
no earthly power could do that… If Korea can be saved at all, it is by 
Jesus Christ…You [missionaries] have given them the very thing they 
needed… [God] gave us this great opportunity so that the Koreans might 
give up their national pride, ancestral beliefs, and hereditary 
superstitions… Today more than one hundred thousand native Christians 
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are praying earnestly and constantly that their beautiful little country may 
become a perfect Christian nation within the next twenty years. I am one 
of these native converts who firmly believe that God will answer our 
prayers.
323 
   
Rhee might have prepared this address with a diplomatic intention to attract American 
attention to Korea as a deterrence against the increasing Japanese power in Korea. 
Considering that Rhee actually became a Korean nationalist leader in exile in the States and 
continued to lobby with Washington for support for Korea’s independence, it is likely that 
he had such diplomatic consideration in mind when he made the address. Nonetheless, it 
still shows us that a nationalist like Rhee knew well enough what kind of message the 
American missionary audience wanted to hear most from a native Korean Christian and had 
to present the Koreans as a naïve nation who would not pursue earthly political aims, 
abandon national pride, and wait for God’s salvation on the verge of national demise. 
Simply put, Rhee could not say in front of the missionary audience, even if he wanted, that 
he pray God for Korean national independence and His protection in his struggle against 
the Japanese because the missionaries did not want to hear. He had to conform to the 
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missionary view in any way as long as he tried to keep American attention through the 
Mission, the gateway to the American power.   
There were, of course, some missionaries who showed more personal sympathy 
for the passing of Korea than others, but their sympathy did not drive to them to oppose 
mission policy or confront the Japanese regime. James Scranton, for instance, was worried 
that Bishop Harris, who presided over both Japanese and Korean Methodist Church, had a 
strong pro-Japanese gesture might dishearten the Koreans, but even he had no intention of 
rejecting the Japanese. He expected Japan’s rule, if inevitable, would benefit Korea and 
wrote to the Board. “As foreigners living in Korea… we are nearly all pro-Japanese to the 
extent of wishing well for Japan in Korea, if she will do well by Korea,” even though “We 
are Korean sympathizers first, and look at Korea from the local standpoint.”
324   
  Missionary support for the Japanese regime was expressed not only in word but 
also in deed. Especially when church members were involved in any form of anti-Japanese 
movement, the Missions punished them as violating the principle of separation of church 
and politics. For instance, the Methodist mission disbanded the Epworth League, a youth 
group in the Chŏngdong Church, the oldest and the largest Methodist Church in Seoul at 
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that time, where Chŏn Tŏkki, a missionary servant-turned-pastor, schemed to mobilize 
some members of the church for the anti-Japanese movement. Though the detailed 
activities of the League were not disclosed in the official record of the Mission, it accused 
the League’s members for “leading a double life before the church and within itself” and 
“falling under the control of outsiders…who were carrying away the League from the 
purposes of the church to that of the world.”
325   
  While missionaries prohibited Korean Christians from expressing their 
dissatisfaction with Japanese rule, they allowed themselves to express sympathy and 
affinity with the Japanese empire. A good example is the Methodist relationship with the Itō 
Hirobumi, the first Resident-General in Korea. When Itō arrived in Seoul, a representative 
of the Methodist Mission escorted him to the palace where he was to receive the royal 
audience.
326  The scene of the missionaries, following Itō’s procession in horse cart through 
the main street of Seoul was a clear message to Koreans that Christians should remain loyal 
to state authority, whether the state was handled by the Korean King or the Japanese 
Resident-General. 
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The Anti-Ŭibyŏng Attitude of the Church 
  With such high expectations placed on the religious role of Korean Christians, it 
was natural that the missionaries were rather unsympathetic to the ŭibyŏng, the righteous 
army who took arms against the Japanese at the time of the Protectorate Treaty in 1905. 
This armed rebellion quickly spread, especially after the disbanding of the Korean Army in 
1907, when many of the dismissed Korean military officials and soldiers joined other 
anti-Japanese forces organized by Confucian scholars and other local leaders.
327  To counter 
this popular resistance, the Japanese deployed a large number of fully armed police and 
conducted aggressive campaigns to suppress it. Thus, there were continuous skirmishes 
between the Japanese and Korean guerrilla forces between 1905 and 1910, resulting in 
significant socio-economic turmoil in rural area. 
  The conventional historiography generally interprets ŭibyŏng as a manifestation of 
anti-Japanese Korean nationalism. However, since many ŭibyŏng leaders were 
Confucianists and maintained conservative values, they were not simply anti-Japanese but 
anti-foreign. In fact, one of the common purposes of the ŭibyŏng uprisings was to restore 
the traditional socio-political order under the current dynasty by expelling all foreigners, 
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western and Japanese alike. Therefore, Korean Christians and missionaries in general had a 
quite low view of the “Righteous Army” as reactionary and anachronistic. In addition, their 
armed resistance caused many local disturbances and worsened the living conditions of 
local Christians who had been struggling in daily poverty. Often, local Christians were 
caught in the fighting between the ŭibyŏng and the Japanese and suffered serious damage to 
their home and religious life. As a result, the missionaries had to conclude that the ŭibyŏng 
was the enemy of the Church, and often worse than the Japanese police force. For example, 
Charles A. Clark (1878-1961, NP) was totally disgusted with the ŭibyŏng when he 
inspected the real aftermath of the ŭibyŏng’s righteous fighting in Kyŏnggi and Kangwŏn 
province in 1906. 
 
I saw the ruins of hundreds of houses burned either by the Japanese or the 
“euipyungs [sic],” for both are in the business. At Yanggeun, 300 houses, at 
Tukusoo, 80, Yongmoon, 80, and so on. There were the largest towns but 
every day we passed isolated house and small villages burned in whole or in 
part. Hundreds are living in caves… The Japanese have been very cruel, in 
some places, but on the whole not worse than the other side. The 
“euipyungs” are the real oppressors of the poor. Some months ago, there 
was a faint spark of patriotism in this movement and it no doubt lingers in 
some individuals, but my conclusion, from what I saw, is that 90% of them 
are in it for Number One and not for the sake of the country. They have 
never, so far as I could find, sought the Japanese to fight them. From the 
beginning, they have gone around in bands of 30 to 1500 men, going from  
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village to village, summoning the leaders of the town and demanding great 
sums of money. Wherever they were refused, they murdered or tortured 
without limit…The “euipyungs” have taken food and clothes and money 
from the Christians and they burned one Christian village near 
Whang-sang-kol, but they have not as yet harmed any of our people 
physically…
328 
 
As ŭibyŏng guerrilla warfare dragged on, the state of the local churches deteriorated further. 
Clark’s report for the year 1907-08 depicted a grimmer picture of the war.   
 
The whole area has been passing through a reign of terror. All the 
opponents of the Japanese from the 13 provinces have assembled here 
because the mountains make it hard for the Japanese to catch them. The 
guerrilla fighters have roamed around in band living off the land. The 
Japanese have followed them wherever they could get any knowledge of 
them. Night and day, for months, continuous skirmishes have gone on. 
NO mercy was shown on either side. Anyone suspected of helping 
either side was at once shot by the other, if caught. Every house or 
village that entertained either side was at once burned by the other… It 
has put the church through a test of fire.
329   
 
The situation was no better in the Northern provinces. Mattie and Arthur Noble (1866-1945, 
NM) in Pyŏngyang, observed that “The We-pyung [sic] have for a long time not only been 
plundering and killing Japanese but their own country men and women in the interior, who 
                                                   
328 Charles Allen Clark, “Personal Report to the Korean Mission for 1906-1907,” cited in 
Donald N. Clark, Living dangerously in Korea : the western experience, 1900-1950 
(Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2003), 35-36. 
329 Charles Allen Clark, “Personal Report to the Korean Mission for 1907-1908,” cited in 
ibid., 35.  
204 
 
they thought could give them money and help or who they suspected of being Japanese 
sympathizers.”
330   
  Totally repulsed by the undisciplined ŭibyŏng soldiers, James S. Gale (NP) 
introduced them in a negative light to Christian audiences overseas.     
 
A mad sort of spurious patriotism started into being, with suicide, chopping 
off of fingers, sworn oaths, guerrilla warfare flint-lock resistance. It still 
goes on to a considerable degree, while the poor people in valleys, caught 
between the two contending forces, have to pay the price of Korea’s past 
failures.
331   
 
While missionaries campaigned against the ŭibyŏng, there were instances where local 
Christian leaders were arrested and executed by Japanese on charges of being “participators 
in the insurrection.”
332  Though such radical elements were a small minority in the church, 
the missionaries were afraid that the Japanese would see the Korean Church as ŭibyŏng 
sympathizers. Therefore, the missionaries had all the more reason to keep the Korean 
Christians from taking any part in the resistance and avoid any engagement in political 
complications. 
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    Most Korean Church leaders followed this mission policy loyally. Kil Sŏn-ju 
(1869-1935, NP), one of the first ordained Korean Elders, preached to the congregation in 
his church in Pyŏngyang not to join the ŭibyŏng and told the Christian that “the powers that 
be are ordained of God” and thus avoid confronting Japanese.
333  Some leaders took more 
positive action. Ch’oe Pyŏng-hŏn (1858-1927, NM), one of the first Korean Methodist 
pastors, accepted the Korean governmental appointment to become a “peace commissioner” 
(sŏnyusa) who would be sent to ŭibyŏng leaders in rural provinces and persuade them to 
lay down arms under royal authority. It was likely that this royal appointment was 
manipulated by the Japanese protectorate acting behind the crown, but Ch’oe accepted it 
positively, thinking, “it was not meddling with politics but simply an humanitarian 
measure.”
 334  George Heber Jones (1867-1919, NM), who supervised Ch’oe, opposed his 
decision at first and refused to give his consent. But, upon Ch’oe’s plea, he gave him 
permission to become “commissioner” on condition that he should take a leave of absence 
from his church work.
335  It was the Korean Christian’s determination to negotiate with 
ŭibyŏng to lay their arms. Soon the Methodist Mission publicly expressed its support for 
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Ch’oe’s mission and wished his success.
336  Endorsed by the missionary, Ch’oe visited rural 
villages in his home province of Ch’ungch’ong, escorted by the Japanese police, and 
preached to the local residents as well as the ŭibyŏng leaders, persuading them that the 
current and immediate need of Korea was to promote education among the common people 
and losing lives to armed resistance was to waste a valuable asset. Ch’oe’s campaigning 
had some effect and several ŭibyŏng leaders surrendered to the Japanese authority.
337 
    Likewise, Sŏ Sang-ryun (1848-1925, NP), one of the first Korean Protestant 
converts in Manchuria, who by then had become the senior leader of the Church, also 
received an appointment as “peace commissioner” and was dispatched to his home 
province of Hwanghae. However, Sŏ was less successful in his persuasion campaigns as he 
rejected the ŭibyŏng’s cause outright and branded them traitors against the royal order. 
During the tour, he was captured by the ŭibyŏng on one occasion and reportedly flogged a 
few dozen times, on suspicion of being a false “royal commissioner” and a “Japanese 
spy.”
338 
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  For their part, the ŭibyŏng leaders thought that Korean Christians were simply 
manipulated by the missionaries. They thus planned an anti-missionary assault. In fact, an 
anonymous leader of the ŭibyŏng sent a death threat to George H. Jones, which aimed at 
“his life in ten days, and from him down to the Christians the burning of missionary homes” 
unless he recalled Ch’oe before then.
339  The same letter was sent to James S. Gale, though 
he was not a Methodist missionary and had no control over Ch’oe. The scared missionaries 
decided to recall Ch’oe after consulting with the U.S. and British Consuls.
340  They also 
reported to the Japanese police of the harassment and the Japanese sent the police guards to 
Jones’ residence to prepare for the ŭibyŏng’s attack, for which Jones was very thankful.
341 
  These Korean Christian and missionary reactions to the ŭibyŏng show that 
anti-Japanese nationalism did not bond the Christians the ŭibyŏng together, but divided 
them farther apart. For the ŭibyŏng, the Christians were identified as followers of the 
heterodox religious rule of the foreign missionaries and were thus traitors. Their 
anti-Christian sentiment was so strong that they had little sympathy for Korean Christians 
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and robbed property and money for their righteous war against the Japanese. As seen in 
Chapter 2, such anti-Christian violence had been prevalent in Korea prior to the Japanese 
Protectorate and this was not the first time that Christians were physically threatened by 
non-Christians. By contrast, the Korean Christians and missionaries viewed the ŭibyŏng as 
bandits or anti-Christian thugs. As they possessed no military power to challenge the 
ŭibyŏng, however, they had to rely on the suppression campaigns of the Japanese 
protectorate. Hence, it was not a critical issue for them whether the government force was 
Japanese or Korean. They simply needed any power that could pacify the uncontrolled 
violence of the ŭibyŏng and restore an order in which they could enjoy the freedom of 
religion. Their primary objective lay in preserving the security of their religious as well as 
material life with the Church at its center, even if this was accomplished under foreign rule. 
It is also worth noting that there was an important historical precedent for Korean 
Christian reliance on foreign protection. Catholic Christians under the Chosŏn dynasty had 
also been dependent upon foreign power and prerogatives for protection of their existence. 
The missionary’s extraterritorial rights had been the primary defense against government 
persecution, but they had been ineffective against the uncontrolled violence of 
anti-Christian mobs and riots. Thus, physical force was at times needed and, following this  
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logic, the missionaries welcomed Japanese intervention to suppress the anti-foreign and 
anti-Christian Tonghaks in 1894 and appreciated peace under Japanese domination in the 
postwar era where they gained greater freedom of religion and Christian growth took off. 
Taking into account such historical context, the Christian reliance on the Japanese against 
the anti-Christian ŭibyŏng was in accord with their past behavioral patterns. As long as 
Korean society at large maintained an intolerant and violent attitude toward Christianity, 
Korean Christians always needed an external guarantor of their security, whether in the 
form of the western missionaries or the Japanese colonial power. 
  In short, the missionaries and Korean Christians wanted the restoration of peace 
and order above all and worked diligently to achieve this goal. The Methodist Mission 
commended such Christian efforts, and gladly reported to the Board that:   
 
Both at Seoul and Pyengyang [sic], and throughout the disturbed sections, 
the Christians exerted their influence on the side of law and order and 
contributed very largely to keeping the spirit of disorder under control. In 
the north, no uprising against the government occurred, and this was all the 
more remarkable, as the people in Pyengyang and the northern provinces 
are the most excitable and turbulent in the empire.
342   
 
The Mission thus concluded the report proudly: 
                                                   
342 George Heber Jones and Arthur W. Noble, The Korean Revival (New York: Board of 
Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, ca.1910 ), 41.  
210 
 
 
Any just review of the causes which contributed to tranquility must give a 
large share of credit to the restraining influence of the churches. Throughout 
this entire region, both in the north and at Seoul, misguided patriots 
threatened the lives of missionaries and native preachers because their 
influence was against disorder, but as the result of the counsels and 
restraining influence of the Christian workers, bloodshed was prevented and 
order maintained.
343 
 
In other words, the major contribution of the Korean Church in this period was not to 
promote anti-Japanese nationalist struggles, but to suppress it. 
   
Mass Revivals in 1907 
  While missionaries and Korean Christians stayed out of politics, they made a 
concerted effort to propagate the gospel and disseminate the message of religious salvation 
among the general populace. Korean Christians, who were mostly poor and socially 
underprivileged, had neither the political will nor the material means to rise up in arms 
against the Korean government, ŭibyŏng or the Japanese protectorate. The desperate 
hopelessness and helplessness prevailed among the impoverished Koreans and the 
missionaries often heard their crying, “Wei-chi hal kot tomochi oupso [ŭiji hal kot tomuji 
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ŏpsŏ],” meaning “there is altogether no place to trust.”
344  In a time when hope for 
socio-political salvation was fading away, many Koreans were tempted to seek religious 
salvation as an alternative. This desire led to a series of Christian revivals, beginning in the 
northern regions of Korea in the wake of the Japanese Protectorate, but quickly spreading 
all over the country and reaching its peak in 1907 at the “Great Revival” in Pyŏngyang. 
  The “Great Revival” has been explained as the expression of Korean Christian 
nationalism, in which Korean Christians cried and prayed for national rejuvenation and 
salvation. However, the missionaries at least did not note such a nationalist agenda in the 
revival, but rather intended to make it an opportunity to promote religious piety and keep 
Koreans away from national politics. William Blair (n.a.- 1970, NP), one of the initiators of 
the Revival, articulated his purpose as follows.   
 
We felt that the Korean church needed not only to repent of hating the 
Japanese, but a clear vision of all sin against God, that many had come 
into the church sincerely believing in Jesus as their Savior and anxious to 
do God’s will without great sorrow for sin because of its familiarity… 
We felt…that embittered souls needed to have their thoughts taken away 
from the national situation to their own personal relation with the 
Master.
345 
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There is no way of knowing if Korean Christians repented the sin of hating Japanese as the 
missionaries instructed, but there is evidence that missionaries and Korean Christians 
invited Japanese residents in Pyŏngyang to the Revival and proselytized them at that time. 
George H. Jones, for example, was greatly impressed by Japanese participation in the 
Korean Revival.   
 
A number of Japanese were converted in the meetings held in Pyengyang, 
although they were ignorant of the Korean language and the contact was 
altogether in spirit. The Christians who witnessed the effects of the 
revival on the Koreans were profoundly moved and carried back the 
news to Japan, where in several instances it resulted in quickening the 
Japanese Church... One night there came into the meeting in Pyengyang a 
Japanese army officer who appeared to be deeply interested in what was 
taking place. When the Christians knelt in prayer, he knelt with them, but 
when they arose he continued prostrate before God. No one present could 
speak the Japanese language, so it was not possible to communicate with 
him…The next day he came with the pastor of the Japanese church in 
Pyengyang to see the missionary. He told of how in the past he had no 
belief in existence of God, but in the meeting had been so impressed with 
what had taken place that he could doubt no longer his being and 
presence, and there had given his heart to Christ. As he was soon to 
return to Japan he requested baptism, and the following night a little 
group of Japanese took their place in the midst of the vast audience of 
Koreans. At the close of the service this soldier-Christian was baptized 
into the Christian faith amid the common rejoicing of Japanese and 
Koreans. The officer returned to Japan with his heart filled with the 
divine passion for souls. He preached the gospel in the garrison city to  
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which he was appointed with such earnestness that the entire community 
was deeply stirred and many persons brought to Christ. This is but typical 
of the possible influence that Korea may exert upon her neighbors.
346 
 
The joy of transnational alliance in faith was also experienced by Presbyterian missionaries, 
who visited Pyŏngyang to attend the Great Revival, and met Japanese Christians there.   
 
Sometimes Mr. Murata, the Japanese evangelist, and other Japanese 
Christians attend and take part, either in broken English or in pure 
Japanese, which none of us can understand. And yet, strange to say, 
interpreted by common sympathy and faith, we all feel the spirit of what 
they are saying, and are enabled to join in heartily with them in prayer.
347 
 
The Japanese involvement in the Great Revival in Korea was more than nominal. It 
inspired Japanese Christians both in Korea and at home, and some Japanese Christians in 
the mainland, who were inspired by the news of the revival in Korea, even made an 
inspection tour of Pyŏngyang in 1907,
348  and reported favorably of the spiritual 
development in the neighboring country upon their return to Japan.
349   
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As mentioned above, some missionaries entertained visions of making Koreans 
future missionaries among other Asian peoples. From the missionary point of view, then, 
the evangelizing efforts of Korean Christians toward the Japanese were quite desirable and 
satisfactory. The missionaries were thus proud of Korean Christians being neighbor-loving 
evangelists rather than anti-Japanese fighters. For the missionaries, the Korean loss of 
national independence was sufficiently compensated by the growing evangelization of 
Korea and its transnational impact upon its colonizing neighbors. And, whether willing or 
unwilling, the Korean Christians conformed to the missionary’s expectations. At a 
minimum, they never chose to confront the powers that be.   
 
Silence about Annexation 
  Having given up hope for Korea’s independence after the Protectorate Treaty, the 
missionaries had no reason to oppose the formal Japanese annexation of Korea. They 
calmly accepted annexation and taught the Korean Christians “submission to the inevitable, 
rather than a reckless waste of life and treasure.”
350  In fact, some missionaries expected 
that the annexation would bring merit to Korean Christians. For instance, Henry Bruen 
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(1874-1957), a Presbyterian minister (NP), gladly observed the change of the atmosphere in 
the Korean Church after the annexation.   
 
The supremacy of the Japanese in Korea having become a definite reality 
even the vague and shadowy hope of political succor in time of stress, 
which was something of a motive in the minds of some in coming in the 
church and from among whom the church eventually secured some 
earnest spiritual minded members, is no longer operative.
351 
 
In other words, the Japanese colonization of Korea was helpful in purifying the Church as 
politically-minded Christians would leave the church, having lost their last hope for Korean 
independence. To the missionaries, the less political hope for Koreans, the better for Korean 
Christians.   
In sum, the Korean Church under missionary control did not make any 
contribution to the Korean nationalist cause. The Church remained as a community of the 
religiously devout but apolitical Koreans who prioritized individual salvation from sin over 
national salvation from the Japanese empire. Such a disinterested attitude on the part of 
Korean Christians at a time of national crisis was shockingly disappointing to secular 
Korean nationalists who resisted Japanese rule either through armed resistance or printed 
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dissent. Thus, Taehan Maeil Sinbo, a popular Korean newspaper that represented the 
nationalist camp at the time, publicly condemned the Korean Church and renounced its 
religious pietism as treason to the nation.   
 
We don’t say that no Christians have any national spirit (kukka chŏngsin), 
but there are many who do not have it… Among the Christians, there are 
those who know only the salvation of the spirit but do not know the 
salvation of the flesh; know the way to heaven, but do not know the 
business of this world; know the blessing in heaven or the suffering in 
hell, but do not know the preservation of a state or the demise of a nation. 
How can we not be appalled by their attitude!
352 
   
The editorial continued to argue that the teaching of “turn the other cheek" in the Bible 
“should not be applied to Koreans today whose country has been destroyed and whose 
people are suffering” and urged that “Koreans today must be sympathetic to the suffering of 
fellow Koreans and resist the violent Satan.”
 353  Nonetheless, the majority of Korean 
Christians did not heed this call to join the anti-Japanese uprising. Following orthodox 
Christian doctrine and missionary instructions, they remained loyal to secular authority kept 
their distance from the nationalist camp. After all, nationalism was not a primary value for 
Korean Christians, and identification of the Church and nationalism was totally unthinkable 
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in the historical context of the time, where the Mission stood in between and blocked such 
union.   
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Chapter 6  Korean Christian Revolts against Ecclesiastical Authority 
 
    From the beginning of the mission through the 1910s, missionaries retained 
controlling power over the Korean Church. Not only did they dictate the internal 
management of the Korean Church, but they also suppressed the relationship of Korean 
Christians to political matters outside the Church. During this period, the controlling power 
of missionaries was generally secure and did not face a serious challenge from Koreans. 
There were, however, sporadic murmurings of dissent among Koreans against the 
missionaries. In the beginning, missionaries could relatively easily suppress such dissent 
behind the scenes, but gradually oppositional voices against the missionaries grew stronger 
and took on a visible form so that missionaries had to deal with Korean dissatisfaction more 
seriously. This chapter focuses on the Korean Christian challenge to missionary authority 
and analyzes how it affected the development of the Korean Church.   
 
Dispute in Kon Dang Kol Church 
In the early stage of the mission, Protestant missionaries could not infiltrate the 
Korean aristocracy, and thus targeted lower-class Koreans as the primary object of their  
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evangelizing campaigns. As a part of its effort to evangelize the poor, the Presbyterian 
mission selected a slum district of Seoul called Kon Dang Kol and built a church there in 
1893, assigning Samuel F. Moore (NP) as its minister. 
  During the Chosŏn dynasty, when rigid social status distinctions were maintained, 
the residential areas of Seoul were divided along status lines and Kon Dang Kol was an 
area inhabited by the lowest social castes, including paekchŏng, who were severely 
discriminated against for their animal-related occupations such as butchery and leather 
work. Adjacent to Kon Dang Kol to the north was another residential area called Pukch’on, 
where yangban aristocrats and high-ranking government officials resided. And, this setting 
of Kon Dang Kol between lower and upper social castes important provided a cause of 
dispute in the church later. 
The church was started with 16 members, but membership quickly grew to 43 
within a year and became the largest of the five Presbyterian churches in Seoul by 1896.
354 
Needless to say, the majority of this church’s members were the lower class Koreans in the 
area. Perhaps because of the church’s proximity to the yangban’s residence, however, there 
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were also a few aristocratic members such as Yi Sŭng-du and Ma Yŏng-jun. Though it is 
not clear how prestigious their family status was within yangban society, it was rare to see 
Korean church members of the upper classes among the predominantly lower class 
congregation.   
The mixed class composition of the Kon Dang Kol church may tempt one to see it 
as an example of Christian egalitarianism put into practice. Such, however, was not the case. 
When Samuel Moore met a man by the name of Pak, a paekchŏng, and brought him to the 
church, it upset the congregation, especially, those belonging to the upper classes, who saw 
it as disgraceful to have a paekchŏng in their church. Moreover, when Moore baptized Pak 
and gave him full church membership, many found this intolerable and left the church to 
avoid being treated by missionaries on equal terms with paekchŏng.   
Moore sadly reported to the Board that “Yesterday at church half a dozen regular 
attendants were absent… they felt they could not belong to the same church as a butcher” 
since “one might take a beggar up and make a man of him but the butcher can never 
rise.”
355  What embarrassed Moore even more, however, was that these anti-paekchŏng 
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Christians did want to maintain their affiliation with the church. The dissident leader, Yi 
Sŭng-du, said that they should build a chapel somewhere else or meet for worship at home. 
Moore tried to persuade them against this plan, but they did not listen to him. Moore 
reported the Board of the consequence of trouble as follows. 
I said that I thought it strange that children of one Father could not sit 
down together in one room. The butcher could keep still no longer but 
came and sat before them [yanbans] and asked what sin he had committed 
against their highness... When he [butcher] came here he thought our 
religion was one that took up the lost and dying sinners and lifted them to 
heaven… The yangban’s religion would permit only the highest classes to 
go to heaven… [Yangban] Yi lost his temper and began to speak very 
loudly and abusively. When I told him to hush up the yangban all went out 
together.”
356 
About a month later some of the yangban returned. According to Moore, “they 
acknowledged themselves in the wrong and promised to do better,” but some yangbans 
insisted that “they can only return to the church on one condition, that a custom be 
established giving the yangban seats of honor and the butchers the back seat of the room as 
per Korean Custom.”
 357  But, when Moore rejected the suggestion, they said that he would 
not return to the church but remain a Christian and observe the Sabbath at home.
358 
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The dissident yangbans then started a separate meeting and soon established their 
own church, Hong Mun Suk Kol church in Pukch’on, the yangban district north of Kon 
Dang Kol. There they observed Sabbath service, held prayer meetings and also engaged in 
evangelism in the area.
359  This yangban-centered church soon attracted Christians from 
other churches in Seoul, presumably yangbans, who formally transferred their memberships 
to join the church.
 360 
No doubt was it the yangbans’ motive for splitting the church was their desire to 
preserve the distinction of their social status. While this motive would not be considered 
morally respectable today, their decision was nonetheless a historic event because it was the 
first case in Korean Church history of a Korean congregation opposing missionary 
authority and establishing a separate church of their own. The dissident yangbans 
demonstrated that Koreans could run a church independently without missionary 
endorsement. It is important to note, however, that achieving full ecclesiastical 
independence from the Mission was not their ultimate goal but only a means of establishing 
social segregation in the Church. In fact, when the Mission recognized the yangban-only 
                                                   
359 Kim Kwŏn-jŏng, "Ch’ogi kidokkyo suyong kwa sahoe pyŏndong," in Han’guk sahak 
nonch'ŏng: Hong Kyŏng-man kyosu chŏngnyŏn kinyŏm nonch’ong (Hong Kyŏng-man kyosu 
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Hong Mun Sok Kol Church, the congregation was reconnected with the missionaries and 
invited them to visit their pulpit and give sermons every week.
361  To the yangbans, the 
missionaries were objectionable only when they threatened the social hierarchy; they were 
otherwise considered to be acceptable as teachers of a new religion.     
There are several possible reasons why missionaries endorsed social segregation in 
the Church, but the mostly likely reason was that segregation was still practiced even in the 
United States. In fact, Samuel Moore recalled the segregation at home when he saw off the 
yangbans from his church.     
The yangbans went off without saying good bye to me and told my 
teacher that they were never coming back. At first I was disposed to 
think them sinners above most all others, but when another missionary 
reminded me that at home also there were Christian people who would 
not allow low people or colored brethren to meet with them for 
worship, and I remembered that these [Koreans] have only just come 
out of the darkest heathenism, I felt more lenient.
362 
 
This testimony shows that the missionary understood the issue of social status in Korea as 
being similar to the issues of race and class in the United States. It was thus understandable 
                                                   
361 The Presbyterian missionaries who preached in the church were O. R. Avison, H. G. 
Underwood and C. C. Vinton. Kŭrisŭdo Sinmun (2/3/1898), 83; (2/24/1898), 57; 
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362  Samuel Moore to Ellinwood (6/7/1896), quoted in Huntley, Caring, growing, changing : 
a history of the Protestant mission in Korea, 71.  
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that they took a pragmatic or gradualist approach to the toleration of segregation within the 
Korean Church. Hence, segregation was not considered a sin in the Korean Church and 
missionaries later ordained Yi Sŭng-du and Mok Wŏn-gŭn as the first deacons of the church 
regardless of their roles as leading segregationists.
363   
This ordination had a symbolic meaning insofar as it meant that the missionaries 
had sustained their ecclesiastical authority over the yangban Christians. By endorsing 
segregation in the church, the missionaries alleviated the yangbans’ frustration and kept 
them under their control, without losing the yangban class from their church causing them 
to apostate. Segregation was a means to sustain the integrity of Korean Christians under 
missionary control.   
Nevertheless, a few years later the yangbans would have to pay the price for their 
recognition for the missionary authority. In 1901, the Hong Mun Sok Kol Church was shut 
down by the Presbyterian Mission and the congregation was dissolved for good. Available 
sources tell us that there were two reasons in the main for the closure: First, the church 
                                                   
363 Kŭrisŭdo sinmun (3/17/1898), 95. These yangban members had joined the Independence 
Club and engaged in the political reform movement at the time. Interestingly, Pak, the 
paekchŏng, had once been invited to present his speech on freedom at a public meeting 
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building and land was purchased using a corrupt source of funding; Second, some members 
brought unbelievers to the church and used the church building for inappropriate purposes 
without approval of the church session, though further details were not accounted.
364  For 
this scandal, the missionaries excommunicated the church’s seventeen members and 
transferred the rest of the congregation to other churches in Seoul. With such a high-handed 
manner, the Hong Mun Suk Kol Church, the first church established by Korean initiative, 
was closed overnight and disappeared from history. There were many mysteries about this 
church closure, but what this incident clearly showed is that who had the power in 
administering the Korean Church.   
 
Dispute in Yŏndong Church 
  The Kon Dang Kol church was not the only institution that was split over the 
problem of social status and caused yangban’s opposition to the missionary. The same 
problem occurred in Yŏndong Church, one of the oldest Presbyterian churches in Seoul in 
1909. Interestingly, the dissidents were influential members of the church such as Yi 
Wŏn-gŭng, Yu Sŏng-jun, and Ham U-t’aek and, all of whom were aristocratic yangbans, 
                                                   
364 Kŭrisŭdo sinmun, (2/27/1902), 68.   
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and two of them, Yi and Yun, were the famous “converts in prison” mentioned in the 
previous chapter. These yangbans were helped by James S. Gale, while in prison, and after 
their release, they had come to attend Yŏndong Church where Gale was ministering. 
Gale was a great benefactor to the yangbans in the sense he first provided them 
with the chance to encounter with Christianity, but the yangbans soon discovered that Gale 
was self-righteous, giving preferential treatment to lower-class Koreans and neglecting the 
yangbans on purpose. They felt especially insulted in 1909 when Gale ordained Ko 
Ch’an-ik (1861-1908), and Yi Myŏng-hyŏk (1863-1930), both of whom came from lower 
class society, but rejected Yi Wŏn-gŭng’s candidacy for eldership without much 
explanation.
365 
  Perhaps Gale meant to teach the yangbans social equality and demonstrate 
Christian egalitarianism in his church by such appointments, but it seems he did so with 
little respect for the yangbans and the traditional education they received. His basic view on 
Korean education was that “in Korea [education] is like a foot bandage…for the 
                                                   
365 Yŏndong kyohoe, ed. Yŏndong Kyohoe 100-Yŏnsa 1894-1994 (Seoul: Yŏndong 
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mind---once fairly put on and all growth and development is at an end,”
 366  and thus he 
said of the Korean upper class equipped with such education: “An idle existence brings 
with it no stings of conscience; in fact, the native who can scheme to do nothing, proves by 
all the logic of antiquity his right to be classed among the gentry.”
 367   
Given such a low view of Korean intellectuals, surely Gale eventually would have 
collided with the yangbans who had kept their pride in their Confucian education, even if 
the incident involving the ordination of lower class Koreans described above had not 
occurred. In any case, when the yangbans’ frustration reached its peak, they left the church 
in several groups and formed the splinter church, Myodong church in 1910,
368  and 
continued to hold Sunday service without the presence of missionaries. The yangban 
Christians were driven by their class interest in founding the new church, but they 
nonetheless accomplished their independence from the foreign mission, something 
unprecedented in Korean church history.
 369 
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Disputes in Pyŏngyang   
  The above two cases of Korean challenges to missionary authority were led by the 
yangbans in Seoul and their major causes were rooted in issues of class, but there were 
other cases in which anti-missionary sentiment of Korean Christians was expressed in a 
more direct manner.   
In 1907, when the Northern Methodist Mission held its conference in Pyŏngyang, 
a number of Korean Christians came up to break the service and demanded that the 
missionaries should publicly proclaim that Dr. Douglas Follwell (NM), a medical 
missionary in Pyŏngyang, was a “wicked man.”
370  The cause of trouble was Follwell’s 
dispute with a Korean church member over land property, for which the missionary took his 
case to the local magistrate for judgment. His action could have been justified legally, but 
the Methodist Church had a rule that “a brother having a matter against a brother should 
have it come before the Church committee and not take it to law.”
371  Of course, it was the 
Mission that made this rule and taught its Korean church members to follow. Thus, Korean 
                                                                                                                                                           
the first Korean publication of this kind. Myodong kyohoesa 80-chunyŏn p'yŏnch'an 
wiwŏnhoe, Myodong kyohoe 80-nyŏnsa , 160.   
370 Mattie Noble’s Diary (7/8/1907). 
371 Mattie Noble’s Diary (7/8/1907).  
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Christians were angered by this contradiction and expressed their frustration in the Mission 
Conference, where many missionaries from other Missions and Churches were also present 
beside the Methodist missionaries.   
  The Methodist missionaries could not control the Korean protesters who kept 
shouting and clamored for everyone to stop worshipping during the service. Observing the 
disorder, Yun Ch’i-ho, who happened to be there as an honorable guest from the Southern 
Methodist Church in Korea, intervened to help the troubled missionary. As Yun was one of 
few prominent yangban Christians and well respected by Koreans, he was able to quiet 
down the Korean protesters quickly and resume the service. After the conference, however, 
the frustrated Koreans continued to demand that the Mission take disciplinary action 
against Follwell and intimidated that they would form a separate Church of their own. In 
fact, they soon began holding separate services at the private residence of one of their 
members. Finally, Follwell was forced to admit his wrongdoing and went to the Koreans to 
ask for forgiveness. But it was too late; these Korean Christians rejected his apology and 
did not return to the Church.
  
  The Methodist missionaries were deeply embarrassed to show such a trouble 
happening to the missionary guests from other countries while they were in Korea.  
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However, W. R. Lambuth, a long-time Japan missionary and the head of Kansei Gakuin 
College in Kōbe, was very understanding and told them his view, which impressed Mattie 
Noble (NM). 
   
Dr. Lambuth says he thinks it remarkable so many years have elapsed 
without a demonstration of this kind [in Korea]. He says he has seen 
churches split in two [sic] many times in China and Japan, and our growth 
has been phenomenal.
372 
 
What struck Lambuth was not the rising Korean voice against the missionary in front of his 
eyes, but the fact that there had not been such challenge to the missionary before in Korea. 
To him, Korea missionaries were remarkable in that they had kept local Christians under 
control and achieved the church growth without being challenged by them. 
 
Christians caught-in between Missionaries and Nationalists 
  Meanwhile, the pastor of the Church, Yi Ǔn-sŭng, a missionary’s protégée, was 
caught between the missionaries and the Korean congregation and had to make the difficult 
decision of which of the two sides to take. As a Korean, he could perhaps understand well 
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the anti-missionary sentiment among his congregation, but he could not betray the 
missionaries who raised him as a pastor.     
 
For many years they [Koreans] wouldn't have translators of Scripture, 
great scholars... and there was no ground for their leaving their beloved 
missionaries… I have been with and learned of Mr. Noble for nearly ten 
years and I will stay by them [missionaries].
373 
 
The missionaries “all rejoiced” to hear Yi’s confession of faith. Especially, Mrs. Noble, 
whose husband’s long tutelage of Yi was rewarded, was happy to write in her diary, that 
“He [Yi] was faithful and loyal, as I had believed he would be.”
374  What made her even 
happier was that her Bible women and helpers as well as “a number of the faithful” stayed 
in the Church.   
  However, the “faithful” followers of the missionaries were seen as betrayers by the 
Korean protesters. In fact, the dissenting Koreans were angry at the Bible woman and 
helpers who supported the missionaries and abused them verbally, “You who receive pay 
from the foreigners won’t stand by your people for their independence. Only paid hirelings 
stand by them. We wouldn’t ask you to come with us.”
375  For independent-minded Korean 
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Christians, association with the missionaries was no longer a merit but a disgrace for the 
Korean Church, and the symbol of Korean subjugation to foreign rule. Hence, they began 
to call for national independence from the missionaries within the Church.   
  Nonetheless, Arthur Noble, the Superintendent of the Northern Methodist 
Mission, who closely observed the situation, did not think that the missionaries were 
responsible for the Korean uprising. In his report to Bishop Harris, Noble mentioned 
Follwell’s misbehavior as one of the causes, but he placed greater fault on the lack of 
discipline among Korean Christians and regretted that “we have been receiving a great 
mass of people who have not been thoroughly indoctrinated in our Church law and 
regulations.” On the other hand, he also blamed the Japanese for agitating and assisting 
anti-missionary movement from outside. According to his report, the Japanese governor of 
the Province was seeking to “destroy the American influence in Northern Korea by 
influencing the Christians to separate into independent churches” and “the Japanese have 
visited the disaffected people and encouraged them in the movement, while the local 
Japanese papers took it up with vigor and by garbled of affairs [sic] tried to enflame the 
people.”
376   
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Noble’s claim was not groundless as the Japanese authority was becoming 
increasingly suspicious and inimical to missionaries who still enjoyed extraterritorial 
immunity from the Japanese protectorate government. However, he did not reflect upon the 
question of why Korean Christians were susceptible to Japanese propaganda despite the 
fact that Koreans in general felt an “irritation of foreign domination in political and social 
life” under Japanese rule. Perhaps he knew that missionaries were becoming increasingly 
unpopular, but did not want to admit it publicly. In fact, Noble’s Annual Report of that year 
kept silent about the serious church split in Pyongyang, but mentioned only positive 
developments.   
 
Pyengyang: Never in the history of our work has the City church shown 
so much of the real spiritual life as it does at the present. Our total 
following is 2,123. There have been added to the church rolls over 300 
during the year… This church is by far the strongest church in the 
North.
377 
 
The report of the numerical growth of the Church was probably true, but it was deceptive 
insofar as it revealed only one side of the dynamic development of the Korean Church in 
that region. Behind the increasing number of Christians, there was growing Korean 
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dissatisfaction about the missionary’s presence in the Korean Church and some began to 
challenge missionary authority under the direct or indirect influence of the Japanese 
protectorate.   
 
Alliance with the Japanese Church 
  Given that previous studies have stressed anti-Japanese nationalism as a core value 
of the Korean Church, Noble’s observation that some Koreans Christians were pushed by 
the Japanese propaganda in an anti-missionary direction may strike us as peculiar today. 
However, there were other cases where Korean Christians’ conflict with missionaries led 
their churches to seek assistance from the Japanese.   
Ch’oe Chung-jin was a minister at a Presbyterian church in Chŏlla Province, 
where the Southern Presbyterian Mission had exclusive jurisdiction. In 1910, Ch’oe 
submitted a petition to the local Presbytery in which he made five specific demands to the 
missionaries. The summary of his demands was : 1) Do not be too strict about the Korean 
baptismal candidates and give them more freedom in practicing their faith, 2) To assign him 
a broader mission territory, 3) Establish a middle school in his region, 4) Establish a “relief 
committee” with the mission fund and help affected members of the church in time of  
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natural disasters, 5) The Mission should provide free housing for Korean pastors as it did 
for the missionaries.
378   
  These five demands correspond quite closely to the problems plaguing the Korea 
mission discussed in previous chapters. First, the baptismal rights of Korean converts were 
monopolized by the missionary since there were few Korean ordinations. Second, Korean 
pastors were treated more as “helpers” than as ministers and assigned to work in areas 
according to the territorial division of the Missions. Third, the general education of Koreans 
was neglected and there was no mission school above the elementary grade. Fourth, the 
majority of Korean Christians lived in poverty and needed constant material support from 
the Mission, especially in times of famine. Fifth, missionaries were provided good housing 
and extremely high salaries from the mission, while the Korean pastors were compensated 
less for the same work. In short, Ch’oe’s petition was based upon astute observations made 
in the field and accurately diagnosed what was wrong with missionary policy.     
  However, Ch’oe’s petition to improve the rights and welfare of Korean ministers 
rights and well-being was rejected by the Presbytery. Ch’oe resisted sending a letter of 
objection to the Presbytery, criticizing the missionary. 
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Listen, You missionaries from the West! How much [salary] do you 
receive every month? Read the Gospel of Matthew 7: 12,
379  and repent! 
You should provide a part of what you receive for poor Korean pastors 
and helpers and then let them work. They [first] have to be clothed and 
fed.
380 
 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, Korean helpers were paid less than one tenth of an average 
missionary salary, and the pay rate was as low as that of coolie or peasants at that time, In 
this light, Ch’oe’s plea represented a real grievous cry of Korean Christian leaders who 
were struggling in dire poverty and nothing too demanding at all.   
  Nonetheless, the mission-dominated Presbytery not only rejected his letter but 
condemned him for “[being an] ingrate,” “law-breaking,” and “disobedience,” and ousted 
from the Church, with his name removed from the membership list.
381  This was a clear 
message from the missionaries that any attempt by the Korean Christians to stand on par 
with the missionary was tantamount to treason. The duty of Korean Christians was to 
accept their secondary status and remain loyal to the higher authority of the Presbytery.   
                                                   
379 Matthew 7: 12 says “So whatever you wish that others would do to you, do also to them, 
for this is the Law and the Prophets.” 
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Though ousted from the Presbyterian Church, Ch’oe did not become an apostate. 
Rather, he established his own church independent of missionary control and named it the 
“Free Christian Church of Korea” (Taehan yesugyo chayu kyohoe). In western Christian 
history, the term "free church" usually refers to a Church pursuing independence from the 
state church or government intervention, but for Ch’oe “freedom” meant ecclesiastical 
independence from the missionaries. According to the conventional interpretation, Ch’oe’s 
action was the manifestation of Christian nationalism. For instance, Yi Tŏk-chu stresses 
that Ch’oe was the first Korean pastor who demonstrated the “subjectivity of the Korean 
Church” by criticizing the dictatorial rule of the missionaries.
382  Indeed, Ch’oe was a man 
of great subjective agency but we should not overlook that he was excommunicated by the 
Korean Church for the very “subjectivity” that he demonstrated. His independence 
movement was the antithesis of the Korean Church in which Korean Christians were 
subjugated to the missionary control. He was a Christian nationalist, but he had to leave the 
Church in order to demonstrate it. 
Moreover, Yi’s argument completely overlooks the fact that Ch’oe’s “Free Church” 
soon joined the Japanese Congregationalist Church that had started sending Japanese 
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Christian missionaries to Korea after annexation in 1910.
383  The independent-minded 
Ch’oe did not stop at breaking ties with the mission-dominated Korean Church, but went 
further to ally himself with the Japanese Church. Given that previous studies have stressed 
that anti-Japanese sentiment was a core value of the Korean Church, the decision of a 
Korean Christian to transfer his allegiance to the Japanese Church may strike us as peculiar 
today. As I shall discuss below, however, Ch’oe was not alone in seeking association with 
the Japanese Church 
For instance, Ch’a Hag-yŏn, a church leader in Kanggye, Pyŏngan Province, was 
dissatisfied with missionary rule and split from the church along with his followers. 
Moreover, he “seized the old church property on the theory that they were entitled to it.”
384 
It was at this time that Ch’a decided to visit Ch’oe Chung-jin in Chŏlla Province after 
hearing that he too was also making a stand against the missionaries. On his way to the 
southern Province, Ch’a met Watase Tsuneyoshi (1867-1894), a Japanese Congregationalist 
missionary, in Seoul and discussed his possible transfer to the Japanese Congregationalist 
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Church.
385  Finally, both Ch’a and Ch’oe joined the Japanese Congregationalist Church 
along with their followers. Like-minded independents and close associates of Ch’oe 
Chung-jin all over Chŏlla Province decided to join the Congregational Church.
386  On 
January 7, 1912, Watase and his Korean fifty Korean attendants including Ch’a and others, 
conducted a ceremony to celebrate the union of these 14 Korean churches of total 600 
members with the Japanese Congregational Church, and Watase ordained Kim Ki-ch’an 
and also appointed Yi Kŭn-hong during the ceremony.
387 
Shortly afterward, another Korean Methodist minister, Kim Sang-bae, from 
Ch’ungch’ong province also joined the Congregational Church with his 200 followers. Kim 
had been excommunicated from the Methodist Mission after having trouble with 
missionaries. However, the Korean congregation supported Kim and objected to the 
missionary decision. Consequently, the missionary withdrew from the area, abandoning the 
pastoral care for the church and Kim had no other choice but to preach in the region 
independently, maintaining several churches under his care.
388  It was after this period of 
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isolation from the Mission that Kim and his followers in Ch’ungch’ong Province sought the 
membership of the Congregational Church. 
In the case of Kim Chang-ho in Hwanghae Province, he blamed the missionaries 
for imposing anti-intellectual fundamentalist theology on the Korean Church. He was tried 
in the court of the church and chastised for teaching a liberal interpretation of the Bible.
389 
He then left the church to establish an independent church of his own, the Korean Christian 
Church (chosŏn kidokkyohoe), which did not become a member of the Congregationalist 
Church but retained a close affiliation.
 390   
These leaders all resided in the region, but the Congregationalist boom was seen 
also in Seoul. The key Korean Congregationalist leader in Seoul was Kim Chŏng-sik, one 
of the prominent yangban converts in prison. After his conversion, Kim became a pastor 
and he was dispatched to Japan to minister Korean students group at the Korean Y.M.C.A. 
in Tokyo. In 1916, he returned to Korea and joined the Congregationalist Church and 
became its active member.
391  By that time, he was well-known among Korean Christian 
leaders for his staunch anti-missionary posture, which Yun-Ch’iho, Kim’s close friend, 
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testifies in the following episode, when they made a joint trip to Chŏnju, Chŏlla Province, 
to attend the Y.M.C.A convention in April 1917. 
 
Our Chŏnju experience has been on the whole very pleasant. No friction. 
But the attitude of indifference of the missionaries resident in Chŏnju. 
They showed no sign of welcome on arrival, no sign of courtesy on 
parting, no sign of hospitality during the convention. Such a perfect 
indifference and inhospitality to the delegates was deeply felt by all the 
Koreans. Then Kim Jung Sik [sic] who is strongly anti-f[oreign] some 
hand throw concerning missionaries.
392   
 
Moreover, Kim was so strongly anti-foreign that he tried to persuade Yun to “raise fund 
among the Japanese so as to free the Y.M.C.A. from the grip of Americans.”
393  From these 
testimonies, we can reasonably assume that Kim’s participation in the Japanese Church had 
much to do with his anti-missionary sentiments. 
As previous studies have revealed, the Japanese Congregationalist mission was 
manifestly an imperial agent in the sense it was partly funded by the Japanese colonial 
government, albeit in a clandestine manner.
394  However, it is important to note that despite 
adversarial conditions such as the prevailing anti-Japanese sentiment and the omnipresence 
of Western missionaries, a mass conversion of some Koreans to the Japanese Church 
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nevertheless did take place. The Missionary Handbook, edited in 1920 by the Western 
missionaries, recorded that the Japanese Congregationalist Church had 200 churches with 
20,000 members in 1920 and “except for two, all the thirteen provinces are occupied.”
395 
There is not enough primary evidence to judge whether the leaders of the Korean 
churches that joined the Japanese Congregationalism Church were willing to endorse 
Japanese colonialism. However, Kim Chŏng-sik, at least, was clearly aware of and against 
Japanese aggression in Korea. Yun Ch’i-ho’s diary records a following episode to show 
Kim’s stand against Japanese. One day Kim saw a Japanese policeman kicked down an old 
Korean woman on the street, whom nobody seemed to take any notice of. So, Kim 
intervened and suggested the police to send her to the nearest hospital.
396  So, as a close 
friend and observer of Kim, Yun Ch’i-ho’s conclusive view of Kim was that “Mr. Kim 
Chŏng-sik, while pro-Japanese is true to Korea.”
397 
Being pro-Japanese but true to Korea sounds like a contradiction, but reveals 
precisely what drove Korean Christians leaders to join the Congregationalist Church. They 
were not happy about Japanese colonialism but they were equally unhappy about the 
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western missionary dominance over the Korean Church. As a Christian leader, their priority 
was to emancipate Korean Christians from the missionary’s yoke and they chose to ally 
with the Japanese Christians to achieve that purpose. They were true to the Korean 
nationalist cause in that their ultimate aim was to bring more Korean autonomy within the 
Church. Despite his personal animosity against the Japanese, Kim’s Christian nationalism 
seems to have led him to seek Korea’s ecclesiastical independence from the missionaries 
before national independence from Japanese.   
In any case, there is no doubt that Korean Christian leaders could find practical 
merits in joining the Congregational Church according to their need and situation. First, 
having severed their relations with the Western missions, the Korean leaders needed to 
secure an alternative source of political and financial support and they likely saw the 
Japanese mission as the better alternative. In fact, the Congregationalist Mission dispensed 
abundant funds to aid the financially weak Korean churches. Since the pastor like Ch’oe 
Chung-jin had long been troubled by the low salary and had actually asked the foreign 
missionary for the material aid and got rejected, he had little reason to reject the Japanese 
funds as alternative if it were provided for the improvement for Korean welfare. According 
to the internal records of 1915, the Congregational Mission paid on average fifteen to  
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twenty yen a month for the salary of Korean ministers in urban churches, while paying five 
to ten yen for evangelists in rural provinces.
398  Considering that ministers in the Korean 
Methodist Church received twenty to thirty yen a month around that time,
399  this pay rate 
was slightly below average. However, there were some additional budgets of 300 yen for 
“special service bonus” (irōhi), 770 yen for “travel” (ryokōhi), and 294 yen for “house 
rent”(yachin). It is not clear how these additional funds were allocated among 35 Korean 
Congregationalist pastors at that time.
400  If we assume that the “bonus” fund was equally 
allocated among them, it gave them additional 9 yen a year, making it closer to the average 
pay. In any case, whether the new pay rate was a little higher or lower than their previous 
pay, it must have been a substantial and meaningful compensation for Korean ministers 
who had been financially struggling for long time and lost even their meager income 
sources when they left the mission-dominated Korean Church. 
Assuming that the Korean ministers received more or less the same amount of 
salary in the Congregationalist Church, we can also say that Korean ministers were not 
                                                   
398 “Taishŏ yonen do chōsen dendōhi tokubetsu kaikei” in Ebina Danjō shiryŏ (Collected 
papers of Ebina Danjō) Document Number 5, Dōshisha University Library. 
399 Yun Ch’iho’s Diary (5/29/1918). Also, see the discussion about the Korean minister’s 
salary in Chapter 8. 
400 “Taishŏ yonen do chosen dendōhi tokubetsu kaikei” in Ebina Danjō shiryō.  
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enticed by the better salary offered by the Japanese Congregationalist Church alone; they 
also seem to have found other merits in the Japanese Congregationalism besides the decent 
salary. For Korean ministers, one probable merit of joining the Congregationalist Church 
may have been that a major characteristic of the Congregationalist tradition is the rejection 
of central control by a denominational headquarters and respect for the autonomy of each 
local church. This stood in contrast to the Presbyterian and Methodist traditions that placed 
much greater value on a more centralized form of government. In fact, the Congregational 
Church propagated in Korea that, “The fundamental principle of the [Congregational] 
Church is to include breadth of faith, self-government and self-support; this applies to 
Korea equally with other parts of the world.” This tradition can be seen in Watase’s 
handling of Korean transfers to the Congregational Church. As mentioned above, when 
Watase conducted a ceremony to receive Korean churches, he does not appear to have had 
Koreans adopt any particular doctrinal standard. Also, it seems that he ordained Korean 
pastors without mandating them to study again in the Congregational seminary in Japan or 
elsewhere. This kind of administrative looseness would likely have been frowned upon by 
Presbyterian or Methodist missionaries as neglecting the ecclesiastical traditions of the 
West, yet it could have been seen as a form of religious tolerance or freedom by the Korean  
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Christians who had been subjected by western missionaries to many unfamiliar 
denominational traditions. Such case may apply the case of Kim Chang-ho who objected 
the conservative theology of the Presbyterian Church and sought association with Japanese.     
Another merit of joining the Congregationalist Church could be the fact that the 
Congregational Mission ignored the territorial divisions established by the western 
missionaries and invited like-minded Korean Christians to come together under the same 
Church organization irrespective of their place of residence. This was a new experience for 
Korean Christians who had been divided and assigned to different denominations under the 
comity agreement of the Missions. In fact, the major Korean figures in the Congregational 
Church such as Ch’a Hag-yŏn, Ch’oe Chung-jin and Kim Sang-bae lived in different parts 
of Korea occupied by different missions and could not have become members of the same 
Church if they had stayed in the western missionary jurisdiction. Thus, joining the 
Congregational Church meant gaining access to an alternative ecclesiastical network 
capable of overcoming the geographical and regional boundaries created by the western 
missions. 
Lastly, the number of Japanese missionaries in Korea was much smaller and far 
less conspicuous than the western missionaries. There were only four Japanese missionaries  
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to 120 Korean staff and preachers in the Congregational Mission and the “workers in Korea 
form their own executive body and advance the work according to their own judgment.”
401 
As a result, regardless of whether or not the Japanese were truly willing to give Koreans as 
much freedom as they promised, the tiny Japanese missionary force had no choice but to let 
Koreans run their churches on their own.   
Whatever their primary motivations may have been, the mass conversion of 
Korean Christians to the Japanese Congregational Church suggests that missionary-Korean 
power relations began to change with the growing presence of the Japanese empire. 
Tensions between the Korean leaders and the missionaries had long existed, but some 
Korean Christians after colonization could now use the Japanese Christian presence to 
counter the western missionaries. The frustration of these Korean Christians about 
missionary control was so great that it made sense to them to seek an alliance with the 
Japanese Church as long as it would bring them greater ecclesiastical autonomy and 
financial aid. This does not mean that the Korean leaders accepted or approved of Japanese 
colonialism, but rather that they strategically relied upon and took advantage of Japanese 
power to counter the western missionaries whom they perceived more as oppressors of the 
                                                   
401  Swinehart, Korea, handbook of missions, 25.  
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Korean Church. Even if they were critical of Japanese colonialism itself, their struggle for 
ecclesiastical independence from the western Missions held primacy over their desire for 
national independence from the Japanese empire. Simply put, the Korean 
Congregationalists thought that ecclesiastical independence had to precede national 
independence.   
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Chapter 7  Korean Intellectual Revolts against Ecclesiastical Authority 
 
Once Korean Christians began to question the legitimacy of missionary rule in the 
Church, it was a natural consequence that they would also turn a critical eye to the same 
oligarchical rule that missionaries exercised over the Christian schools. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the missionaries had maintained the mission schools and church schools mainly 
as subsidiary institutions of the Church to evangelize Koreans and produce Christians rather 
than as independent institutions to provide general education to the broader Korean public. 
This general policy was increasingly unpopular among Korean Christians, and their 
frustration gradually took the form of open revolt.   
 
Student Strike 
  In 1903, twenty students at Paejae School, the leading Methodist mission school, 
sent a letter of protest to their missionary teachers. The letter stated that they found “the 
religious teaching in the school distasteful and they would leave if it were not 
discontinued.”
402  Paejae School had accepted both Christian and non-Christian students, 
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but Bible teaching was mandatory as mission policy. It is not clear if the protesters were all 
non-Christians, but in any case the students were dissatisfied with the heavy emphasis on 
religious indoctrination at the school. The missionary teachers informed the students that 
“they need not bother to withdraw from the school, as their names were already stricken 
from the roll” and dismissed the students without any attempt at conciliation.
403  These 
Korean students then surrendered one by one and “made an apology before other students 
in chapel” and “promised to obey implicitly thereafter the rules of the school.”
404   
  The first “student strike” at a Korean mission school indicates that many Korean 
students had received religious teaching only reluctantly. Had there been any other schools 
that provided general education without religious teaching, they could have transferred to 
them. In Korea, however, there was no universal education system yet, and given that the 
paucity of schools , the eager Korean youth had no other choice but to choose the mission 
school. Religious teaching was a kind of tax they had to pay in order to acquire new 
knowledge.   
  Although this initial strike was suppressed, Korean frustration over the mission 
school curriculum was omnipresent and continued to grow. In 1907, 400 students at Sungsil 
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High School (Union College) in P’yŏngyang,
405  run jointly by the Northern Presbyterian 
and Northern Methodist Missions, submitted a list of grievances to their missionary 
teachers and the head of the Methodist Mission, Bishop M. C. Harris (1846-1921) and 
boycotted classes.
406  Though available sources do not tell exactly what grievances they had, 
the contextual evidence indicates that they were mostly likely to relate to the general 
quality of school teachers and the missionary prohibition of student engagements in politics. 
Regarding teachers, William Baird (NP), the principle of the school, had noted his fear that 
“our Christian schools cannot continue to exist in the face of Japanese schools which may 
be established here…I believe this fear is well founded if we continue to transfer capable 
men [teachers] to other positions” and “our schools are poorly manned with teachers who 
are ill-trained,”
407  indicating dearth of qualified teachers demoralized schools. On politics, 
                                                   
405 During the Japanese Protectorate period, the Missions were exempted from the 
governmental educational order and thus had a liberty in granting any categorical title to their 
mission schools such as “Academy” or “College” without any substance. For instance, Union 
Academy consists of a three years course, preceded by one year of preparatory course, but 
students came from primary schools after six years study there. Annual Report of BFMMEC 
(1907), 419. This means Academy was an equivalent of junior high school in Japanese 
educational system at that time, while four years of study at the “College” was an equivalent 
of high school education. In fact, Koreans at that time called the school, “Sungsil 
chung-kodŭng hakkyo,” which means “middle and high school” not “taehak” or college. So, 
it is important to note that the title of the mission schools often does not reflect the substance 
of its education.  
406 Evelyn Becker McCune and Heather McCune Thompson, Michigan to Korea : Arthur 
Lynn Becker, 1899-1926 (N.P.: Lulu, 2009) , 276. 
407 Ibid., 277 ; “Teaching Teachers,” Korea Mission Field ,(August 1906): 206.   
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the summer in 1907 was the time when the Korean Emperor, Kojong, was forced to 
abdicate by the Japanese government and political air was tense. However, Baird’s firm 
policy was to “keep the students away from political issues” and he “monitored” the student 
orations in school events so that the topics would be religious.
408  Given that Barid’s annual 
report for that year mentions his added “anxiety” that “political and social motives are 
cooperating with educational and religious” outcome in the school, it is likely that students 
made some kind of requests on the current political issues.   
  Whatever the real reason might be, missionary teachers paid no serious heed to this 
protest and ordered the students to immediately return to school. Missionary power 
prevailed, and many students gave up their demands. Having pacified these Korean 
students, Arthur Becker (NM) reported to the Methodist Board that “they had learned that 
they were not running the school and we had peace for the rest of the year.”
409 
In 1909, Paejae experienced another student strike in which 140 students 
participated and “paralyzed” the school for a few days. Though the missionary record does 
not detail what the student demands were, it was likely that the students were still 
dissatisfied over religious indoctrination. This time students “marched out in a body” and 
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some students transferred to other schools when their demand was not met. According to 
D.A. Bunker (NM), the missionary teacher at Paejae, such “outbursts of passion on the part 
of the students” had been common among other mission schools by that time and it came 
“periodically to all schools in this land.”
410  In spite of such circumstances, the Missions 
made little effort to seek conciliation with Korean students and fiercely maintained their 
commitment to religious education.   
 
An Ch’ang-ho and Taesŏng School 
  For some Korean Christian leaders, the mission school problem was not limited to 
religious education alone. They were fully aware that the mission schools were no different 
from the churches where missionaries presided over important business and suppressed 
Korean voices that conflicted with missionary decisions. Such subordinate Korean status in 
mission schools was growingly unbearable for independent-minded Christian educators and 
they thus began to seek opportunities to establish their own schools outside missionary 
jurisdiction. Just as some Korean ministers broke their ties with the Missions to gain more 
freedom, some Korean Christian educators also followed the same path. 
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  One such Korean educator was An Ch’ang-ho, who studied in the Presbyterian 
school in Seoul in the 1890s and became a Christian (Chapter 4). By the 1900s, however, 
An was known to be one of the leading Korean nationalists rather than a church leader. He 
had taken an active part in the so-called Patriotic Enlightenment Movement (aeguk 
kyemong undong), which aimed at Korean self-strengthening through modern education 
and organized a Korean youth group, called Sinminhoe, (New People’s Association) 
through which he promoted nationalist thought among the Korean youth. He vigorously 
toured around Korea and inspired many students with his eloquent speech and charismatic 
leadership.   
       As a part of his nationalist project, he founded Taesŏng School in his hometown, 
P’yŏngyang, in 1908, with Yun Ch’i-ho at its official head.
411  His vision was to make the 
school the center of nationalist education in Korea. However, despite the fact that both An 
and Yun were Christians, An did not make Taesŏng a Christian school and kept its doors 
open to anyone who wanted to study. According to his wife, An was dissatisfied with 
missionaries who “taught only about the otherworld” and wanted to disseminate education 
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that placed science at its center.
412  Clearly, his intention was to provide an alternative form 
of education for the Korean youth and foster nationalism among them, something not 
possible in the mission school. Had he been a “devout” Christian loyal to Church authority, 
he could have collaborated with the Sungsil School in P’yŏngyang, where many Christian 
students gathered, but he dared to maintain a school independent of the Church and the 
Mission in the same city.   
Knowing An’s intention, the missionaries in Pyŏngyang all turned against him and 
saw him more as a threat to the Church engrossed in national politics against the church 
rule. In fact, when Japanese police interviewed Samuel Moffett (NP), the leader of the 
Presbyterians in Pyŏngyang, about An and his relation to the Church, Moffett made no 
defense for him. 
 
An Ch’ang-ho used to be a Christian adherent in our Presbyterian Church 
and had taken a part in evangelism. But, he is now engaged in his 
educational work and provides no sincere support for the Church. He 
always seeks to use education as a means of politics.
 413   
 
                                                   
412 Tosan Kinyŏm Saŏphoe, Tosan An Ch'ang-ho, 26. 
413 “Itō kō ansatsu narabini An Ch’angho no taiho ni tsuki gaikoku senkyōshi no kanjō” 
(11/10/1909), Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe, ed. T'onggambu munsŏ vol.7 (Kwach'ŏn-si: 
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Arthur Becker (NM), the head of the Methodist teachers at Sungsil, endorsed Moffett’s 
view to the Japanese and did not hide his animosity against An: “An Ch’angho was not 
only anti-Japanese but anti-foreign. I guess he intends to expel all foreigners.”
414  The 
missionaries were well aware that An’s nationalist activities would bring negative 
consequences to the Church and the Mission. On the one hand, his former affiliation with 
the Church could mislead the Japanese into identifying the Korean Church with 
anti-Japanese institutions and invite unnecessary persecution. On the other, An’s nationalist 
propaganda could lead Koreans to seek control of the Church and the schools, where 
foreign domination by the Missions was conspicuous. Therefore, as a Christian nationalist, 
if An could be labeled as such, he was a most unwelcome presence for the missionaries and 
there was no room for him in the Korean Church and the schools under missionary 
jurisdiction.   
 
Yi Sŭng-hun and Yi Kwang-su in Osan School 
  The missionary’s control over Christian education also became an issue at Osan, a 
private school in Chŏngju, north of P’yŏngyang. In conventional Korean historiography, 
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Osan is today known as a “nationalist school founded upon Christian ideals” along with 
Taesŏng School.
415  However, the founder of the school, Yi Sŭng-hun (1864-1930) was not 
a Christian at the time of its foundation. Yi was originally a peddler of brassware, whose 
business network covered the entire P’yŏngan Province. As the Japanese colonial presence 
increasingly encroached upon Korean sovereignty, Yi joined the Patriotic Enlightenment 
Movement and met An Ch’angho, who urged him of the need of modern education for 
Korea’s national empowerment.
416  Greatly inspired, Yi decided to invest his business 
fortune to build Osan School in his hometown of Chŏngju in 1907.
417   
Yi subsequently converted to Christianity in 1910 immediately following Korea’s 
colonization, when he happened to hear an impressive sermon by Han Sŏk-chin.
418  It is 
said that he found in Christianity a new hope for national rejuvenation and salvation, 
though there is no documentary evidence of this.
419  However, what is known is that Han 
                                                   
415 Hanʾguk kidokkyosa yŏn'guso, Hanʾguk kidokkyo ŭi yŏksa 1, 290.  
416 Osan chunghak-kodŭng hakkyo, Osan 80-nyŏnsa (Sŏul: Osan chunghak-kodŭng hakkyo, 
1987), 56-57; Tosan Kinyŏm Saŏphoe, Tosan An Ch'ang-ho, 47; Kim To-t'ae, Namgang Yi 
Sŭng-hun chŏn, 188-192. 
417 The school name was Kangmyŏn Ǔisuk and later changed to Osan hakkkyo. Namgang 
munhwa chaedan, Namgang Yi Sŭng-hun kwa minjok undong (Sŏul: Namgang Munhwa 
Chaedan Ch'ulpʻanbu 1988),121-123. 
418 Ibid., 303. Han was the one of the first seven Korean ministers who received the 
Presbyterian ordination in 1907.Rhodes and Campbell, History of the Korea mission, 
Presbyterian Church U. S. A.,77. 
419 Namgang munhwa chaedan, Namgang Yi Sŭng-hun kwa minjok undong,303-304.  
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was one of few ordained Korean pastors who was critical of missionary rule over the 
Korean church and thus invited by Myodŏng Church in 1909, the church that was founded 
by the anti-missionary yangban dissenters (Chapter 6).
420  Thus, if Yi’s conversion was 
truly brought about by Han Sŏk-chin, it was likely that his anti-missionary attitude 
impressed Yi.   
Upon conversion, Yi established a chapel in his Osan School, but invited S. L. 
Roberts (1881-1946, NP) to administer the church and the school.
421  This decision meant 
that these institutions came under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Northern 
Presbyterian Mission that controlled Chŏngju and its vicinity as its exclusive mission 
territory. Considering Yi’s nationalist orientation, it is not clear why he placed a missionary 
as Osan’s school principal, if only nominally, but his disciples explain that the missionary 
presence was necessary as a buffer against Japanese intervention.
422  If so, Yi was a 
nationalist, but also a realist, and did not hesitate to take advantage of western power to 
check Japanese colonialism. 
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In any case, Yi’s involvement in nationalist education campaign invited Japanese 
attention and he was soon imprisoned by the Japanese police for conspiring to assassinate 
the Japanese Governor-General, the so-called “Conspiracy Case” or “105-in Sakŏn” in 
Korean, and vacated the school office until 1915 (discussed in detail in Chapter 8).
423 
Hence, despite his vision to make Osan school in a center of nationalist education, the 
school was quickly Christianized rather than nationalized under missionary supervision in 
his absence.
424   
This drastic change in school management from being run by a Korean nationalist 
to the Presbyterian Mission meant that the school now had to conform to Presbyterian 
school policy, which prioritized evangelization over intellectual enlightenment. This change 
clearly narrowed the educational spectrum and placed Korean nationalist teachers who 
would not agree with the policy in a difficult situation. A typical example was Yi Kwang-su, 
who taught at the school from 1911 to 1914, and later became a prominent writer, often 
referred to as the founding father of modern Korean literature.   
Yi Kwang-su was a native from Chŏngju and had experience studying at Meiji 
Gakuin High School, a Presbyterian mission school in Tokyo, from 1905-1909, which was 
                                                   
423 See Chapter 8 for further discussion about the “Conspiracy Case”.  
424 Osan chunghak-kodŭng hakkyo, Osan 80-nyŏnsa, 98.  
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quite a rare and prestigious accomplishment among the Korean youth at that time. When 
Korean sovereignty was lost, his patriotism brought him back to Korea to promote the 
educational cause for the future of Korea. His student career and nationalism as well as his 
regional background as a Chŏngju native were greatly appreciated by Yi Sŭng-hun, who 
invited him to teach at Osan School despite his young age of nineteen years.   
       As a young, intelligent, and critical thinker, Yi Kwang-su did not embrace the 
Presbyterian dogmatism imposed upon the church and the school. He was a faithful to the 
Christian cause and a catechumenate (baptismal candidate) who would even make 
occasional preaching in the church when asked, but he disagreed with conservative 
Presbyterian theology and could not compromise his intellectual honesty to embrace a 
literal understanding of the Bible or accept at face value traditional creeds such as the 
Virgin Birth and Resurrection. Thus, every time the missionary, S. L. Roberts, visited 
Chŏngju Church in itineration and examined his faith as a baptismal candidate, Yi declined 
to comply with the catechumenal standard and confessed his honest doubt about the  
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traditional doctrines. Consequently, he had been left unbaptized and his admission to 
church membership was rejected.
425 
  Yi’s intellectual honesty soon faced a series of personal attacks from the church 
Elders, who mobilized the religiously genuine Christian students and their parents to press 
him to leave the school. They labeled him a “Tolstoyan” for his critical attitude toward the 
Church and condemned his beliefs as “heresy.”
426  The Tolstoyans rejected the divinity of 
Christ, setting aside the miraculous in the Gospels as well as the doctrines of an orthodox 
Church such as the Atonement, the Resurrection, the Trinity, but believed Jesus as a man's 
greatest good who fulfilled God’s will, and tried to pursue a life in simplicity and love.
427. 
  It is not clear whether Yi self-identified as a Tolstoyan, but his rejection of 
orthodox doctrine became associated with Tolstoyanism and appeared as a threat to 
Presbyterian missionaries who wanted to make the Korean Church into a bulwark of 
orthodox Presbyterianism. Yi Kwang-su was gradually cornered by orthodox Christians and 
                                                   
425 Yi Kwang-su, "Na ŭi kyowŏn saenghwal," in Namgang Yi Sŭnghun kwa minjok undong, 
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the missionaries and decided to leave the school, which remained in his heart as an 
inerasable trauma. His departure from Osan marked the end of his institutional connection 
with the Korean Church.   
 
Yi Kwan-su’s Response to the Church 
Deeply hurt, Yi moved to Seoul and started a new career as a writer for an 
intellectual journal, Ch’ŏngch’un (Youth), the only one of its kind published in Korea. 
Ch’ŏngch’un was edited by Ch’oe Nam-sŏn (1890-1957), a young nationalist scholar and 
educator, who had invited Yi to work with him. Now having a public medium in which to 
express his thoughts, Yi vigorously wrote critiques on various contemporary social issues in 
Korea, including the problems of the Korean Church, and publicized his frank views of the 
Korean Church to inform Koreans of what was wrong with it. In his article, “Defects of the 
Korean Church Today,” he diagnosed the various ills of the Korean Church.
428   
  First, Yi criticized the hierarchical relationship between the church leaders and 
lay believers, pointing out that “the Korean Church of today is organized on the caste 
                                                   
428 Ch'ŏngch’un (November, 1917): 76-83. For the English translation, “Defects of the 
Korean Church Today”, Korea Mission Field (December, 1918):253-257.  
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system.”
429  He observed that “the relation between pastors or elders and the lay believers is 
something like that between rulers and subjects, seniors and juniors, teachers and disciples” 
and that “Pastors and elders may almost be called Yangbans while the lay members are 
Sangnoms (men of low-class).”
430  Therefore, he lamented that, “To be a church officer in 
the Korean Church is regarded as possessing the honor and power which the holders of 
secular offices used to have,” concluding that, “Christianity, the religion of equality itself, 
seems powerless to unsettle this idea of caste.”
431 
  Second, Yi denounced the Korean Church’s disrespect for the secular world, a 
vanity that was underpinned by excessive religious pietism. He observed that the Korean 
Church still held to the “doctrine of ecclesiastical supremacy,” which he explained as the 
conviction that “the Church… must rule mankind in everything” and that “faith in religion 
is the whole duty of man.”
432  As a consequence, Korean Christians came to look down on 
“non-Christian [as] belonging to an entirely different species… and not to be trusted,” to 
forbid “intermarriage with non-Christians,” and even discouraged even social intercourse 
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with them.
433  Moreover, their disregard for secular society that led them to “treat learning 
with the greatest contempt, calling it “worldly knowledge,” and took it “as a temptation of 
the devil and an enemy of the soul.” Therefore, in Korea, he concluded, “those who desire 
to acquire an education higher than that of a special school, or to go abroad for study, are 
considered to have already stepped inside the gates of hell.”
434   
    Third, Yi pointed out that this general disregard for secular knowledge naturally 
resulted in the “ignorance of the church workers.”
435  He urged that “A preacher be 
furnished, at the least, with a knowledge of Christian theology, of philosophy ancient and 
modern, and religious literature” and “something of the great principles of modern 
philosophy and of the spirit of science so that he may understand the spirit of modern 
civilization, the source of modern thoughts, the relation between modern civilization and 
religion,” but such preachers had been scarcely produced in the Korean Church because the 
Examination Committee of the Presbyterian Church “consists mostly of uneducated old 
men who are incapable of judging the character and ability of a man,” and “the most 
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successful candidates are those who assent to everything the Committee says--- who are, in 
short, as superstitious, as ignorant and as unthinking, as the Committee.”
436 
  Lastly, Yi denounced the western missionary’s use of conversion tactics that took 
advantage of the ignorance of the Korean people. He observed that “old superstitions, such 
as the doctrines of heaven and hell, of resurrection, of the omnipotence of prayer, etc., have 
been utilized to save the ignorant multitude from sin” in Korea and “rather than reason and 
contemplation, superstitious belief has been recommended, encouraging them to trust 
blindly in the mystical merits of ritualism --- like baptism, worship, and prayer.” As a result, 
“In Korean churches, as well as in Christian homes, prayers are offered for personal 
benefits such as “recovery from sickness” and “the birth of sons.”
437 
  Needless to say, all of Yi’s points touched precisely upon the major problems of 
the Korean Church, which we have dealt with so far, and they were drawn from his 
personal experiences and observations in the Church, especially, from his days at Osan 
School, where he was attacked and ousted by the Church authorities. The problems of the 
Korean Church as he diagnosed them were not unknown among Korean intellectuals at that 
time, but few had dared to publicize such critical views and provoke Korean Christian 
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leaders and the missionaries who stood behind them. Thus, Yi’s final remark in the article 
that “the educated classes of today are not satisfied with the kind of Christianity we have 
now”
438  carries a profound historical significance as the first powerful intellectual 
challenge against the Korean Church and the Missions.   
  Yun Ch’i-ho was one of the Korean Christian intellectuals who understood the 
historical significance of Yi’s article. Though he did not agree with everything what Yi said, 
Yun nevertheless felt the need of informing the missionaries of this article so that they 
would be aware of the intellectual trend among the educated Korean youth. Thus, Yun 
translated Yi’s article and had it appear in the Korean Mission Field, a monthly missionary 
journal, under the joint editorship of the Korea missionaries. In his introductory remarks, 
Yun made clear that as a practicing Christian, he would not take Yi Kwang-su’s side, 
commenting that “as is common to many young men of talent in certain periods of their 
lives, he is inclined to be destructive in his criticisms.” However, Yun continued, “however 
incorrect some of the opinions seem to be, they are worthy of serious consideration as they, 
in a way, represent the mental attitude of a large class of young men toward Christianity in 
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Korea today.”
439  In Yun’s eyes, it was clear that young Korean intellectuals of a nationalist 
mindset were already withdrawing from the mission-dominated and anti-intellectual 
Korean Church. Yun thus took Yi’s critique as a serious warning and challenge to the 
Korean Church and urged the missionaries to be prepared for the intellectual sophistication 
of the Korean youth who he thought would soon subvert the missionary’s sway over the 
Korean Christian. 
   
Japanese Educational Ordinance 
  The Korean Church and mission schools in the 1910s faced another important 
challenge; the 1911 Educational Ordinance issued by the Korean Government-General. The 
Ordinance declared that the purpose of public education was to make “good and loyal 
Japanese subjects” of Koreans and thus ordered all schools whether government or private 
to conform to the rules and regulations stipulated by the Ordinance. One of the new rules 
was to prohibit teaching religion as a required subject in middle schools and above. This 
meant that missionaries could no longer mandate Koreans to study the Bible in their 
schools, though they were free to study it outside the schools under private teachers, or at 
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special institutes such as Sunday school, seminaries and churches.
440  Another possibility 
was for the missionaries to continue their religious teaching in schools without receiving 
governmental recognition as “middle-schools,” but graduates of a non-recognized school 
had no qualifications with which to proceed to higher schools such as professional schools 
and colleges. The Japanese authority gave a ten-year grace period to the mission schools to 
decide whether they would conform to Japanese standards and receive recognition as 
“middle-schools” or remain non-recognized and shut down at the end of the tenth year.
441   
  The missionaries were generally opposed to the Japanese ordinance. They saw it as 
a violation of freedom of religion and asked the government to modify the rule. They 
thought that the Japanese demand to separate religion from schools was too extreme and 
ruinous to the very purpose of Christian education. They were also upset by other 
regulations in the Ordinance, which prescribed details such as “certain building 
requirements, grounds of a certain size, athletic and scientific and other school furnishings, 
and equipment of specified design and quantity.”
442  The opposition was particularly strong 
among older missionaries in Korea who had faced “very little interference from the Korean 
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Government” due to their extraterritorial status and “developed schools and were 
conducting them in accordance with their own educational ideals.”
443  Thus, it was natural, 
as one young missionary observed, that “many of them looked upon the Japanese as 
interlopers, who were coming in to destroy or seriously hamper the work to which they had 
given years of labor… and which they regarded as vital to the well-being and progress of 
the Korean Christian Movement.”
444  In short, the Japanese authority appeared to these 
missionaries as a formidable rival in the educational sphere where they competed over the 
souls and minds of young Koreans. 
  Nonetheless, the extraterritorial status of the missionaries ceased with the 
colonization of Korea by Japan and the U.S. government had fully acknowledged that 
United States citizens were subject to the Japanese jurisdiction in Korea.
445  Thus, the 
Japanese colonial government did not concede its controlling power over Korean education 
and turned down repeated petitions by the Missions to modify the Ordinance. Having 
exhausted all their resources and realizing their powerlessness to counter Japanese colonial 
authority, divisions of opinion surfaced among the missionaries. The division occurred 
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along denominational lines, though there were divergent views among individuals. The 
Methodist Mission decided to conform to the Japanese Ordinance and sought governmental 
recognition, while the Presbyterians declined to do so. The Methodist missionaries made 
additional investment in the Paejae School in Seoul to improve both faculty and facilities, 
and revised the curriculum to make religion optional. Soon, the Japanese granted the due 
recognition to Paejae as a “higher common school” (kodŭng pot’ong hakkyo), the first 
Korean mission school that could stand on par with Japanese middle-schools.
446  Other 
Methodist mission schools followed suit at varying intervals from the 1910s through 1920s 
and 30s. This does not mean, however, that they ceased to exist as Christian schools. Even 
though they did not mandate Bible study in school, they would hold chapel exercises 
outside the school building or at a nearby church, or they would hold voluntary Bible 
classes arranged for afternoons and evenings, so that they could keep their religious 
identities.
447   
  On the other hand, the Presbyterian Mission took a completely opposite path. 
Presbyterian missionaries, who consisted mainly of theological conservatives, held that the 
missionary school was a place for religious indoctrination. As we saw in Chapter 4, the 
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Presbyterian Mission did not place priority upon education and believed that the primary 
aim of school was to adopt children from Christian families and nurture them to serve the 
Church. Thus, they did not hesitate to shut down schools once it became clear that they 
could no longer use schools for religious aims. Accordingly, the Presbyterians chose to 
remain as non-recognized schools and to withdraw from the educational field after ten 
years, when their schools were no longer allowed to operate by the government. Some 
schools, such as one Presbyterian school (SP) in Sunch’ŏn, South Chŏlla Province and a 
Girls’ Academy (NP) in Sinch’ŏn, P’yŏngan Province were closed immediately or reduced 
in size and grade, without waiting for the end of the ten-year grace period. Other local 
schools under the Korean Church followed suit as they were also under direct or indirect 
missionary control, and some schools were shut down “either on the account of the 
religious exclusion article or on account of some of the other provisions by which the 
standards were raised to a level which they could not reach.”
448   
  The majority of Presbyterian schools that remained as non-recognized schools 
were able to protect their rights to provide religious education. However, they made no 
systematic improvement in terms of faculty, facility, and curriculum as they did not seek 
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governmental recognition under the Ordinance. Consequently, these non-recognized 
schools could not match the recognized schools in terms of their educational appeal to the 
Korean youth who wanted a better learning environment and the qualification to proceed to 
higher schools. The widening gap between these two kinds of school posed a serious 
dilemma to intellectual Korean Christians, who had to choose either the religious but 
lower-grade school or secular but higher-grade school for their children. Yun Ch’i-ho was 
one such Korean Christian.     
 
Yun Ch’i-ho’s Concern 
As a Christian intellectual and a nationalist, Yun’s life work was to raise the 
educational standard of the Korean youth. He had thus been involved in both Christian and 
secular educational projects. Not only had he helped An Ch’ang-ho build Taesŏng school, 
but he also donated his private fund to found the first Southern Methodist School in 
Kaesŏng (Han-Yŏng Hag-wŏn or Anglo-Korean School), where he served in the school 
board along with the missionaries.
449  He also played an active part in the Y. M. C. A. 
where he led various educational projects for the Korean youth.   
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In this way, he did not limit his field only within his denominational Church circle, 
but he remained personally loyal to his denominational identity, sending his daughter to a 
Southern Methodist school, Paehwa Girls’ School, in Seoul. Nonetheless, watching his 
daughter’s progress, Yun soon noticed that the educational quality at the mission school 
was far from satisfactory and began to wonder if he should withdraw her from a school he 
had come to consider as defective.   
 
I am thinking seriously about taking Munhŭi [Yun’s daughter] out of the 
Pai Hwa (sic) school and sending her to the governmental Higher 
School [kwallip pot’ong hakkyo]. She has been going to the former 
school for the last three years and hasn't learned hardly anything in 
Chinese or Japanese. Can I afford, is it right for me, to sacrifice the 
education of my precious children to the mere sentiment―of keeping or 
sending my children to the Church schools when the Church schools, 
thanks to the obstinacy of missionaries, are the poorest of their kind?
450   
 
Within a few days, Yun reached the conclusion that the Japanese Higher School was the 
best choice for his precious daughter. Though he “regret[ed] very much the necessity for 
withdrawing Munhŭi from my [his] own church school,” he believed that he had no choice 
in the situation where “the missionaries, with the very best intentions in the world ruin the 
schools.” He pointed the specific missionary offenses as follows: 1) “employing only the 
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cheapest grade of teachers  ￥11 to 12 for girl-teachers”, 2) not discussing with “the 
Koreans who have great interest in the school and who ought to know what is good for the 
Korean, better than a missionary; 3) “by not adopting method and curricula to the needs and 
conditions of the Korean children.” Yet, the fundamental problem for Yun was that “The 
missionaries despise Koreans too much if not in so many words, nonetheless, in so many 
acts.
451  Here, Yun’s observation concurs what we have seen thus far. The missionaries had 
an absolute power over school management and imposed what they wanted to teach on the 
Koreans, without consulting and adapting to Korean needs and circumstances.   
Such neglect of Korean agency was nothing new in the mission school, but the 
new development after the Japanese Annexation is that that disillusioned Korean Christians, 
especially of intellectual class, began to turn to Japanese educational institutions. As the 
overbearing missionaries in the Korean Church lost many independent-minded Korean 
church leaders to the Japanese Congregationalist Church, they also started losing the best 
Korean Christian intellectuals and their children from their mission schools.   
    In fact, such a trend was prevailing on a nationwide scale. Wherever there was an 
opportunity, the majority of Korean students preferred to go to government schools and did 
                                                   
451 Yun Ch’i-ho’s Diary (1/10/1919).  
275 
 
not seek education at Christian schools, which often required them to maintain Church 
affiliations. As the Methodist Mission reported in 1914, “the Korean students in the higher 
common schools in Seoul … all speak Japanese and are not being touched in any large way 
by the Korean churches” and “the Korean children in the public schools throughout the 
country are mostly from the so-called heathen homes and are not in the present Sunday 
schools.”
452  In other words, Christian schools at large were the second choice for many 
Koreans, and as long as they could afford public education, there was no need for them to 
maintain affiliations with schools under ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The public education 
system, even if it was under Japanese control, began overwhelming the Christian schools in 
quality and popularity already in the 1910s.   
  Nonetheless, it is important to note that there was always a constant lack of public 
schools for the increasing number of Korean children of school age, and a universal 
education system was not fully established until the end of the Japanese colonial rule. 
Therefore, Christian school could hold strong merit as a substitute for public schools and 
continued to appeal to those who had no access to public education. The problem is that the 
Christian schools were mostly elementary grade and there were only a few schools that 
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provided middle school education or above. Therefore, the numerical growth of enrollment 
at Christian schools did not contribute to a remarkable rise of educational standards among 
the Korean Christians. This is evidenced by the fact that the popular image of the Korean 
Christian was still the man of little means and the Korean Church was often ridiculed by 
non-Christians as “the Society of the Impoverished” or “the Society of the Ignorant” even 
in the mid-1910s.
453  In short, the Korean Christian schools as well as the Church were not 
venues where young and intellectual Koreans were willing to come and work together for 
national salvation through education.   
 
Y. M. C.A. as a Nationalist Center 
  An alternative venue for educated Koreans to work for the national cause was the 
Young Men’s Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.). The Korean branch of this international 
organization was established in Seoul in 1903 and quickly developed as the most popular 
youth organization.
454  Under Japanese colonial administration, where Korean civil 
liberties were limited, the Y.M.C.A. was one of few civil organizations where Koreans 
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could gather and operate various social programs such as speech contests, chorus, and 
athletic games.
455  Yet, the Y.M.C.A. was not a Korean institution. Like the Korean Church 
and mission schools, the Korean Y.M.C.A. was funded in large part by foreign sources. It 
was headed by a foreign director, P. L. Gillett, dispatched by the Y.M.C.A. in the United 
States and its Board members included many foreign missionaries and even Japanese.
456  In 
fact, it had received regular support from Japanese affiliates, one of whom was none other 
than Itō Hirobumi, the Japanese Resident-General. Itō made a generous donation of 10,000 
yen a year for several years during his office.
457 
         The Y.M.C.A. was a so-called “para-church” organization, where Christians 
were supposed to cooperate ecumenically in the interests of social advancement. It could 
thereby avoid ecclesiastical control by a particular Church or Mission. Therefore, there was 
no religious requirement for its members, let alone the catechumenal test to check their 
reception of the traditional Christian dogmas. This was a great attraction to many Koreans 
who simply wanted an institution where they could carry out their social and political 
programs without the ecclesiastical supervision. 
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  In fact, many Korean Christian intellectuals who collided with the Church and the 
Mission flocked to the Korean Y.M.C.A. and made it the center of their socio-political 
agenda. The best example was Yi Sang-jae, one of the prominent “converts in prison.” Yi 
was a high-class yangban who became a Christian in 1903, while he was imprisoned as a 
former member of the defunct Independence Club.
458  He began attending the Presbyterian 
Yŏndong Church but soon found that the apolitical attitude of the church and the 
missionary did not suit him.
459  Hence, even though he was elected as Elder, he declined 
church office, choosing to devote more energy to the Y.M.C.A. as the better place for 
educating Korean youth.
460  Likewise, Yun Ch’i-ho also declined to assume any church 
office, though he regularly attended Sunday service at the Chonggyo Church in Seoul. 
Instead, he was more active in the Y.M.C.A. and served as a Y.M.C.A. Secretary for many 
years. Sin Hŭng-u (1883-1959), who succeeded Yun’s secretaryship of the Y.M.C.A. was a 
Northern Methodist, with a degree from Southern California University,
 which was rare 
among Korean Christians in those days. Yet, this intellectual figure also did not become a 
minister but made Paejae School and Y.M.C.A. as his major field, though he often attended 
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the Methodist and other Christian conferences in Korea and abroad as a Korean 
representative.
461  Beside, another yangban convert in prison, Kim Chŏng-sik, who joined 
the Japanese Congregationalist Church was also active Y.M.C.A. member as shown in 
Chapter 6. Among the younger leaders, Pak Hŭi-do (1889-1951) deserves note.
462  Pak 
graduated Sŭngsil High school and received his professional training in the Methodist 
seminary in Seoul and became an ordained minister, but he was also active in the Y.M.C.A. 
and served as its officer.
463   
On the other hand, the Y.M.C.A. was also seen with much caution by the 
conservative missionaries because they knew that many Korean Christians wanted to join it 
in order to escape from their control. Anna Nisbet (1867-1920, SP) testifies her sense of 
disgust when she saw the Y.M.C.A. drawing many unchristian-like Koreans.   
 
The great objection to the church has always been the unpleasant 
insistence upon repentance and putting away certain sinful habits; but a 
new condition arose. The Y.M.C.A. had been founded in Seoul, and 
soon after, the Epworth League, in the Methodist Church, both of which 
had the customary provision for associate membership. The report now 
spread rapidly that one could belong to the church without the 
objectionable features, such as believing on Jesus and forsaking sin. As 
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a result, the YMCA and Epworth League spread like wild fire among 
non-Christian villages, using their names, constitution, and by-laws until 
prohibited by the respective organizations.
464   
 
As seen in Chapter 5, Epworth League actually became an organizing site for anti-Japanese 
movement and was thus dissolved by the Methodist Mission.   
There were some liberal missionaries such as Horace. H. Underwood (NP), the son 
of H. G. Underwood,
465who showed a more understanding attitude toward Korean 
Christians and recognized the social significance of the Y.M.C.A. in the specific Korean 
colonial context.   
 
In some quarters the whole movement is regarded as purely political, 
and still others regard the associations as mere social clubs lacking the 
restraints of Christianity or any religion, and more evil than good…    In 
our much-organized society, with its countless lodges, and clubs and 
associations of every conceivable sort this simple association seems of 
little import. But in Korea their very organization and development on 
native initiative is a sign of the times, and once organized and 
functioning they have untold potentialities in the direct and indirect 
education of the people.
466 
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Here we can see more clearly why the Y.M.C.A. continued to be the center of various 
socio-political movements during the colonial period, including that of the nationalist 
movement. Unlike the Epworth League, which was suppressed by the Methodist Mission, 
the Y.M.C.A. was international organization independent of any denominational Missions 
or Churches and could not be dissolved singlehandedly by such ecclesiastical authorities. 
Thus, it continued to attract many political activists who had loose or no affiliations with 
the Church. In other words, from its inception, the Y.M.C.A. had an institutional character 
that would entice socio-politically ambitious Koreans who were inclined to neglect the 
authority of the Church and the Mission and preferred to act as independent individuals. It 
was the only social venue where Korean intellectuals could balance between Christian faith 
or ideals with their nationalist aspiration and turn them into more visible actions. And, thus 
it could become one of the centers of the March First Movement, which we will discuss in 
the next chapter.   
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Chapter 8  Korean Church and Independence Movement 
 
 
In the previous chapters, we have observed that the Korean Christians were 
divided into two groups over their different attitude toward the mission-dominated Korean 
church and Christian schools. On one hand there was a majority consisting of those who 
accepted the existing framework of a missionary dominated Church and derived various 
advantages from it such as foreign protection, access to education as well as religious 
consolation. On the other hand, there was a minority group that consisted of high-class 
yangbans and intellectuals, who subscribed to the Christian faith and its ideals, but tended 
to distance themselves from the Church in order to avoid missionary control.   
  This division within Korean Christianity has been largely suppressed by the 
nationalist framework in the conventional historiography. As a result, any incident of 
national significance that involved Christians has been largely reduced to the achievement 
of the Korean Church. This chapter looks into two of such cases, namely, the “Conspiracy 
Case” [105-in sakŏn] in 1911 and the “March First Movement” in 1919, and analyzes how  
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much Christian involvement was actually there and, if any, how much we can attribute it to 
the merit of the Korean Church.   
 
Conspiracy Case Trial 
In 1911, the Japanese police made a series of arrests of over hundreds of Koreans 
for the charge of conspiring to assassinate the Japanese Governor-General Terauchi 
Masatake. Of these, 123 men were formally prosecuted and 105 men were convicted in the 
Seoul court.
467  The Japanese prosecutors claimed that these Koreans had formed a secret 
society, “New People’s Association” (sinminhoe), and plotted to kill the Governor with the 
assistance of the foreign missionaries when he toured the north the previous year.
468 
Among the 123 prosecuted, 94 were Protestant Christians, including noted figures such as 
Yun Ch’i-ho and Yi Sŭng-hun, while only two were Catholics.
469   
If these Christians involved in the “Conspiracy Case” had truly conspired to 
launch such a violent attack on their Japanese ruler, their actions would prove the 
prevalence of anti-Japanese nationalism among Korean Christians at that time. However, 
                                                   
467 For the names of the arrested 123 Koreans, see Yun Kyŏng-no, 105-in sakŏn kwa 
sinminhoe yŏn'gu (Sŏul: Ilchisa, 1990), 26-27. 
468 Ibid., 20-21.    
469 Ibid., 88-89.  
284 
 
the series of court trials revealed that that these Christians were tortured by the Japanese to 
make a false confession. The missionaries were also convinced of the innocence of the 
Korean Christians and furious with the Japanese for torturing Koreans to make false 
confessions that some missionaries masterminded the conspiracy behind Koreans.
470 
Therefore, as Arthur Brown, the secretary of the Presbyterian mission, stated, “many 
Japanese, as well as practically all foreign observers, realized that the “conspiracy” had 
been manufactured out of the imaginations of hostile and overzealous police” and the 
missionaries pressed the Japanese government to give them a fair trial.
471  Eventually, this 
court case ended up acquitting most of the Korean defendants except for six individuals 
considered to be the masterminds of the alleged plot, who were also released by a Japanese 
amnesty after a couple of years in prison.
472  The “Conspiracy Case” actually proved the 
absence of the alleged conspiracy, even if the Japanese authority did not admit it officially.   
Among the six people who received guilty sentences were Yun Ch’i-ho and Yi 
Sŭng-hun. While Yun and Yi repeatedly testified that they had made false confessions under 
Japanese duress, they were not released, while others who provided the same defense were. 
                                                   
470 The missionary names indicated by the Japanese police were George S. McCune and 
Samuel A. Moffett, both Presbyterians residing in the northern provinces. Rhodes,499. 
471 Brown, The Mastery of the Far East, 572. 
472 Yun Kyŏng-no, 105-in sakŏn kwa sinminhoe yŏn'gu,130-166.  
285 
 
Simply put, the Japanese needed to give them a guilty sentence as a general warning to the 
Korean Christians, who they thought were involved in nationalist politics, if not alleged 
conspiracy. Here, it is worth recalling that Yun and Yi were active in nationalist education at 
that time. Yun worked with another nationalist leader, An Ch’ang-ho, and headed a new 
nationalist school, Taesŏng School, in Pyŏngyang, while Yi was inspired by An and 
founded Osan School in his hometown, Chŏngju, to promote the Korean nationalist cause 
among the youth (Chapter 6). So, the Japanese accusation of their ringleaders of the 
conspiracy was completely groundless and a Japanese fabrication, their nationalist 
reputation was real. 
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to make their activities, which were all 
undertaken outside ecclesiastical institutions, into nationalist credentials for the Korean 
Church. Their schools aimed at nationalist education rather than religious education and 
such school was not tolerated in the mission-dominated Korean Church where religious 
devotion was prioritized over national education. Moreover, Yi Sŭng-hun converted to 
Christianity only after a year before the Conspiracy case, and it was only after his 
imprisonment that he became more religious, having read the Bible many times in  
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prison.
473  In any case, what is clear is that he had no influential position in the Korean 
Church at the time of the Conspiracy Case. Similarly, Yun was a prominent Christian 
intellectual, but he also had no church office at that time and desired to be free from 
missionary control. In fact, he had long believed that working as a pastor under an 
overbearing missionary was the most humiliating thing he could think of and intentionally 
declined to take church office despite his commitment to the Christian faith. 
 
To me the prejudices of heathen unbelievers seem less unbearable than the 
unintentional but the matter-of-fact "bossism" of missionary superiors. 
Once become a "native preacher," I would have to surrender to a 
missionary not only my time and service but my freedom of opinion and of 
conscience as well, compelled to preach the doctrines and dogmas of the 
Mission whether I believed in them or not. I can hardly imagine a situation 
more degrading or more painful than that in which one has to preach the 
sacred doctrines of religion not necessarily through conviction but under a 
sort of pious compulsion.
474    
 
In short, Yun and Yi were Christians but they were in no position to represent the Korean 
Church, from which their nationalist activities received no institutional support.   
In this sense, Japanese were completely mistaken when they identified these men 
as Korean Church leaders. They failed to note the widening schism between the minority of 
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nationalist Christians with the majority of apolitical Christians who were loyal to Church 
authority. The Japanese colonial government’s false identification of the Korean Church 
with the anti-Japanese movement also led them to pay special attention to the northern 
region of Korea where the Christian population was heavily concentrated. In fact, An 
Ch’ang-ho and Yi Sŭng-hun were northerners from P’yŏngan Province and the Japanese 
police arrested many of their friends and associates in the north, thus making northerners 
the majority of the prosecuted in the Conspiracy trial, 118 out of 123,
475  though none of 
them had anything to do with the fabricated conspiracy.   
The Japanese false arrest of a number of northern Christians left one unexpected 
result: a strong regional memory of oppression. Those northerners were not only arrested 
without evidence but also imprisoned and tortured to make false confession before they 
were released. Thus, this collective experience was enough to convince the northern 
Christians of the injustice of Japanese rule and left a long-lasting feeling of resentment that 
would resurface later at the time of the March First Movement.   
 
The March First Movement 
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Like the “Conspiracy Case,” the “Christian” element in the March First Movement 
in 1919 has been stressed in the previous studies. It has been claimed that the Korean 
Church produced 16 out of 33 signatories of the famous “Declaration of Independence,” 
who were Christians, and also mobilized many Christians who actively participated in 
street demonstrations, shouting “manse” (Long Live Korea) for Korean Independence.
476 
Thus, the Movement has been regarded as the single most important manifestation of 
Korean Christian nationalism.
477  However, in order to verify the conventional 
interpretation, we need to qualify who among the Christians took actual leadership in the 
Movement and how much they represented the Korean Church, keeping in mind the 
internal division within Korean Christianity described in earlier chapters. In so doing, we 
will be able to render a fairer judgment on the relationship between the Korean Church and 
the nationalist movement. 
    , 
Yi Kwang-su and the Korean Student Movement in Tokyo   
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  The scholarship on the March First Movement commonly refers to a so-called 
“Wilsonian Boom” in which Korean intellectuals were inspired by the idea of the “national 
self-determination” and took it as their opportunity to raise their voice to the world, as the 
major backdrop of the movement.
478  To this end, some Korean nationalists both within and 
without Korea planned to send delegations to the Versailles Peace Conference, while others 
resorted to the more direct method of declaring independence without securing recognition 
from the powers. One such early attempt that had an immediate impact on the March First 
Movement was the Korean students’ movement in Tokyo on February 8, 1919. On that day, 
Korean students gathered at the Korean Y.M.C.A. building in Kanda, Tokyo, and read loud 
their Declaration of Independence. Unsurprisingly, the Japanese police swiftly cracked 
down on the gathering and arrested many of the Korean students. However, the news of the 
Students’ Declaration soon reached Korea and stirred the Korean nationalist leaders and led 
them to organize a similar movement, which materialized in the March First Movement.
479
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  The student movement in Tokyo had a small Christian element that stands in 
contrast to the subsequent March First Movement, which conventional historiography 
credits the Korean Church with having led. In fact, the student leader who drafted the 
February Declaration was none other than Yi Kwang-su, the sharpest and boldest critic of 
the Korean Church and its missionaries. Yi came to Japan to pursue advanced scholarship at 
Waseda University after he was ousted from Osan School by the leaders of the Presbyterian 
Church, and had established himself as an active leader of the Korean student community 
in Tokyo.   
  In that connection, it is also important to note that the Y.M.C.A. provided the 
venue for the student movement. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Y.M.C.A. 
attracted Korean students because, as an international civic organization, it was one of few 
places where Koreans could enjoy relative freedom of speech without intervention from the 
Church and its missionaries or agents of the Japanese empire. The same was true of the 
Korean Y.M.C.A. branch in Tokyo and it provided space where many political-minded 
Korean students could gather together. For example, Sŏ Ch’un, one of the central figures in 
the student movement at the Tokyo Y and also an alumnus from Osan School,
480  was a 
                                                   
480 Osan chunghak-kodŭng hakkyo, Osan 80-nyŏnsa,118, 132.  
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leftist who shared with Yi Kwang-su a critical view of the Korean Church public criticizing 
the Church for its dependency on western missionaries and its anti-national tendencies.
481 
The nationalist movement by Korean students in Tokyo, which galvanized the subsequent 
March First Movement, was led by young Korean intellectuals who had a low view of the 
Korean Church and kept their distance from it.   
 
Ch’ŏndogyo’s Initiative in the March First Movement 
  The absence of the Christian element was also conspicuous in the preparatory 
process of the March First Movement. The planning of the Movement was mainly led by 
Ch’oe Rin (1878-1958), Kwŏn Tong-jin (1861-1947), and O Se-ch’ang (1864-1953), all of 
whom were leaders of Ch’ŏndogyo, the succeeding organization of the former Tonghak, the 
indigenous religion that intimidated Christians in Korea in the famous anti-foreign uprising 
of 1894. By 1919, the Ch’ŏndogyo had modified their political and ideological orientation 
and enlisted some intellectual leaders such as above-mentioned Ch’oe, Kwŏn, and O under 
the new leadership of Son Pyŏng-hŭi (1861-1922), but still had no friendly relations with 
                                                   
481 Gendai Shiryō vol. 26 (misuzu shobō, 1980), 8. Hereafter, GS.    
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the Christian Church, much less with the missionaries, whom they used to attack as foreign 
intruders. 
  The Ch’ŏndogyo leaders began to prepare their own independence movement in 
January 1919, upon hearing of the Wilson’s Fourteen Point Statement. These leaders 
thought that if Koreans successfully demonstrated their collective will for national 
independence, this aspiration would be recognized by the Allied Powers, and thus planned 
to draft and distribute a Declaration of Independence throughout the world, including 
Japan.
482  For this purpose, they tried to recruit several important leaders from outside 
Ch’ŏndogyo institutions. At this time, Ch’oe Rin approached Ch’oe Nam-sŏn a prominent 
scholar who was well versed in both Chinese classics and contemporary western 
scholarship, but not a Christian, and asked him to draft the Declaration. Ch’oe consented, 
while refusing to sign the declaration itself to avoid arrest by the Japanese.
483 
  It is worth recalling here that Ch’oe Nam-sŏn and Yi Kwang-su had worked 
together to publish Ch’ŏngch’un and introduced Yi’s harsh criticism on the Korean Church 
to the public through his magazine. Ch’oe Nam-sŏn had respect for his Christian friends 
                                                   
482 Kwŏng Tong-jin’s testimony at Keijō Local Court (4/8/1919) in Ichikawa Masaaki, 
San'ichi dokuritsu undō (Tōkyō: Hara shobō, 1983) vol.1, 228. Hereafter, SDS.   
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and mentors, but had no religious commitment to the Church and the Christian cause.
484 
Therefore, it was natural that the Declaration he drafted included no specific references to 
Christian tenets or thought. In fact, the absence of Christian language in the Declaration is 
so obvious that even the leading Korean Church historian of the nationalist school, Min 
Kyŏng-bae admits that there is no Christian confession in the statement of the 
Declaration.
485   
  The Ch’ŏndogyo leaders also took full responsibility for printing the Declaration. 
They printed three thousand copies of it in their own printing factory that usually published 
their organizational papers. The company was located on the campus of Posŏng School, 
which was owned and run by the Ch’ŏndogyo.
486  It goes without saying that printing and 
distributing uncensored documents was illegal and a difficult business, given the watchful 
eyes of the omnipresent Japanese police. That the Ch’ŏndogyo managed to print their 
Declaration was due to the fact that, unlike the Korean Church, it possessed all the 
                                                   
484 Chŏn T'aek-pu, "3.1 undong ŭi chongsin kwa kŭpaegyŏng," Kidokkyo Sasang 22, no. 3 
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294 
 
necessary material and human infrastructure under its own jurisdiction without relying on 
any external form of support.     
  By contrast, the sixteen Christian leaders who signed the Declaration played no 
part in drafting and printing this document. They nevertheless became its signatories over 
the course of the following events. The first Christian involvement in the movement began 
when Ch’oe Rin asked Ch’oe Nam-sŏn to invite Yi Sŭng-hun from P’yŏngan Province to 
join their movement in mid-February, 1919.
487  Ch’oe knew Yi personally as he had 
provided personal support for Yi’s Osan School in Chŏngju.
488  Meeting with the 
Ch’ŏndogyo leaders in Seoul, Yi agreed to participate in the movement and promised to 
cultivate more Christian supporters in his home province in the north, where he soon 
recruited several prominent Christian ministers such as Kil Sŏn-ju and Yang Chŏn-baek.
489 
After securing their support, he came to Seoul again and met Ham T’ae-yŏng, a young 
Presbyterian layman, and Pak Hŭi-do, a Methodist minister and also Y.M.C.A. officer, both 
of whom joined the movement.
490  Pak subsequently brought his Methodist colleagues to 
Ham and Yi, and the Christian leaders all agreed to ally with the Ch’ŏndogyo for the sake 
                                                   
487 Ch’oe Rin’s testimony at Keijō Local Court, (4/7/1919), SDS vol.1, 216. 
488 Ch’oe Nam-sŏn’s testimony at Keijō Local Court (5/19/1919), SDS vol.3, 89. 
489 Yi Sŭng-hun’s testimony at Keijō Local Court, (4/7/1919), SDS vol.1, 290-291. 
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of national union.
491  Henceforth, the Christian leaders signed onto the Declaration and 
helped distribute it to regions throughout the Christian network.   
  There is no doubt that Yi Sŭng-hun was the single most important figure among 
the Christian signers, and there would have been no Ch’ŏndogyo-Christian alliance and no 
Christian signers, had he not taken an active part in the movement. However, as already 
discussed in previous chapters, Yi was already a black sheep in the Korean Church for his 
political involvement and did not represent the Korean Church at that time. It is true that he 
became ordained a Presbyterian Elder after he was pardoned from prison in 1915 and 
entered Presbyterian Theological seminary in 1916 at the age of 52, but he was soon asked 
to withdraw by S.L. Roberts, the missionary in charge of his home church in Chŏngju, who 
was aware of his political ambition.
492  Thus, had Yi been a loyal member of the Korean 
Church, he could not have acted in the way that he did. In the first place, his participation in 
the movement boldly transgressed the principle of the separation of politics and religion. 
Also, his collaboration with the Ch’ŏndogyo was controversial since the Korean Church 
had long despised the indigenous religion as a heathen, idol-worshipping cult that was 
                                                   
491 Pak Hŭi-do’s testimony at Keijō Local Court, (4/23/1918), SDS vol.1, 301. 
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incompatible with Christian faith.
493  His involvement in the March First Movement was 
possible because he had been disloyal to ecclesiastical rule and the tradition of the Korean 
Church despite being an ordained elder. In substance, he was no different from An 
Ch’ang-ho or Yi Kwang-su who were loosely affiliated with the Church but left it when 
ecclesiastical censorship over their political and intellectual freedom became too 
cumbersome.   
 
Signatures against their Will : Kil Sŏn-ju, Yang Chŏnbaek and Chŏng Ch’un-su 
  Unlike Yi Sŭng-hun, Kil Sŏn-ju and Yang Chŏn-baek were two of the first seven 
Korean ministers ordained in 1907 and established themselves as leading ministers in the 
Korean Presbyterian Church. On this basis, previous studies have concluded that their 
signatures on the Declaration of Independence represent irrefutable evidence that the 
Korean Church, especially its Presbyterian branch, made a great contribution to the 
independence movement.   
                                                   
493 Recall many cases of Christian conflict with local religions, including Tonghaks, in 
Chapter 2. Also, Sin Hong-sik, one of the signatories, later testified that he had been hesitant 
to work with Ch’ŏngdogyo because of the “difference in doctrinal belief.” Sintonga (March 
1969) :207.    
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  This conventional understanding of the role played by Kil and Yang has been 
drawn without giving serious consideration on their own testimony, which they made 
during the court trials following the March First Movement. During the court hearings, Kil 
himself insisted that he never agreed with Yi Sŭng-hun’s intrigue. According to Kil, when 
he met with Yi in P’yŏngyang in mid-February, Yi told him that he was working with the 
Ch’ŏndogyo leaders to prepare a “petition”, not a provocative “declaration,” to the Japanese 
government to permit Korean independence. Yi asked Kil to come to Seoul and join the 
movement but Kil refused as he was blind and physically weak. Then, Yi then pled with Kil 
to give his personal seal so that he could add his name on the petition in his behalf. Kil 
consented to do this, assuming that petitioning for independence would be acceptable to the 
Japanese as it was something like “a child asking his father to pass on a land title to 
him.”
494  From that point, Kil did not hear anything from Yi about the movement until the 
day before March First, when Yi’s messenger abruptly came and asked him to come down 
to Seoul. Kil was then in Hwanghae Province for a Bible study meeting and hurried to 
Seoul by night train. Upon arriving in Seoul, he learned that Yi and other Christians 
distributed the Declaration of Independence, which he had never seen or read, and his name 
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was also publicized as one of the signatories. Greatly shocked, the honest Kil felt 
responsible for the fact that his name had been used and swiftly surrendered to the Japanese 
authorities in order to explain his innocence.
495 
  Therefore, Kil continued to show the Japanese that he was only guilty for his 
ignorance of the subsequent development of the event after he gave Yi his seal. When he 
was told by the Japanese prosecutor that Yi had claimed that Kil had agreed to sign the 
Declaration, he rejected this and made clear that “Yi was wrong on that point.”
496  He then 
described his state of mind when he agreed to the idea of submitting a petition. 
 
Let me tell you my true heart. I have been devoted only in religion and 
paid little attention to politics. However… when I heard that national 
self-determination was proposed, because of my folly, I consented to give 
my name to the petition. Looking at the consequence as it is, I will never 
take part in such an attempt again, even if independence or even the 
entire world should be offered.
497 
 
As this statement was made in court, one may be tempted to think of it as a court tactic to 
escape Japanese punishment. However, it is important to note that such denials were made 
only Kil and Yang Chŏn-baek (discussed below), the two senior ministers of the Korean 
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Presbyterian Church, while other Christian leaders squarely confessed their conviction that 
they were frustrated by the Japanese and thus participated in the movement to demonstrate 
their will to national independence. To take a few examples, Yi Sŭng-hun detailed how he 
was ill-treated by arrogant Japanese officials and accused the Japanese of treating Koreans 
as “barbarian” during the trials.
498  Pak Hŭi-do proclaimed that he would never quit the 
independence movement, when the Japanese judge asked about his plans for the future.
499 
Ch’oe Sŏng-mo testified that he gave his seal to Ham because he had consented to the 
purpose of the movement.
500  Even the relatively moderate Sin Hong-sik stated that he had 
been discontent about Japanese discriminatory practices in Korea, though he accepted the 
annexation as God’s will.
501  In short, there were few among the prosecuted Christians who 
made such a strong claim for innocence. It therefore seems less likely that Kil, who was 
known to be the most respected minister of the Korean Church, told a lie in front of his 
fellow Christians to save himself alone. 
  For these reasons, it is reasonable to conclude that Kil actually played no part in 
the March First Movement besides that of being misled by Yi Sŭng-hun to lend his name. 
                                                   
498 Yi Sŭng-hun’s testimony at Keijō Local Court (4/7/1919), SDS vol.1, 297. 
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Kil was simply kept in dark (and he was actually blind) and not informed of the clandestine 
intrigue by the movement leaders. His appeal for innocence was recognized by the Japanese 
prosecutors as it coincided with testimonies by others as well as other situational evidence, 
and Kil alone was pronounced not guilty for insufficient evidence among the thirty-three 
signers of the Declaration and released from prison as soon as the case was concluded.
502 
In the end, the court proved that the mainstream Presbyterian minister and leader of the 
Korean Church was a genuine religionist rather than an active nationalist.   
 
Yang Chŏn-baek 
  Like Kil Sŏn-ju, Yang Chŏn-baek also fell victim to Yi Sŭng-hun’s strategy of 
gathering seals for his Declaration under the pretense of merely petitioning the Japanese 
empire to recognize Korean independence. According to Yang’s testimony, Yi came to 
Sŏnch’ŏn in mid-February, during a Bible study conference that many Church leaders 
gathered to attend from all over P’yŏngan Province. Yi took advantage of the gathering to 
explain the movement plan, asking these church leaders to give him their seals for the 
                                                   
502 GS 26, 504-511.   
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movement’s “petition.”
503  Yu Yŏdae and Yi [Kim] P’yŏngjŏ concurred and gave their seals 
on the spot, but Yang promised to give his later. After Yi returned to Seoul, Ham T’ae-yŏng 
visited Yang to receive his seal around February 24 and Yang gave it at this time. Yang later 
received a letter from Yi in Seoul, explaining that the petition would be submitted soon. 
Yang arrived in Seoul on February 28, where he was shown the Declaration of the 
Independence for the first time by Ham T’ae-yŏng and found his name printed on it.
504 
Still, Yang went to the Myŏngwŏlgwan Restaurant on the next day, where the Ch’ŏndogyo 
and Christian leaders gathered to read the Declaration, and was arrested by the Japanese 
police.   
  In court, the Japanese judge was not convinced of Yang’s innocence and pressed 
him to admit that he agreed to sign the Declaration, to which Yang answered: 
 
I have not heard anything about the Declaration of Independence. If I had 
known it before, I would not have given my seal... I never agreed [with 
the Declaration] but I went to the Myŏngwŏlgwan Restaurant because I 
had agreed to the more important business of sending a petition to the 
government … To this day, I have been opposed to the Declaration of 
Independence.
505 
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Nevertheless, it was difficult for Yang to convince the Japanese authorities of his innocence 
because, unlike Kil, Yang did attend the gathering at the Myŏngwŏlgwan, knowing that the 
Declaration would be read with his name on it. In fact, Yang had almost given up on 
persuading the court on this point. 
 
I admit my error in passing over my seal to other person without hearing 
his explanation carefully. Nonetheless, as long as my name is already on 
the Declaration, I know that I would be presumed to have had known it in 
advance, even if I insisted of my ignorance. There is no other way.
506 
 
As Yang expected, his appeal was not taken seriously and rejected by the Japanese court 
and he was sentenced to two years in prison. However, it is important here to note again 
that the two senior and mainstream Presbyterian ministers, Yang and Kim, were the only 
ones who claimed for innocence for the same reason that Yi Sŭng-hun kept them dark what 
he really intended to do.   
 
Chŏng Ch’un-su 
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  Ch’ŏng Ch’un-su was another case of a Korean church leader whose name was 
printed on the Declaration without his prior consent. Ch’ŏng was a Southern Methodist 
minister at a church in Wŏnsan, Hamgyŏng Province, and thus did not have any 
institutional or regional relationship to Yi Sŭng-hun. However, when he came to Seoul on 
church business, he was asked to join the independence movement by Pak Hŭi-do. He 
consented to the idea of submitting a petition, but disagreed with the idea of an alliance 
with Ch’ŏndogyo because he felt unsure of whether the Ch’ŏndogyo leaders had the same 
sense of peace and justice as him and his fellow Christian ministers.
507  In a meeting with 
Yi and other Christian leaders, Chŏng insisted that Christians should adopt a moderate 
approach and petition for Korean “autonomy” rather than “independence.”    Yi, however, 
insisted on the need of an alliance with the Ch’ŏndogyo and worried that if the Christians 
were hesitant, Ch’ŏndogyo would act independently.
508  The other leaders, especially 
Methodist leaders such as Pak Hŭi-do and O Hwa-yŏng (1879-1959?), all took Chŏng’s 
side and the Christian leaders agreed to collect signatures for the petition from each of their 
constituencies.
509  Hence, Chŏng returned to his home in Wŏnsan, while the leaders in 
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Seoul were to prepare the petition. It was around February 20 right after Yi Sŭng-hun had 
returned from the north with agreements to petition for independence by the Presbyterian 
leaders such as Kil and Yang.   
  Upon returning home, Chŏng recruited several ministers including Kwak 
Myŏng-ni in Wŏnsan and waited for instruction from Seoul. Then, he received a letter from 
O Hwa-yŏng in Seoul and learned that the Christians in Seoul had decided to work with 
Ch’ŏndogyo. Chŏng was confused and sent Kwak to Seoul by train to get more precise 
information on February 27. The next day, Kwak returned from Seoul with copies of the 
Declaration of Independence and Chŏng was greatly shocked to find his name used among 
the signatories.
510  However, like Kil Sŏn-ju, he felt responsible for the consequences of the 
Declaration and went to Seoul on March 1, where he found all the signatories already 
arrested. After some hesitation, Ch’ŏng eventually surrendered on March 6.
511   
  Chŏng’s assertion that he was not informed of the new developments in Seoul 
after he left for Wŏnsan was unanimously corroborated by other Christian leaders who 
stayed in Seoul. For instance, Pak Hŭi-do testified that Chŏng left for Wŏnsan after the 
meeting on February 20 and was not informed of what happened afterward. Thus, Pak 
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himself wondered how Chŏng’s name ended up appearing on the Declaration.
512  Ham 
T’ae-yŏng who actually signed on the Declaration on behalf of those who were not present 
in Seoul on February 27 clarified that point in his testimony. Ham clearly stated that, while 
he received the seals from others as proxy and signed for them, he did not receive Chŏng’s 
seal, but thought Chŏng had given it to O Hwa-yŏng and thus added Chŏng’s name to the 
list. In retrospect, however, Ham admitted, “it was likely that Chŏng was not well 
informed.”
513  To corroborate that point, O Hwa-yŏng testified that Chŏng’s name was 
absent when the Christian leaders finalized the list of signers on February 22.
514  Chŏng 
was absolutely sure of his innocence and repeatedly appealed to the court that “I only 
agreed to give my name to the petition for autonomy and it was against my will to demand 
independence.”
515   
   
Yi Sŭng-hun’s Impetus for the Chŏndogyo-Christian Alliance: Financial Need 
  The testimonies of the three ministers above strongly suggest that Yi Sŭng-hun 
acted on his own authority in changing the independence movement’s core statement from 
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a “petition” to a “Declaration” and used the names of other Christian leaders at his 
discretion, while giving them little information on these important changes. In other words, 
while Yi first agreed to the idea of submitting a moderate petition to the government within 
a legal framework,
516  at some point he changed his mind and turned to a more 
confrontational method of distributing the Declaration of Independence without 
government permission.   
  The explanation for this important change was pressure coming from Ch’ŏndogyo 
leaders who preferred a more confrontational approach to the achievement of independence. 
In fact, in a discussion of the proper methods of the independence movement, Ch’oe Rin 
told Yi Sŭng-hun directly that he disagreed with the Christian idea of petitioning the 
Japanese empire.
517  Yi knew well that some of his Christian comrades were biased against 
Ch’ŏndogyo leaders and that it would be even more difficult to ally with them if they 
imposed their radical methods on the Christians. Nevertheless, he decided to accept 
Ch’ŏndogyo’s demands because Ch’oe Rin had promised financial aid in return. Yi who 
first asked Ch’oe to provide 5,000 yen for him as the “movement fund” (undongbi) and, 
when Ch’oe concurred, Yi promised that the Christian leaders would collaborate with 
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Ch’ŏndogyo.
518  Ch’oe delivered the requested sum in cash to Yi the next day upon the 
approval of Sŏn Pyŏng-hŭi, the head of Ch’ŏndogyo.
519  Soon, Yi and Ham T’ae-yŏng 
came to see Ch’oe and confirmed that the Christians would work with Ch’ŏndogyo.
520 
  In court, Yi claimed that the money was not a gift but a “loan” from Ch’ŏndogyo. 
He explained that he needed funds to borrow because there was little time to collect money 
from Christian comrades for the movement.
521  It is impossible to tell whether this was true 
or not. What is important, however, is that financial aid was the crucial factor that led Yi to 
adopt Ch’ŏndogyo’s more radical preference for declaring independence. Moreover, these 
important decisions were made at Yi’s discretion without informing Kil, Yang and Chŏng 
until later.   
  In Yi’s defense, it must be pointed out that, without funding from Ch’ŏndogyo, 
Christian leaders had no financial means with which to execute the movement. Korean 
Christian poverty had been a serious problem since the foundation of the Korean Church 
and the meager salary of the Korean ministers was a constant cause of frustration. 
Moreover, the foreign missions that presided over the Korean Church were against any 
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engagement in politics and there was no hope at all that the Church would grant 
institutional support for the nationalist movement, much less a financial gift.       
  The comparative poverty of the Christian leaders is clear when we compare the 
average salaries of the Christian and Ch’ŏndogyo leaders who were involved in the 
independence movement. Among the Ch’ŏngdogyo signers of the Declaration, Hong 
Ki-ch’o (1865-1938), Yang Han-muk (1862-1919), and Pak Chun-sŭng (1866-1927), each 
of whom held the status of priest (tosa), received 40 yen a month with additional monthly 
allowances from 4 to 5 yen depending on the change in crop price,
522  while the Elder 
(changno) such as Hong Pyŏng-gi (1869-1949) and Yi Chong-hun (1858-1932) received 60 
yen and 70 yen respectively. O Se-ch’ang, the Ch’ŏndogyo’s executive officer and one of 
the masterminds of the Declaration movement, received 100 yen a month, while Son 
Pyŏng-hŭi, the founder of the religion, enjoyed the extravagant salary of 500 yen a 
month.
523   
  By contrast, Kil Sŏn-ju, the most prominent Presbyterian Church leader, who 
ministered the largest Korean Church in P’yŏngyang with more than 2,000 members, 
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received only 40 yen a month, which is slightly less than the average Ch’ŏndogyo priest’s 
salary that included additional allowances. Nevertheless, Kil was still better off than most 
other Christian ministers. Chŏng Ch’un-su, a Southern Methodist minister, received 30 yen 
a month, while his colleague and a non-ordained evangelist (chŏndosa), Kwak Myŏng-ni, 
who ministered a church with 120 members, received only 20 yen a month.
524  By contrast, 
Korean employees of Mission-owned institutions seem to have generally enjoyed a better 
salary than the Korean ministers. One of the Christian signatories, Pak Tong-wan 
(1885-1941), who worked for Kidok sinbo (The Christian News), the Christian newspaper 
funded by the foreign missions, received 35 yen a month.
525   
  With such limited income, Korean ministers had to struggle to support their 
families. Considering that even the average college student, who was arrested for 
participating in street demonstrations during the March First Movement, received 15 yen to 
20 yen a month from their parents,
526  the financial strain upon the Korean ministers are 
plain. In fact, Chŏng Ch’un-su, who had a wife and four children to support, was already on 
                                                   
524 The Pprosecutor’s investigation report for Kwak Myŏng-ni (3/2/1919), SDS vol. 4 149. 
525 Chŏng Ch’ŭn-su’s testimony at Keijō Local Court (5/3/1919), SDS vol.1, 374; Pak 
Tong-wan’ s testimony at Keijō Local Court (5/2/1919), SDS vol.1, 368. 
526 Chu Chong-ŭi’s testimony at Keijō Local Court (4/10/1919), SDS vol.4, 149; Kim 
T’ae-ha’s testimony at Keijō Local Court, (6/3/1919), SDS vol. 4 235.  
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the brink of financial collapse and had begged for financial assistance from his mentor and 
wealthy layman of his Southern Methodist denomination, Yun Ch’i-ho. Yun responded 
favorably to his plea and rendered the needed assistance, which gravely concerned Yun 
about the future of the Korean Church, especially young able ministers.   
 
[Chŏng Ch’un-su] unbosomed to me the financial difficulties he is in. 30 
yen a month with a debt of  ￥100 still weighing on him ― with a little 
girl to support in Miss Wagner's School [Southern Methodist mission 
school in Kaesŏng-- author] ― all this reducing his sal. to  ￥15 ― a hard 
struggle ― I promised him to relieve him of his debt―installments over 4 
or 5 months. The financial struggles of preachers are such that it paralyzes 
their spiritual life. The gulf between Korean church workers and 
missionaries is constantly widening. The missionaries ought to be more 
thoughtful and less arrogant in their dealings with and attitude to 
Koreans.
527   
 
  Because such poverty was the general condition of the Korean ministers’ family 
life, it is understandable that Christian leaders would divert a portion of the enormous fund 
they received from Ch’ŏndogyo to support their families during the movement. When Yi 
Sŭng-hun received the 5,000 yen in cash, he first deposited 3,000 yen in his friend’s bank 
account and gave the rest to Pak Hŭi-do, who distributed about 1500 yen for those traveling 
to the countryside and overseas to recruit supporters for the movement or deliver the copies 
                                                   
527 Yun Ch’i-ho’s Diary, (5/29/1918).  
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of the Declaration. The remaining 500 yen was allocated to those who agreed to put their 
names on the Declaration on the ground that their family members would need financial 
compensation during their expected imprisonment. The Christian leaders decided upon a 
formula to grant 20 yen a month per dependent in their family and, accordingly, the 
voluntary signers received from 70 to 100 yen prior to March 1: Yi P’il-chu (1869-1942), 
70 yen; Pak Tong-wan, 100 yen, Yi Kap-sŏng (1889-1981), 80 yen; O Hwa-yŏn,g 80 yen, 
Pak Hŭi-do, 100 yen, Kim Ch’ang-jun (1888-?), 100 yen.
528  But the most needy Chŏng 
Ch’un-su did not receive any as he was not in Seoul at the time, regardless of the fact that 
his name was being used for the Declaration 
  That Christian leaders used the Ch’ŏndogyo’s monetary gift as a kind of family 
stipend provides further evidence of how distanced they had become from the Church. Had 
these leaders been confident that their Church members were supportive of the nationalist 
movement they were planning, they could expect that Christian supporters would provide 
sufficient means to take care of their families who sacrificed their breadwinners for the 
admirable cause of national independence. They knew too well, however, that such support 
would never occur, given the Church’s apolitical attitude and the general poverty of the 
                                                   
528 Pak Hŭi-do’s testimony at Keijō Local Court (4/23/1918), SDS vol.1, 302.  
312 
 
Christians. So they had to rely on the timely and generous support from Ch’ŏndogyo rather 
than from the Korean Church. While the missionaries boasted that the Korean Church was 
becoming a self-supporting, self-governing, and self-propagating Church, the Christians 
who were willing to work for the nationalist cause had no resource with which they could 
stand up for Korean independence and had no choice but to rely on external support. 
 
Korean-Missionary Conflicts behind the Movement 
  The Christian leaders who signed the Declaration placed little hope in the 
missionaries. They knew that the missionaries would oppose their movement as a violation 
of the separation of the Church from politics. However, some of the Christian leaders who 
had long been associated with the missionaries felt that they could not simply neglect them 
and wanted at least to be honest about their intentions. Thus, these Christians dared to 
report their political determination to the missionaries and asked for their understanding, if 
not support.    
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  Yi Kap-sŏng, one of the Presbyterian signatories, was baptized by Henry Bruen 
(NP) in 1908 and regarded the Bruens as being “the same as my parents” ever since.
529 
Thus, when Yi went down to Taegu on a secret mission to collect signatures for the petition 
(this was before the “petition” became the “declaration”) he stopped by Bruen’s residence 
and told him about his involvement in the movement.
530  Bruen did not become angry but 
showed “a chilly smile” and asked, “Do you think Koreans are qualified for independence?” 
to which Yi responded, “that’s something you will see later.”
531 
  Pak Hŭi-do, the leader of the Methodist group, received a similar warning from 
Arthur Becker, an educational missionary of the Northern Methodist Mission, when visiting 
him on the eve of the March First Movement. To Pak, Becker was a great benefactor who 
had sent him to high school and seminary, paying all his tuitions, and raising him as an 
intellectual minister. Also, Becker was the principal of the church school where Pak was 
teaching. When Pak disclosed his will to take part in the independence movement, Becker 
was worried that distributing the Declaration to the Korean masses might cause a riot as 
                                                   
529 Bruen baptized Yi in 1903 and mentioned him in his report to the board as “one of our 
brightest Christians.”Bruen, 40 years in Korea,84; Yi Kap-sŏn’s testimony at Keijō Local 
Court, (4/28/1919), SDS vol.1, 335. 
530 Yi Kapsŏng’s testimony at Keijō Local Court (4/28/1919), SDS vol.1, 335. 
531  Police investigation report for Yi Kap-sŏng (5/8/1919), SDS vol.1, 171.  
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“there are few among the Koreans who were sufficiently learned and intelligent.” Hence, 
Becker complained to Pak: “You should have consulted me before putting your name on it 
[the Declaration].” 
532   
  These missionaries’ comments to the Christian patriots were intended as 
sympathetic advice to save them from dangerous consequences, but they clearly evinced 
that typical missionary trait --- paternalism based upon a low view of Korean potentials. To 
them, Koreans were as a whole forever immature and thus in need of their kind guidance 
for anything. It was thus more a disappointing than pleasing incident for the missionaries to 
see their Korean protégées acting independently of their control and no longer seeking their 
paternal guidance.   
  In fact, Pak Hŭi-do encountered an even more unfriendly attitude when he met 
B.W. Billings (1881-1969, NM) after Becker. Billings was the head minister at the Central 
Church where Pak was also ministering. Pak thus felt it necessary to confess to the senior 
minister about his political involvement and ask him to prepare himself for Pak’s probable 
arrest and taking leave from the pulpit. When Pak met with Billings however, he found that, 
Billings already knew of Pak’s movement because Kim Ch’ang-jun, his fellow minister at 
                                                   
532 Police investigation report for Pak Hŭi-do (3/9/1919), SDS vol.1, 156.  
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the Central Church, had already come to tell him that both Kim and Pak had signed the 
Declaration and would devote themselves to the cause of independence. Billings was 
embarrassed to know that two Korean ministers under his authority were rebelling against 
ecclesiastical rule and had committed themselves to such a dangerous political plot. He said 
to Pak rather angrily,   
 
You must not engage in such a thing [as the independence movement]… 
A religion[ist] should not take part in it. Moreover, don’t you think it is 
meaningless to seek my consultation now, as you will be carrying out 
the movement tomorrow?
533   
 
Billings then began to offer a prayer in front of Pak so that God would protect, not his 
Korean disciples, but his Church from the “harm” that the two Korean ministers were about 
to cause.
534  According to Kim Ch’ang-jun, Billings “had a bad reputation” among Koreans 
because “he had no idea about the state (kukka) and [was] unsympathetic to the Korean 
cause” and therefore “had no reason to support our movement.”
535  If this is true, it was 
likely that both Kim and Pak went to meet the missionary not to ask for his understanding, 
but to declare their independence from him. They had long endured this disrespectful 
                                                   
533 Police investigation report for Pak Hŭi-do (3/9/1919), SDS vol.1, 156. 
534 Police investigation report for Pak Hŭi-do (3/9/1919), SDS vol.1, 156. 
535 Kim Ch’ang-jun’s testimony at Keijō Local Court (4/20/1919), SDS vol.1, 350.  
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missionary as a boss but finally decided to stand for independence, not by ousting the 
missionary, but leaving the church and participating in the nationalist politics that the 
missionary had long forbade. In other words, Kim and Pak’s participation in the movement 
had a double purpose: independence from the missionaries on one hand, and independence 
from the Japanese on the other.   
         Chŏng Ch’un-su was more self-conscious about the relationship between 
asserting independence from the Mission as well as from Japan. In court, Ch’ŏng explained 
to the Japanese how the two forms of independences came to occupy his mind.   
 
As a Christian minister, I have come into conflict with the missionaries 
over church administration and had grievances against them. In addition 
to this religious problem, I have a problem with national [state] affairs, 
which is that the complete assimilation of Japan and Korea could not be 
materialized [even if the Japanese wanted it]
536 
 
To Chŏng, the fundamental cause of his religious problem--- subservience to the 
missionaries in the Korean Church ---was simple: the lack of Korea’s independent status 
among the nations in the world. Thus, he believed that Korean national independence had 
to be won first from the Japanese in order to accomplish ecclesiastical independence from 
                                                   
536 Chŏng Ch’un-su’s testimony at Keijō Local Court (5/3/1919), SDS vol.1, 374.  
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the missionaries. It was thus his logical conclusion that “all Korean Christian pastors 
should sign the petition” for independence if they desired ecclesiastical independence and 
he hoped that “if we were successful in this attempt [at independence] …we can avoid 
conflicts with westerners in the area of religion.”
537  In short, Chŏng thought that national 
and ecclesiastical independence were inseparable and that the former was necessary to 
achieve the latter. On this point, Chŏng differed from the Korean church leaders who joined 
the Japanese Congregationalist Church and prioritized ecclesiastical independence as prior 
to national independence, and did not hesitate to borrow the Japanese hand in achieving 
independence from the western missionaries. Nonetheless, the difference between the two 
was merely strategic; both were struggling with a common problem that Korean Christians 
in colonial Korea had to face. They were caught in between two colonial overlords--- the 
missionaries who ruled the Church from within and the Japanese empire who oppressed the 
Church from without.   
 
Missionary Attitudes toward the March First Movement 
                                                   
537 Chŏng Ch’un-su’s testimony at Keijō Local Court (5/3/1919), SDS vol.1, 374.  
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     As many studies have shown, there is no doubt that many missionaries took the 
Korean side once the independence demonstrations broke out, especially after the Japanese 
military police used cruel measures to crush the demonstrators.
538  They were not 
supportive of Korean independence in itself, much less Christian involvement in nationalist 
politics, but they were moralists and could not overlook the fact of Japanese brutality and 
thus raised voice under the common slogan, “No neutrality for brutality.”
539  Some 
missionaries such as Frank W. Schofield (1889-1970) publicized the Japanese colonial 
police’s cruel suppression of the Korean independence movement to the world through the 
Christian and secular media and pressed the Japanese government to restrain their use of 
violence.
540  Moreover, some individual missionaries supported by the Mission boards at 
home met with high-ranking Japanese officials and influential Diet members both in Korea 
                                                   
538 Samuel H. Moffett, "The Independence Movement and Missionaries," Transactions of 
the Royal Asiatic Society, Korean Branch 54 (1979);  Donald N. Clark, ""Surely God Will 
Work Out Their Salvation": Protestant Missionaries in the March First Movement," Korean 
Studies 13 (1989) 
539 For the missionaries’ reaction to the March First Movement, see Frank P. Baldwin, 
"Missionaries and the March First Movement: Can Moral Men Be Neutral?," in Korea under 
Japanese colonial rule : studies of the policy and techniques of Japanese colonialism ed. 
Andrew C. Nahm (Kalamazoo: Center for Korean Studies, Institute of International and Area 
Studies, Western Michigan University, 1973). 
540 Doretha Ellen Mortimore, "Dr. Frank W. Schofield and the Korean National 
Consciousness," in Korea's response to Japan : the colonial period 1910-1945, ed. C. I. 
Eugene Kim and Doretha Ellen Mortimore (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Center for Korean Studies, 
Western Michigan University, 1975), 245-261; Clark, Living dangerously in Korea : the 
western experience, 1900-1950, 53-55.  
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and in Japan, as well as the Japanese ambassador in Washington and asked for reforms of 
the colonial administration.
541   
  Nevertheless, despite the good that these missionary actions brought to Koreans, 
they were meant to save the Korean Church and its innocent Christians from brutal 
suppression by the overly suspicious and anti-Christian Japanese police, who wrongly 
believed that all Christians were nationalist activists. The missionaries had little sympathy 
for the Christian signers of the Declaration or the participants in the “mansei” 
demonstration and thought that their movement would bring only harm to the Church. 
Moreover, the Korean Christian leaders of the independence movement themselves knew 
best that the missionaries were neither supporters of Korean independence nor their equal 
partners in the Church. For them, the missionaries were foreign overlords whose duty was 
to carefully watch over and guide the Korean Church so that Korean Christians would seek 
spiritual salvation rather than national salvation.   
  For their part, the Japanese authorities were biased against the Koreans and 
believed them to be incapable of standing up for themselves without foreign support. Hence, 
seeing the missionary efforts to protect Koreans from Japanese suppression, the Korean 
                                                   
541 Min Kyŏng-bae, Han'guk kidok kyohoesa (sin kaejŏn p'an), 350-356.  
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Government-General concluded that the Christian participants in the movement were being 
manipulated and supported by the foreign missionaries. Such Japanese judgments of 
Korean ability were seen as humiliating to the Korean Christian leaders whose aspiration 
for national independence was directed both against the Japanese empire and the 
missionaries. Hence when ordered in court to explain their relationship to the missionaries, 
the Korean leaders stressed their alienation from the missionary presence in Korea. For 
instance, Yi Sŭng-hun insisted that   
 
This independence movement was organized only by our comrades and 
there was no involvement of foreigners or overseas Koreans… We did 
not need any foreign assistance to begin with for such an [easy] thing as 
submitting our declaration to the Japanese government.
542 
 
Pak Hŭi-do, a missionary protégée, echoed this sentiment: “I had no intention of borrowing 
help from the missionaries.”
543  Pak made this statement in spite of the fact that he 
personally felt indebted to his missionary mentors for the help they had extended to him in 
the past. While the representative of Japanese colonial authority may have taken these 
Korean voices as an effort to cover up missionary involvement, but Yun Ch’i-ho, who kept 
in touch with a broad range of Korean Christians for many years and observed the rising 
                                                   
542 Yi Sŭng-hun’s statement to the Prosecutor (3/6/1919), SDS vol.1, 148. 
543 Pak Hŭi-do’s statement to the Prosecutors, (3/9/1919), SDS vol.1,156.  
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tension between Korean Christian leaders and missionaries within the Church, had known 
that the Korean Christian leaders’ agony was real and becoming radicalized on the eve of 
the March First Movement.   
 
Yun Ch’i-ho’s Pessimistic Prospects for Missionary-Korean Relations 
  As mentioned above, Yun was close to Chŏng Ch’un-su and took kind and 
personal care of him as he was a young and promising minister of Yun’s denomination, 
Southern Methodist Church. Yun was well aware of the financial plight of the young 
Korean minister and cleared his debt for him in May, 1918, while criticizing the 
missionaries for their disinterest in the Korean ministers’ material welfare. By that time, 
Yun had known that Chŏng was frustrated not only by the lack of missionary sympathy for 
his financial plight, but also by their autocratic management of the Church and the mission 
schools. As early as September 1917, Chŏng had told Yun that he is “decidedly dissatisfied 
with the exclusive methods and manners of missionaries” and prophesized a more violent 
confrontation between missionaries and Korean Christians, which Yun worriedly recorded 
in his diary.   
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He [Chŏng] said to … me, "If the missionaries persist on their policy of 
exclusiveness―not consulting Koreans on church policy and education, 
etc.―there will be a church revolution soon." 
544 
   
According to Yun, Chŏng had already “showed signs of resistance [to missionaries] 
whenever he had chance” in church conferences and knew enough that the young minister 
was already pursuing ecclesiastical independence from the missionaries. 
  In July 1918, Yun witnessed another case in which his trusted young Korean 
Christian leader in Y.M.C.A. conflicted with a missionary and left his service. As 
mentioned above, Y.M.C.A. provided a comparatively free space for Korean nationalist 
leaders, who disliked the ecclesiastical control over them, yet even Y.M.C.A. was not free 
from missionary supervision.   
 
Yun Ki-wŏng, one of the best workers in the Industrial Dept. sent in his 
resignation. Yi In Yung tells me one of the reasons for this decision on 
the part of Yun is that Mr. Gregg [board member of Y] has been 
promising him now a raise in sal[ary] then a share in the profit, yet 
putting it off from week to week―Another reason is that he (Yun) is not 
given free hand in his department―too much interference and rude 
treatment.
545   
 
                                                   
544 Yun Ch’i-ho’s Diary (9/24/1917). 
545 Yun Ch’i-ho’s Diary (7/3/1918).  
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After observing the situation, Yun actually had come to the same conclusion with Chŏng 
that the Korean Christian revolt against the missionaries would have to happen. Yun 
prophesized: 
 
The arrogance and thoughtlessness of missionaries are alienating the 
Koreans in schools and churches where foreigners rule ―There will be a 
great revolt some day in near future on the part of the Koreans unless the 
missionaries change their attitude. What a pity!
546   
 
With this sense of urgency, Yun tried his best to alleviate to the tension between the 
missionaries and Korean Christian leaders. He actually told Samuel A. Moffett, the senior 
leader of the Presbyterian Mission that “there is gradual alienation between the Korean 
Church workers and the missionaries” and suggested “a Committee be appointed to 
investigate into the causes of this alienation.” Moffett agreed to Yun’s suggestion perfectly, 
and later a committee was appointed by the Council of Missions to investigate the cause of 
“gradual estrangement that exists in the relation between the missionaries and the Korean 
Christian leaders.”
547  Yet, Yun could not trust the missionary’s good will, confessing 
privately: 
 
                                                   
546 Yun Ch’i-ho’s Diary (9/9/1918). 
547 Yun Ch’i-ho’s Diary (9/11/1918).  
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But I fear nothing will come of it. The foreigners' contempt for Koreans 
is too profound to advise any advice. Final break or rebellion only will 
open the eyes of the missionaries―then may be too late.
548 
 
So, when the March First Movement took place, Yun knew well enough why some Korean 
Christian leaders were actively involved in it. Though it took the form of independence 
movement against Japanese, it had another aspect as a Christian “rebellion” against the 
missionaries who long suppressed Korean autonomy in the Church and schools. Yun did 
not endorse the independence movement itself since he was convinced direct confrontation 
with the Japanese would bring more harm to the Koreans than good and criticized the 
popular naïveté that western powers would intervene and help Korea win independence 
from Japanese.
549  Yet, Yun had been most sympathetic to the Korean Christian leaders’ 
agony under the missionary rule and predicted, though unhappily, that the Korean Christian 
frustration against missionaries would turn into action. While non-Christians might have 
                                                   
548 Yun Ch’i-ho’s Diary (9/9/1918). 
549 Yun’s reasons for non-participation in the movement were : “1. The question of Korean 
independence will have no occasion to appear in the Peace Conference. 2. There is no power 
in Europe or America which will be so foolish as to offend Japan by espousing the cause of 
Korea. 3. If independence were given us, we are not ready to be profited thereby. Japan gave 
us independence in 1894. What did we do with it. 4. When a weak race has to live with a 
strong one the former must win the good will of the latter as a matter of self-preservation. 5. 
This foolish agitation of the students are only prolonging the military administration of Korea. 
If shouting Manseis[sic] through the streets will win a national independence there can be no 
subject nation or race in the world! 6. Don't be deceived by schemers like the Ch’ŏndogyo 
people.” Yun Ch’i-ho’s Diary (3/2/1919).  
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not noticed, the Korean Christian leaders, though not representing the Church, were 
fighting for the two-front war in the March First Movement; they wanted to demonstrate 
their desire for liberation from both Japanese and the missionaries.   
   
Regional Deviation among the Participants     
  The fact that the Christian participants in the March First Movement were not 
sufficiently qualified to represent the Korean Church or the nation can be also seen from 
their strong regional character. The majority of Christian participants in the March First 
Movement, whether as leaders or as rank-and-file church members, were heavily 
concentrated in two particular regions, P’yŏngan Province and Seoul.     
  Table 2 shows the place of residence and origins of the Christian leaders who were 
prosecuted by the Japanese authorities for playing key roles in preparing the Declaration, 
regardless of whether they actually signed it or not. Out of these 23 Christian leaders, 11 
belonged to the Presbyterian Church of Korea 7 to the Northern Methodist, and 4 to the 
Southern Methodist Church. The denominational balance was more or less in accordance 
with the actual population of their respective churches at that time: Presbyterian, 70,000, 
Northern Methodist, 20,000, and Southern Methodist, 6,000. But their regional background  
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was conspicuously unbalanced. 11 out of 8 Presbyterians had a long record of residence in 
P’yŏngan Province and half of these were concentrated in the small county of Chŏngju. As 
mentioned above, this small town was home to Yi Sŭng-hun and his Osan School and his 
discretion in collecting signatures for the Declaration does explain this extreme regional 
deviation. 
All the leaders from P’yŏngan Province leaders unanimously testified that they 
decided to join the movement upon Yi Sŭng-hun’s persuasion. Yi met with Yi 
Myŏng-nyong, Yang Chŏn-baek, Kim Pyŏng-jŏ and Yu Yŏ-dae on the occasion of the 
Presbyterian Annual Meeting in Sŏnch’ŏn, where they gathered secretly in Yang’s private 
residence after the official event and agreed to join the independence movement, giving Yi 
their seals to be used for the petition to be prepared.
550  
  That Yi’s recruitment policy was not denominational but solely regional is also 
evidenced by the fact that he also approached Sin Hong-sik, a Methodist minister in 
P’yŏngyang and succeeded enlisting Sin among the signers. Sin then introduced Yi to Pak 
Hŭi-do, a Methodist minister in Seoul,
551  who became Yi’s contact to the Methodist 
                                                   
550 Yang Chŏnbaek’s testimony at Keijō Higher Court, (8/25/1919), SDS vol.2, 173; Yi 
Sŭnghun’s testimony in the Keijō Higher Court, (8/23/1919), SDS vol.2, 132-133. 
551 Sin Hŏnsik’s testimony at Keijō Local Court, (4/25/1919), SDS vol.1, 312-313.  
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leaders. Yi also recruited another young Methodist Minister, Kim Chi-hwan, a native from 
Chŏnju, who was fostered under Yi’s tutelage, though he resided in Kaesŏng at the time of 
the movement.
552 In sum, almost all the leaders from P’yŏngan Province were connected to 
Yi Sŭng-hun through his personal network and their selection as movement leaders had 
nothing to do with the institutional decisions of the Korean Church.   
                                                   
552 Yi Sŭnghun’s testimony at Keijō Higher Court, (8/23/1919), SDS vol.2, 126-127.  
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Table 2    Korean Christians who prepared Declaration of Independence 
553 
    Name  Age  Occupation 
Denominati
on 
Residence  Birth Place 
Sente
nce 
 
1  Pak Hŭi-do  31 
YMCA 
officer 
Northern 
Methodist 
Seoul 
Haeju, 
Hwanghae 
2 
2  Yi P'il-ju  52  Minister 
Northern 
Methodist 
Seoul 
Hongsŏng, 
S.Ch'unch'ong 
2 
3  Pak Tong-wan  35 
Writer,   
Christian News 
Northern 
Methodist 
Seoul 
Y a n g p ' y ŏ n g ,        
Kyŏnggi 
2 
4 
Kim 
Ch'ang-jun 
31  Minister 
Northern 
Methodist 
Seoul 
Kangsŏ,            
N.P'yŏngan 
2.6 
5 
Ch'oe 
Sŏng-mo 
47  Minister 
Northern 
Methodist 
Haeju, 
Hwagnhae 
Seoul  2 
6  Sin Hong-sik  49  Minister 
Northern 
Methodist 
P'yŏngyang  Seoul  2 
7 
Kim 
Sae-hwang 
32 
School 
teacher 
Northern 
Methodist 
Suwon, 
Kyŏnggi 
Suwŏn, 
Kyŏnggi 
0 
8 
Chŏng 
Ch’un-su 
45  Miniser 
Southern 
Methodist 
Wŏnsan, S. 
Hamgyŏng 
Ch'ŏngju, N. 
Ch'unch'ŏng 
1.6 
9  O Hwa-yŏng  41  Minister 
Southern 
Methodist 
Seoul 
P'yŏngsan, 
Hwanghae 
2.6 
10  Sin Sŏk-ku  46  Minister 
Southern 
Methodist 
Seoul 
Ch'ŏngju, N. 
Ch'unch'ŏng 
2 
11  Kim Chi-hwan  29  Minister 
Southern 
Methodist  
 
K a e s ŏ n g ,      
Kyŏnggi 
C h ŏ n g j u ,        
N.P'yŏngan 
0 
12  Yi Sŭng-hun  56  Elder  Presbyterian 
Chŏngju, 
N.P'yongan 
C h ŏ n g j u ,        
N.P'yŏngan 
3 
13 
Yi 
Myŏng-nyong 
48 
Farmer, 
Elder 
Presbyterian 
Chŏngju, 
N.P'yŏngan 
C h ' ŏ l s a n ,       
N.P'yŏngan 
2 
 
                                                   
553 GS 26, 504-511; Kidokkyo taepaekkwa sajŏn vol.3 (kidokkyomunsa, 1981), s.v. “Kim 
Pyŏng-jŏ.” Names in bold are the signers of the Declaration. Place names in North 
P'yongan Province are italicized.  
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Table 2    Korean Christians who prepared Declaration of Independence    (Continued) 
14  Kil Sŏn-ju  52  Minister  Presbyterian  P'yŏngyang 
Anju, 
N.P'yŏngan 
0 
15  Yu Yŏ-dae  42  Minister  Presbyterian 
Ŭiju, 
N.P'yŏngan 
Ŭiju, 
N.P'yŏngan 
2 
16 
Yang 
Chŏn-baek 
51  Minister  Presbyterian 
Sŏnch'ŏn, 
N.P'yongan 
Ŭiju, 
N.P'yŏngan 
2 
17  Kim Pyŏng-jŏ  42  Minister  Presbyterian 
Chŏngju, 
N.P'yŏngan 
C h ŏ n g j u ,      
N.P'yŏngan 
Exile 
to 
  18  Kim To-t'ae  29 
Unemployed 
(ex-school teacher) 
Presbyterian 
Chŏngju,   
N.P'yŏngan 
C h ŏ n g j u ,        
N.P'yŏngan 
0 
19  An Sae-hwan  33 
Secretary,Chrisian 
Literature Society 
Presbyterian  P'yŏngyang 
P'yŏngwon, 
S.P'yŏngan 
0 
20  Yi Kap-sŏng  32 
Officer, 
Severance 
 
 
Presbyterian  Seoul 
Taegu,             
N. Kyŏngsan   
2.6 
21  Ham T'ae-yŏng  48 
Elder, 
(ex-judge) 
Presbyterian  Seoul 
Mosan,      
N.Hamgyŏng 
2.6 
22  Chŏng No-sik  30  Unemployed  Presbyterian  Seoul 
T'aein, N. 
Chŏlla 
0 
23 
Kim 
Wŏn-byŏk 
27 
Student, Yŏnhŭi 
College 
  N/A  Seoul 
Ŭnyul, 
Hwanghae 
1.6 
 
Similarly, most of the Methodist participants were recruited through Pak Hŭi-do’s personal 
network, who had good connections with Christian intellectuals and students in Seoul as he 
was an active and popular officer of the Seoul Y.M.C.A.. Because the Y.M.C.A. was an 
ecumenical institution, Pak’s network reached out both to Presbyterians and Methodists 
regardless of their denomination. Among the signers, Chŏng Ch’un-su, Ch’oe Sŏng-mo, O  
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Hwa-yŏng, Pak Tong-wan, Yi P’il-ju, Yang Chŏn-baek, Yi Kap-sŏng and Yi Sŭng-hun were 
affiliates of Y.M.C.A.
554  Even if these men did not necessarily know each other well, the 
fact that they were acquainted with one another across denominational lines confirms the 
Y.M.C.A.’s character as a center for politically-minded Christians. Pak Hŭi-do met with Yi 
Sŭng-hun through Sin Hong-sik’s mediation and invited his Methodist and Y.M.C.A. 
colleagues to form an inter-denominational alliance. Consequently, the core of the 
Methodist group in the independence movement was constituted by those living in Seoul 
and its surrounding vicinity: 8 out of 11 Methodists came from Seoul and neighboring 
Kyŏnggi Province.   
 
Regional Composition of Rank-and-File Participants 
  The regional unbalance of participation in the March First Movement was not 
limited to its leadership. The same was true of the rank-and file Christians who participated 
in street demonstrations and other anti-Japanese uprisings all over the country. Table 3 
shows the religious affiliation of the Koreans who were arrested and formally prosecuted 
by Japanese authorities between March 1 and May 24. As the “prosecuted” can be 
                                                   
554 Chŏn T'aek-pu, "3.1 undong ŭi chongsin kwa kŭpaegyŏng,"119.  
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identified with those who participated in the movement most aggressively and were thus 
arrested by the Japanese as local movement leaders, we can reasonably estimate the general 
influence of Christians over the movement by analyzing their number among the 
“prosecuted.”    
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Table 3    Prosecuted Koreans for the March First demonstrations 
 
Methodist Presbyterian
Congregatio
nalist
Unknown Total
Seoul 12 5 154 72 40 1 74 187 7 707 417 1,489
Kaesŏng 1 8 8 45 1 55
Suwŏn 0 1 1
Ch'unch'ŏn 1 0 25 26
Wŏnju 0 2 3 5
TOTAL 13 5 155 0 80 40 1 74 195 7 779 422 1,576
Kongju 17 30 11 2 43 51 185 296
Taejŏn 1 0 36 37
Hongsŏng 0 24 3 27
Ch'ŏngju 1 2 3 2 1 6 103 29 141
TOTAL 1 0 20 0 33 13 0 3 49 0 214 217 501
Hamhung 184 95 3 98 82 278 642
Pukch'ŏng 3 0 9 12
Wŏnsan 1 7 11 18 1 22 42
Yŏnghŭng 1 0 5 6
Kangnŭng 3 6 6 80 1 90
Ch'ŏngjin 42 4 4 31 77
Sŏngjin 0 18 7 25
Hoeryŏng 7 7 6 13
TOTAL 0 0 234 0 13 117 0 3 133 1 244 295 907
P'yŏngyang 400 115 193 1 4 313 1 168 5 887
Tŏkch'ŏn 1 1 1 2 4
Chinnamp'p 3 16 19 20 39
Sinŭiju 1 2 124 13 206 1 220 81 79 507
Chŏngju 38 7 4 11 62 4 115
TOTAL 1 2 563 0 131 423 2 8 564 1 333 88 1,552
Haeju 137 60 95 9 164 4 405 710
Sŏhŭng 27 30 48 1 79 1 100 6 213
Caeryŏng 6 6 15 2 23
TOTAL 0 0 164 0 90 149 0 10 249 5 520 8 946
Taegu 11 1 212 1 1 214 5 216 72 519
Kumch'ŏn 8 8 6 24 38
Sangju 4 0 17 21
Andong 16 16 139 73 228
Ŭisŏng 7 7 14 27 48
Kyŏngju 1 1 1 17 19
Yŏngdŏk 32 2 34 2 3 39
Ulchin 2 2 22 24
TOTAL 15 0 0 1 0 277 1 4 282 5 417 216 936
Pusan 38 31 31 95 37 201
Ulsan 1 1 1 52 5 59
Masan 5 3 2 29 29 181 5 225
Miryang 0 30 30
T'ongyŏng 3 1 1 8 12
Chinju 4 3 1 6 3 9 174 191
Kŏch'ang 3 3 11 14
TOTAL 46 7 6 1 0 70 0 4 74 0 521 77 732
Kwangju 1 81 81 57 139
Sunch'ŏn 15 0 28 43
Mokp'o 3 16 1 17 49 69
Changhŭng 2 7 1 8 75 4 89
Cheju 1 1 28 29
Chŏnju 2 19 34 4 38 98 21 178
Kumsan 1 1 1 7 4 13
Namwon 11 0 11
Chŏngŭp 1 1 34 35
Kunsan 19 21 5 26 4 30 79
TOTAL 3 3 67 0 1 161 0 11 173 0 380 59 685
GRAND TOTAL 79 17 1,209 2 348 1,250 4 117 1,719 19 3,408 1,382 7,835
Percentage 1% 0 15% 0 4% 16% 0 2% 22% 0 43% 18% 100
Total Province Branch Office Buddhism Confuci
anism
Ch'ond
ogyo
Sach'on
ggyo
Protestantism
Catholicis
m
No
religion
Unknown
South Kyŏngsan
 Chŏlla
Source: Chōsen Sōtokufu,"Sōjōjiken kiso hikokunin no shinkyō betsu"(May 9, 1919) Japan Center for Asian Historical Records （http://www.jacar.go.jp） Ref. Code, C06031115800.
Translation mine.
 Kyŏnggi /Kangwon
Ch'unch'ong
Hamgyŏng
P'yŏngan
Hwanghae
North Kyŏngsan 
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According to these statistics, Christians made up 1,719 out of the 7,835 prosecuted, which 
roughly equals 22%. This statistic is often quoted as strong evidence that the Korean 
Church and their Christians led the March First Movement.
555  Indeed, the Christian 
percentage is disproportionally high when compared to the actual Christian population at 
that time, around 2% of the national population. Nonetheless, we should note that the 
regional distribution of Christian participants was so uneven that there is reason to question 
whether Christian participation was a prevailing feature of the movement when observed at 
the national level. 34% of the Presbyterian participants (423 / 1,250) were concentrated in 
P’yŏngan Province, 22% (277 / 1,250) were in Northern Kyŏngsang Province, and 16% 
(161 / 1,250) in Chŏlla Province. Thus, the top three provinces produced more than 60% of 
the Presbyterian participants. Likewise, 38% of the Methodists (131/ 348) were also 
concentrated in P’yŏngan Province, 25% (90/ 348) in Hwanghae, and 23% (72 / 348) in 
Kyŏnggi, together constituting more than 80% of the total number of Methodist 
participants.   
  A closer look at the place of residence of these participants reveals that they were 
even more narrowly concentrated within each province in a few particular cities or counties. 
                                                   
555 For instance, Hanʾguk Kidokkyosa Yŏng̕uhoe, Hanʾguk Kidokkyo ŭi yŏksa (Sŏul: Kidok 
Kyomunsa, 1989), 38-39.  
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In P’yŏngan Province, more than 94% of the Presbyterian participants were arrested in 
P’yŏngyang (193) and Sinŭiju (206) alone. In North Kyŏngsang, Taegu alone produced 
over 75% of the participants, while Hamhŭng produced 81% of all Hamgyŏng participants. 
The same trend applies to Methodist participants: P’yŏngyang constituted 86% (115 / 131) 
of the total in P’yŏngan Province, Haeju held 66% (60 / 90) in Hwanghae and Seoul 
occupied 90% (72/ 80) of participants in Kyŏnggi. In short, far from being a “national” 
phenomenon, Christian participation in the movement was narrowly limited to a few 
specific sites within large provinces. 
  On the other hand, the narrow geographical concentration of the Christians marks 
quite a contrast to the universal distribution of non-Christian participants. For instance, the 
number of those “without religious affiliation,” namely the masses at large, also tended to 
concentrate in Seoul and Haeju, but their numbers were far more evenly distributed within 
each province, when compared to those of the Christians. Also, these “unaffiliated” 
participants were active in many regions where little or no Christian participation was 
observed. From these observations, it is estimated that, excepting a few locations where the 
concentration of Christian participation was conspicuous, Christian influence over other 
participants was not as significant as has been previously thought. As evidence for this  
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argument, we may cite the fact that the ratio of Christian participants to total participants in 
Kyŏnggi and North Kyŏngsang Province was only 12 % and 10 % respectively in spite of 
the fact that both provinces produced the largest number of Christian participants. Hence, 
the Christians were a minority in the March First Movement and outnumbered by 
non-Christian participants, even if they were more active than other religions. Like their 
leaders who prepared the Declaration of Independence, the rank-and-file Christian 
participants in the March First Movement were also regionally biased and unable to 
mobilize Christians in other regions. If the Korean Church was a national institution 
exercising control over all Christian constituencies and had injected its institutional 
resources, both material and human, in support of the March First Movement, Christian 
participants may have appeared more broadly across Korea. That this did not happen is due 
to the fact that Christian participants, whether leaders or rank-and-file, had only limited 
institutional power to move the Korean Church, an institution that had long been trained 
and controlled by foreign missionaries to remain aloof of nationalist politics.   
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Epilogue 
 
The March First Movement exposed a schism between Christian nationalists and 
the Korean Church under Mission rule. This schism took the form of a protest against the 
Japanese colonial regime, but it also had the additional dimension of a nationalist rebellion 
against the Korean Church that had long suppressed the activities of nationalists within the 
Korean Church and censored believers to prevent their infection by nationalist thought from 
without. Christian participation in the nationalist movement thus meant subverting 
ecclesiastical conventions and declaring their independence from missionary authority.   
There were, of course, some Christian leaders who participated in the 
independence movement without a clear understanding of what the cost of such 
participation would be and how it would affect their relation to the Korean Church. In the 
aftermath of the March First Movement, however, even they had to realize the need to take 
a clear position between the nationalist camp and church authority. The relationship 
between the two forces was growing too contentious to allow for a neutral position.   
 
Christian Nationalists after the March First Movement  
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  The Christian nationalists who had been already critical of the apolitical stance of 
the Korean Church chose to remain outside the Church and continued to take part as 
Christian individuals in various nationalist programs even after the March First Movement 
failed to bring about immediate national independence. Rather than fade away, their 
nationalist movement gained stronger momentum in the 1920s due to the new Japanese 
colonial administration under Governor-General Saitō Makoto, who took a more 
conciliatory approach, the so-called policy of “Cultural Rule,” to managing rising Korean 
nationalism and providing greater public space in which Koreans could discuss and pursue 
their nationalist ideals within a colonial framework. During this period, greater freedom of 
assembly was secured, the notorious Commercial Law that restricted Korean commercial 
enterprise was abolished, and many publications in Korean language, including daily 
newspapers, were permitted.   
All of this was particularly good news for Korean Christians, whose freedom of 
speech and social activities had been suppressed within the Church organization. They no 
longer needed to rely on the Korean Church and other religious institutions as an expedient 
means to pursue their own socio-political activities. They could now organize civil societies 
on their own, establish commercial corporations and publish newspapers and journals for  
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their nationalist cause. It is not the case that “Cultural Rule” granted full civil liberties to 
Koreans; it did, however, create an alternative space for Korean Christians to pursue their 
socio-political objectives outside the Korean Church.   
In fact, the major Christian nationalists who participated in the March First 
Movement unanimously competed over this newly created public space and launched new 
movements within it. Yi Sŭng-hun, who was released from prison in 1922, returned to his 
hometown and resumed educational work at Osan School. He also joined the movement by 
leading intellectuals and educationalists such as Yun Ch’i-ho to establish the first university 
in Korea.
556  The university was planned as a secular institution open to all Korean students 
without any relationship to the Church. By that time, there was already Sungsil College in 
P’yŏngyang and the Chōsen Christian College (Yŏnhŭi chŏnmun hakkyo) in Seoul, but Yi 
Sŭng-hun and Yun Ch’i-ho wanted to establish a separate secular university that would be 
Korean-financed and –managed rather than attempt to improve the existing mission 
institutions. For Korean nationalists, the nationality of the school was more important than 
its religious identity. 
                                                   
556 Namgang munhwa chaedan, Namgang Yi Sŭng-hun kwa minjok undong, 270-271.  
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The “national university” (millip taehakkyo) plan ultimately proved abortive due to 
the refusal of the colonial government to permit it amid plans to establish the first imperial 
university in Korea. Nevertheless, Yi Sŭng-hun quickly found another forum in which to 
pursue his nationalist ideals. He was invited by the Tonga Ilbo newspaper company to 
assume its chief executive office.
557  The Tonga Ilbo was a daily newspaper, established by 
a group of secular entrepreneurs. It was headed by Kim Sŏng-su (1891-1955), a leading 
Korean capitalist and the president of the Kyŏngsŏng Spinning Company
558  and, along 
with its rival newspaper, Chosŏn Ilbo, was a product of the “Cultural Rule” policy of 
permitting more Korean language publications. Thus, it had every reason to hire Yi 
Sŭng-hun not as a Christian leader, but as a renowned nationalist.   
In fact, the newly established nationalist media generally promoted a critical view 
of the Korean Church, especially its denationalizing tendencies, and Christian nationalists, 
who had become alienated from the Church, joined in this nationalist critique of Korean 
Christianity. A symbolic example of this trend may be cited in Yi Sang-jae’s public 
                                                   
557 Ibid.,273-274. 
558 For the development of capitalism in colonial Korea during the life-time of Kim Sŏng-su, 
see Carter J. Eckert, Offspring of empire : the Koch'ang Kims and the colonial origins of 
Korean capitalism, 1876-1945, Korean studies of the Henry M. Jackson School of 
International Studies (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991).   
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denunciation of Korean Christians for discontinuing the practice of traditional ancestral 
worship, an incident that was publicized in the Chosŏn Ilbo in September 1920. Yi blamed 
the missionaries for defining the traditional Korean practice of venerating parents as idol 
worship and urged that Koreans “should not forget Korean spirit [chosŏn hon] even in the 
realm of religion.”
559   
This kind of nationalist critique of Korean Christian practice and subservience to 
the missionaries had already circulated among Korean intellectuals prior to March First. 
That it was now disseminated through the popular media by one of the most prominent 
Christians in Korea such as Yi Sang-jae, however, was a phenomenal change. Given that 
there were several Christian papers such as Christian News (kidok sinbo), Yi could have 
raised his criticisms through the Christian media as an attempt at reformation within the 
Church establishment. However, these media outlets were all owned by the Missions and Yi 
must have known that they would never provide such space for him, who had long 
distanced himself from the Church and devoted himself to educational causes through the 
Y.M.C.A. In any case, Yi Sang-jae chose to challenge ecclesiastical authority not from 
within, but from without, with the backing of secular nationalists.   
                                                   
559 Chosŏn Ilbo (9/1/1920), 3.  
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The Korean Christian Approach to Communism 
Some Christian intellectuals turned to socialism as a new vision for the nation in 
the post-March First era. Communist thought had already been introduced into Korea from 
Japan prior to March First, but it gained a broader currency among Korean intellectuals in 
the 1920s as Japanese censorship loosened and the intellectual importing from Japan 
increased. Among such left-leaning intellectuals was one veteran of March First, Pak 
Hŭi-do, a signatory of the Declaration of Independence, who ignored the missionary 
persuasion to participate in the movement.   
When Pak was released from prison, he did not return to the pulpit, but instead 
launched a magazine, Sinsaenghwal (New Life) which he served as chief editor, to promote 
social reform ideals with a leftist bent. For this endeavor, he was quickly targeted by the 
Japanese thought police and sent to jail again when he publicized an article in 1922 to 
commemorate the fifth anniversary of the Russian Revolution.
560  After his second release 
from prison, he increasingly collaborated with Japanese colonial authority and established a 
Japanese-language journal in the 1930s to promote the Japanese imperialist cause. The 
                                                   
560 Ch’inil Inmyŏng Sajŏn (minjok munje yŏn’guso, 2009) s.v. “Pak Hŭi-do.”  
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motive behind his conversion to communism and then to Japanese imperialism deserves its 
own study. Suffice it to note here that both ideologies advocated anti-western imperialism 
and could have appealed to Pak, who had observed a form of western imperialism in the 
Church.   
By contrast, Pak’s comrade-in-arms, Kim Ch’ang-jun, the other Methodist minister 
who signed the Declaration of Independence, returned to the pulpit after his release from 
prison. He seems to have repented and pledged allegiance to the Mission again. This 
change of heart is suggested by the fact that he was sent to study theology in the United 
States with missionary support, which was quite a privilege at that time. Yet, when he 
returned home again to assume a professorship at the Methodist seminary in the 1930s, he 
began to show interest in balancing Christianity with communism. He then publicized his 
view as “Jesus Socialism” (yesu sahoechuŭi), the Korean version of Christian Socialism.
561 
He subsequently left Korea for Manchuria in the late 1930s to put his ideals into practice 
and when he returned home after Korean Liberation in 1945, he was more deeply 
committed to communism and eventually migrated to North Korea.
562 
                                                   
561 Yu Tong-sik, Hanʾguk kamni kyohoe ŭi yŏksa : 1884-1992 I, 552. 
562 Kidokkyo tae paekkwa sajōn vol.3, s.v. “Kim Ch’ang-jun.”  
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The Christian inclination toward communism was not limited to elite intellectuals, 
but is also observable among the rank-and-file Christian youth. Kim San, a pseudonym of 
Chang Chi-rak, was a student at a mission school in northern Korea, who participated in 
street demonstrations on March First. He believed that Christian pacifism and non-violent 
demonstration would bring immediate independence to Korea. However, he was 
completely disillusioned to see his Christian ideals trampled by brute Japanese force. He 
later recalled how this experienced had changed his life and thought. 
 
Before March First I had attended church regularly. I had never 
questioned the fact that the Christian church was the best institution in 
Korea, though I thought praying futile. After this debacle my faith was 
broken. I thought there was certainly no God and that the teachings of 
Christ had little application for the world of struggle into which I had 
been born.
563 
 
Moreover, the American missionaries’ reaction to the March First Movement and their 
religious bias against Korean involvement in politics completely disillusioned him of the 
Christian West. 
 
One thing in particular made me angry… was hearing an American 
missionary tell the people, “God is punishing Korea for the mistakes she 
                                                   
563 Kim San and Nym Wales, Song of Ariran : a Korean Communist in the Chinese 
revolution (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1972), 83.  
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has made. Now Korea is suffering to pay for these. Later God will let her 
recover after penance is done. When God wills, Korea will get her 
independence, not before.” Why should Korea be the only nation to 
practice Christian ethics, I asked myself. In Europe the Christian nations 
did not turn the other cheek… To fight was to gain victory. Only to pray 
was to ensure failure… March First was the beginning of my political 
career. A torment entered my soul and mind. All over Korea, young men 
felt the same.
564 
 
This experience led Kim San to conclude that something was missing from Christianity and 
this conclusion turned him toward communism, which promised a revolution by means of 
physical force. Eventually, Kim moved to China and joined the Red Army to achieve his 
goal.   
 
Perseverance for Vengeance 
     Ham T’ae-yŏng, the Presbyterian ringleader of the March First movement, entered 
the Presbyterian seminary and started a new career as an ordained minister after graduation. 
Thereafter, he continued to rise in the church hierarchy and established himself as an 
influential leader of the Presbyterian Church. However, as he gained power, he also began 
                                                   
564 Ibid., 83.  
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to challenge ecclesiastical authority of the conservative missionaries and their loyal 
followers.   
He later allied with the Methodist dissenter, Sin Hŭng-u, and established an 
interdenominational parachurch organization, the Positive Faith Association (chŏkkŭk 
sinangdan), the purpose of which was to abolish traditional Church doctrines and by-laws 
imposed by the Missions and to promote a more liberal faith among Korean 
Christians.
565Interestingly, his comrade from March First, Pak Hŭi-do, joined the 
Association and helped his challenge to ecclesiastical authority. Needless to say, the 
Association caused a strong reaction from the conservative Church and the Missions and 
Ham was pressed to dissolve the Association or leave the Church. He resisted, but 
eventually surrendered to pressure and chose to acquiesce in the inevitable. Nevertheless, 
he rebelled again in 1939 by establishing a new Presbyterian seminary, Chosŏn Sinhag-wŏn 
(Korean Theological Seminary) in Seoul with a formal permit from the Japanese 
authorities.
566  This seminary was the first seminary that was owned and run by Koreans 
                                                   
565 Kidokkyo taebaekkwa sajŏn vol.16, s.v. “Ham T’ae-yŏng.” 
566Yŏndong kyohoe, ed. Yŏndong Kyohoe 100-Yŏnsa 1894-1994 , 267.  
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and intended to challenge the mainstream Presbyterian seminary in Pyŏngyang that had 
been dominated by the Mission and used to propagate conservative theological ideas.
567   
  Similarly, Chŏng Ch’un-su, the most articulate critic of missionary rule over the 
Korean Church, chose to persevere in the Church for a while after March First, but 
gradually moved to challenge missionary authority. He resumed his ministry upon release 
from prison and devoted himself to the administration of the Church, which promoted him 
to high office by the 1930s.
568  At this time, he was once again arrested and imprisoned by 
the Japanese on charges of conspiring to form an underground anti-Japanese movement and 
communicating with Syngman Rhee in the United States. There is no way to know whether 
Chŏng actually did conspire against the Japanese empire. At a minimum, however, it is 
significant that the Japanese watched Chŏng for his advocacy of Korean national 
independence. Yet, after his second release, he began to urge reformation of the Korean 
Church, by which he meant adopting a more liberal faith and greater independence from 
missionary supervision. His anti-missionary stance won him the trust of Japanese colonial 
authority and, just as Pak Hŭi-do did, he collaborated increasingly with the Japanese. As the 
tension between Japan and the United States heightened in the late 1930s, Chŏng was 
                                                   
567 Kidokkyo taebaekkwa sajŏn vol.16, s.v. “Ham T’ae-yŏng.” 
568 Kidokkyo taebaekkwa sajŏn vol.13, s.v. “Chŏng Ch’un-su.”   
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elected Superintendent of the Korean Methodist Church and led the Christians to work for 
the Japanese imperial cause to fight against western imperialism.
569   
  Reviewing the life path of these veterans of March First, one notes that their dual 
desire for national independence from Japan and ecclesiastical independence from the 
Mission continued to confront them with a difficult question. There is no doubt that 
increasing Japanese pressure and violence had much to do with their pro-Japanese 
collaboration, but their challenge to missionary authority with Japanese support was not a 
new phenomenon in colonial Korea. It was already visible in the 1910s, when 
independent-spirited Church leaders began to transfer their allegiances to the Japanese 
Congregationalist Church en masse. In the 1930s, these veterans of the March First 
movement came to reach the same conclusion as the Korean Congregationalists had in the 
1910s. When the increasing Korean Christian desire for the ecclesiastical independence was 
matched with their decreasing hopes for immediate national independence, they seem to 
have placed priority on former independence and taken advantage of Japanese support to 
achieve  it.    
 
                                                   
569 Ibid.  
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Return to Church Loyalty   
  While many Christian veterans of March First experienced many ups and downs 
over their continuous efforts for national independence both within and without the Church, 
the two reluctant participants in the movement, Kil Sŏn-ju and Yang Chŏn-baek, whose 
names were misused for the Declaration of Independence, returned to a simple and pietistic 
life as mainstream Presbyterian ministers. Kil was released ahead of other ministers as he 
was not sentenced to a prison term due to insufficient evidence, the only defendant to 
receive a de facto non-guilty sentence among the 33 signers of the Declaration of 
Independence. While he waited for the final verdict in his detention cell, he is said to have 
devoted himself to the reading of St. John’s Revelation and religious meditation.
570 
Spiritually renewed, Kil returned to the pulpit in his Church in Pyŏngyang and continued to 
preach salvation from sin and hope for new life in the other world. His fame as a powerful 
evangelist never faded and he was invited to numerous revival meetings all over the country. 
Never again was Kil misled into joining any political intrigues and he ended his career as 
an orthodox Presbyterian minister within the established framework of the Church. 
                                                   
570 Kil Chin-gyŏng, Yŏnggye Kil Sŏn-ju (Sŏul Chongno Sŏjŏk 1980), 278-279.  
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Yang Chŏn-baek returned to his hometown in Sŏnch’ŏn and continued his ministry. His 
loyalty to the Presbyterian Church was not shaken in the post-March First period and he 
was appointed by the Church to an internal committee to compile the history of the Korean 
Presbyterian Church.
571  This appointment was doubtlessly a great honor for the senior 
minister and recognition of his long service for the Church by the foreign missionaries. Of 
course, he stayed out of politics and quietly ended his life in 1933, two years before Kil 
Sŏn-ju’s death.   
The continuity of the conservative and pietistic tradition of the Korean Presbyterian 
Church was clearly manifest in the makeup of its executive church officers. In the fall of 
1919, the General Assembly of the Korean Presbyterian Church elected Samuel A. Moffett 
as its Moderator.
572  This paramount office had been occupied by missionaries for the first 
few years since the foundation of the Korean Presbyterian Church in 1907, but was passed 
over to Koreans from 1915 through 1918.
573  As if to turn the back the clock by ten years, 
however, the Korean delegates to the assembly returned the office to missionary control 
                                                   
571 Kidokkyo taebaekkwa sajŏn vol.12, s.v. Yang Chŏng-baek.” 
572 F.S. Miller, “The Korean General Assembly,”Korea Mission Field (November 1919): 
240. 
573 Chŏng In-gwa, ed. Yasogyo changnohoe yŏngam (Keijō: Chosŏn yasogyo changnohoe 
ch’onghoe,1940), 7.  
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after the March First Movement. This decision may have been an emergency measure 
adopted in response the absence of qualified leaders in the wake of Japanese arrests. Even 
allowing for this possibility, however, there were still “sixty-nine [Korean] pastors, seventy 
elders” along with “fifty-six missionaries” who responded to the roll call in the 
Assembly.
574  Moreover, according to F. S. Miller (NP), Moffett was elected in spite of the 
fact that his fellow missionaries “voted for a Korean candidate [out of] habit” to let a 
Korean pastor take office. Hence, the election of a missionary Moderator in spite of a 
Korean majority in the assembly and missionary support for a Korean candidate furnishes 
indisputable proof of how much the Korean Church remained dependent upon missionary 
power in time of need. As a matter of fact, the election convinced the missionaries of how 
much “the Koreans are determined to have Dr. Moffett preside and probably they are wise 
under the present political conditions.”
575 
    Such a strategic decision has to remind us of the early Christian converts who 
often sought missionary protection. By 1920, the missionaries had lost their extraterritorial 
privileges, but they were not colonial subjects and stood on par with the Japanese. Thus, the 
                                                   
574 Ibid., 40. 
575 Ibid., 40.  
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Korean church leaders had a reason to seat the missionary at the head of the Church, whom 
they expected to be a buffer, if not an aegis, to the persecuting Japanese in time of need.   
  In the following year, the General Assembly elected Kim Ik-tu (1874-1950) as the 
new Moderator to replace Moffett. The return of a Korean Moderator was s small step 
toward the normalization of church management, but Kim was not the type of leader who 
would do anything for the advancement of national independence. Kim was a typical 
Korean minister at the time. He came from humble origins and received little modern 
education, but was handpicked by a missionary to become a minister. By then, he was a 
popular revivalist and known for his extraordinary spiritual power such as faith-healing. 
Hence, with the assumption of the office of Moderator, he had his supporters compile the 
stories of his miracle and published it as “The Evidence of Miracles” in which tales of his 
fascinating healing of the sick, the blind and the lame filled over the pages.
576  Moreover, as 
he believed his miraculous powers were sufficiently proven, he let his follower ministers 
raise a motion in the General Assembly to revise the Constitution of the Presbyterian 
Church that denied the possibility of miracles.
577   
                                                   
576 Ijŏk ch’ŭngmyŏng,  (chosŏn yaso kyoso hoe, 1921) 
577 Kidokkyo taebaekkwa sajŏn vol.3, s.v. Kim Ik-tu.”  
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Kim’s faith-healing gained great popularity and the revival meeting he organized 
in Seoul in 1920 gathered more than 10,000 believers. While the sober, intellectual, and 
passionate nationalist Christian leaders were jailed for organizing the national 
independence movement, the majority of Korean church leaders and believers, in contrast, 
flocked around the revivalist-Moderator instead of nationalist fighters and indulged in a 
religious enthusiasm for his miracle. In the end, the March First Movement did not bring 
about any change in the fundamental character of the Korean Church. It was, as it had been, 
a society of the oppressed masses, who had little interest in nationalist politics, but gathered 
at the Church in search for various merits ranging from physical safety to religious 
salvation and healing.   
    The Christian indulgence in religious enthusiasm at a time of national crisis was 
enough to make Korean nationalists abandon the Church. Looking at the Korean Christians’ 
continuous negligence of national affairs, the new nationalist media could not but renounce 
the Church as a whole. A popular journal Kaebyŏk, edited by leftist intellectuals, called 
Kim Ik-tu a “crazy pastor” and blamed the Church for letting him disseminate superstitious 
beliefs among the Christians of the “ignorant class.”
578  The Tonga Ilbo also ran a critical 
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article on the false faith-healing and other supposed miracles by Kim, while also 
mentioning that sober Christians were now opposed to Kim’s leadership. The Church, 
however, did not listen to such criticism but instead sent a letter of objection to the Tonga 
Ilbo, demanding that the article be rescinded.
579   
 
Missionary Responses to “Cultural Rule” 
  When the excitement of March First and the brutal Japanese suppression subsided, 
the majority of the missionaries also returned back to the everyday job of cultivating 
Korean faith. Their anger against the Japanese empire’s cruel treatment of innocent 
Koreans certainly led them to stand with Koreans and win the trust of some nationalists. 
Such solidarity, however, did not last long. They were soon captivated by the new 
Governor-General, attracted not only by his liberal policies but also by his personal 
character and sympathy for the Christian cause, and became more conforming toward the 
Japanese colonial administration. Indeed, the new Governor and his administration brought 
many changes to colonial administration, especially in its relation to the missionary and the 
Church.   
                                                   
579 Tonga Ilbo (5/15/1926, 5/25/1926).  
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First, Saitō Makoto and his wife sought to develop personal relations with the 
missionaries. Saitō had spent four years in Washington D.C. as a young Naval Attaché to 
the Japanese Legation from 1884 to 1888 and had a good command of English as well as a 
good sense of western culture and taste. He could speak with the missionaries directly and 
cultivate their personal trust. Mrs. Saitō Makoto was equally adept at improving relations 
with the missionaries as she was a graduate from a Methodist mission school (Tōyō eiwa 
jogakuin) in Japan and had a good understanding of the missionary cause.
 580  They often 
invited the missionaries to various formal and informal gatherings at the 
Government-General and entertained them well with honored guests, while listening 
sympathetically to missionary ideas and works. 
The Saitō administration also opened a new office, the Religious Affairs Section 
(shūkyōka), through which missionaries could file complaints and requests pertaining to 
religious matters. Saitō also brought with him a high-ranking officer and translator, Oda 
Yasuma, who was a graduate of Ohio Wesleyan College and a practicing Christian. Oda 
became an important intermediary in all the important matters between Mission and 
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1919): 199-200.  
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Government and his sincere work to improve relations between the two parties was 
“regarded most highly by the entire missionary community.”
581   
  There were of course more visible improvements too. The notorious government 
ordinance of 1915 was revised in 1920 and mission schools were given the right to teach 
religion. Also, in 1923, the Government issued a proclamation to the effect that private 
schools which meet the governmental standard may be “designated” as the equivalent of 
Government schools.
582  This policy change saved many mission schools, especially 
Presbyterian ones, from scheduled shut-down, which was supposed to happen in 1925 
according to the previous ordinance that had prohibited religious teaching in private schools 
after the ten-year grace period. The effect of this proclamation was immediate and “created 
an attitude of friendliness and co-operation between the Government officials and church 
leaders.”
583  The Government also allowed the Missions and Churches to establish their 
properties as “foundational juridical persons” (zaidan hōjin). This was also a legal revision 
missionaries had desired for some time to allow for convenient management of their 
Mission properties.   
                                                   
581 Rhodes and Campbell, History of the Korea mission, Presbyterian Church U. S. A. 
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  Of course, the missionaries were not entirely happy with the new administration. 
They suffered continuous annoyances from suspicious police, censorship of their 
publications, and interference with public ceremonies on the Sabbath day, etc.
584 
Nonetheless, Herbert E. Blair (1879-1945, NP) after observing the administrative transition 
from the Chosŏn dynasty to the Japanese colonial government saw that “the benefits of 
Japanese occupation upon the Church have been many.” 
 
Sunday has been made an official holiday. Peace and security of life and 
property has been given. Government regulations have taught efficiency. 
The Church of Korea has been given legal recognition and the 
incorporation of church bodies guarantees church and denominational 
property rights.
585 
 
When Saitō resigned his office in 1928 to serve as Ambassador Plenipotentiary to the 
Washington Conference, the Presbyterian Mission sent a congratulatory letter and 
expressed their sincere expression of friendship, to which Saito responded with equal 
friendliness: “As I look back on the past eight years and more during which I held office as 
Governor-General of Chosen, I recall with much pleasure the cordial relation that existed 
                                                   
584 Ibid..503-4. 
585  ,Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. Korea Mission, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
Korea Mission of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 1884-1934, 118.  
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between all of you and myself.”
586  The friendly relationship was sustained even after Saitō 
left Korea in the 1930s when the fourth degree of the Order of the Sacred Treasure was 
conferred upon O. R. Avison (NP) in recognition of his forty-years of medical service and 
Samuel A. Moffett (NP) was presented with a gold medal in recognition of his 
distinguished service in the field of education.
587  So, it is not at all surprising that many 
missionaries later recalled the Saitō administration with much admiration and nostalgia. 
Even a known anti-Japanese missionary, Duncan MacRae (1868-1949, Canadian 
Presbyterian, “CP”), mourned Saitō’s death at the hands of rebel soldier in the famous 
February 26 Incident of 1936, writing to his family on that day : “Something has happened 
in Japan today. All kinds of rumours, Stock exchange closed, the Palace occupied, and a 
number crossed the Jordan to the land from which they do not return. The dearly loved 
Saito among them.”
588   
 
Missionary Relations with the Korean Church 
                                                   
586 Rhodes and Campbell, History of the Korea mission, Presbyterian Church U. S. A. 
1884-1934, 505. 
587 Ibid.504-505. 
588 Lee and Penner, A tiger on dragon mountain : the life of Rev. Duncan M. MacRae, D.D., 
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As missionary relations with the Government improved, its relations with the 
Korean Church and its loyal Christians remained unchanged. The missionaries were 
disturbed by the participation of some Christian nationalists in the March First Movement, 
but they knew that many of these were urban intellectuals only loosely affiliated with the 
Church, and did not represent the majority of Korean Christians. On the basis of their 
experience as long-serving field managers, the missionaries felt confident that the majority 
of Koreans, who mostly resided in the countryside, remained loyal to their ecclesiastical 
authority, detached from turbulent politics, and devoted to the religious cause.   
In fact, the General Assembly of 1919 was the best occasion for missionaries to 
confirm their confidence in Korean Christians. The missionaries were gladdened not so 
much by the election of a missionary-Moderator by the Korean delegates but by the fact 
that “one characteristic of the meeting… in this time of trial” was “the evident 
determination of the delegates that world politics shall not be allowed to enter their spiritual 
assembly.”
589   
For the missionaries, then, the primary task in the post-March First era was not to 
lead the Korean Church to adapt to the rise of nationalist sentiment in secular society, but to 
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protect the Church from any dangerous influence. In particular, they were wary of 
nationalists who maintained nominal affiliations with the Church but engaged in politics in 
the name of Christianity. Hence, they tightened their grip over Korean Christian 
participation in politics and continued to purify the Church of political activism. This policy 
was loyally pursued and continued through the 1920s and 1930s.   
There were a few exceptional missionaries who astutely observed that the time had 
come to change conventional mission policy to adapt to socio-political changes that 
happened under the Japanese colonial regime, especially, in urban centers. For instance, 
James S. Gale, who interacted closely with Korean intellectuals in Seoul, understood that 
the Mission’s negligence of modern education for Korean Christians completely isolated 
them from the rest of society, where people could access modern scientific knowledge and 
learn critical views of religion through secular education at public schools and media 
without intermediation of the Church or the Mission. Though his message came rather 
belatedly, Gale felt compelled to urge his fellow missionaries that 
 
Modern education, be it ever so superficial, so defective, so much mixed 
and compounded of East and West, is a mighty factor in the city of Seoul. 
Therefore, the pastor must himself have explored, seen, and known its 
world if he would appeal to the educated classes about him. The day of  
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the old pastor who hardly knows that the world is round, is gone never to 
return.   
 
Moreover, he stressed that English and Japanese had become necessary means of leading 
the growing number of educated Koreans.   
 
As a sine qua non of special knowledge he should read and speak freely 
both Japanese and English. He needs Japanese to live comfortably and 
carry on his work as pastor under the present administration; he needs it 
to be at home with the student class who use Japanese freely; he needs it 
to know what present day thoughts rule the minds of his people. He needs 
English, on the other hand, as the great reservoir of Christian thought. 
English literature is permeated with the teachings of the Bible and no man 
in Asia can be a leader in the Church without being able to read English 
books… English is an absolute necessity.
590 
 
Nonetheless, Gale’s suggestions were too demanding and came too late, given that his 
Mission had neglected the education of Korean pastors over three decades. In fact, among 
the two hundred Korean graduates of the Presbyterian seminary from 1907 to 1919, who 
constituted the core leadership of the Korean Church, only three were college graduates, 
nine Academy graduates, and around thirty with some academic training, and “the rest had 
only the old Chinese style education and a very small number could not even read 
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Chinese.”
591  As for English and Japanese literacy, “of the last five classes graduated, 
practically all of the men have some knowledge and perhaps twenty men have some 
knowledge of English.” In other words, the vast majority of the Korean pastors could read 
neither Japanese nor English. Considering that there was a serious lack of Korean textbooks 
even for elementary education, Korean students must have learned not by reading but by 
listening to their missionary teachers, inheriting their conservative religious thought, 
without being challenged by secular thoughts and ideas which were inaccessible to them 
due to limited literacy in foreign languages.   
  In any case, liberal critics urging the need of Korean education were a minority 
voice easily overshadowed by the conservative majority. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, 
their recommendations were never put into practice. It was thus not surprising that Gordon 
Holdcroft (NP), one of the leading conservatives, still held strongly in the 1930s that the 
current dangers for the Korean Church and the Mission were “secular education”, “an 
attempt to promote state [shinto] religion”, “material allurement” and “communists and 
other thoughts from [the] North,” and lamented the rise of “modernism... a weakness, a 
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treachery, a betrayal in the ranks of our own ‘Christian’ constituency.”
592  Simply put, 
except for the Japanese imposition of Shinto, anything that was attractive to Koreans in the 
post- March First period was what the missionaries wanted to deprive of the Korean 
Christians. Therefore, when Robert Greison (1868-1965, CP) casually mentioned that “our 
tenure of leadership is temporary” in Korea right after the March First, this was no more 
than lip service paid to Koreans. The true intentions of the missionary were better reflected 
in the passage below. 
 
In all our policies we should estimate in the back of our imaginations 
what the conditions will be like when we surrender the staff of office to 
our successors. We should not do thing that they [Koreans] will have to 
undo. We should build our foundations broad enough for Korean 
Christianity to build upon.
 593 
 
We can see clearly here how the missionary perception of Koreans remained surprisingly 
intact over a dozen of years, even after their witnessing the eruption of Korean nationalism 
in the March First Movement. While they might have sympathized with the innocent 
Koreans who suffered from indiscriminate Japanese suppression, they had far less 
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sympathy for the Korean desire for national independence both within and without the 
Church. Rather, seeing some Korean Christians “betray” the Church and participate in 
politics, they were all the more convinced of their divine role as guardian angels of the 
Korean Church protecting weak Korean Christians from a dangerous secular world.   
In 1934, the Presbyterian Mission celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the Mission 
and held a series of ceremonial events in Seoul that lasted several days. As mentioned in the 
beginning of this study, the 100
th anniversary of Korean Christianity in 1984 was hosted by 
the Korean Church and the missionaries were praised as benefactors of the Korean nation. 
However, the 50
th anniversary was neither organized by nor celebrated for the Korean 
Church. The official title of the anniversary was the “50
th Anniversary of the Korea Mission 
of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.,” and not that of the Korean Church. The 
centrality of the mission was clearly seen in the fact that no Korean guest was invited to 
make a speech or present a paper at the opening ceremony. The only foreign guest of honor 
was a high-ranking Japanese government officer who read a congratulatory remark on 
behalf of the Governor-General Ugaki Kazushige. In order to commemorate their 
accomplishments, the Mission also published on that year, The History of the Presbyterian 
Mission in Korea, in which the history of the Korean Presbyterian Church was subsumed  
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and narrated as a product of missionary efforts over a half century.
594  The narrative style 
itself was certainly an expression of missionary rule over the Korean Church, but the 
missionaries did not actually need such a subtle way of expressing their position vis-à-vis 
the Korean Church. In the last section of the History, the missionary-editor, Henry Rhodes 
(NP), asked himself how many more years the Mission should stay in Korea, given the 
remarkable growth of the Korean Church after fifty years of the Mission. His answer was 
simple and bold:   
 
The Mission believes that missionaries will be needed for some time, 
perhaps for another fifty years, depending upon future development.
595   
 
 
 
Reviewing the history of the Protestant Churches from the late nineteenth century through 
the March First Movement in 1919, it is concluded here that the Korean Church had limited 
autonomy from the foreign missionary presence. While it is true that Korean Christian 
converts and churches grew in number and spread over the country during this period, this 
does not mean that they were organized under an independent Korean Church free to 
exercise socio-political influence over society. This study has revealed that, despite its 
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steady numerical growth, the Korean Church was subjugated to missionary power and 
restricted their participation in popular impetuses toward modern education and 
anti-colonial activism, both of which were considered unimportant and harmful by the 
Missions.   
  It goes without saying that those opposed to such missionary surveillance had no 
choice but to leave the Church. Those who wanted to sustain their Christian identity did not 
become apostates, but were alienated from the Church and their affiliation with the Church 
was either lost or remained nominal at best. And when such dissenters attempted to 
infiltrate the Church and mobilize people for their social or political aims, they were 
checked and ousted by Church authority, and lost their influence in the Church. As a result, 
Korean Christians were largely divided into two camps, the apolitical majority of loyal 
followers of the Mission on the one hand and the politicized minority of rebellious 
dissenters on the other. This division was also exacerbated by the lingering influence of 
traditional status distinctions in Korean society. The oppressed and undereducated classes 
desired the protection of the Church from the persecuting government and thus acquiesced 
in the foreign rule over the Church, while the traditional yangban elites tended to challenge 
foreign authority and replace foreign leadership with that of their own.    
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  Moreover, the division of the Korean Church was widened further by Japanese 
colonial policy and especially through the gradual dissemination of public education. 
Although the purpose of Japanese colonial education was to make loyal Japanese subjects 
out of Koreans, it provided a new channel through which Korean Christians gained access 
to modern knowledge with which they could challenge the intellectual authority of the 
Mission and subvert its rule over the Korean Church. The Japanese education system, 
despite its existence as a vehicle of colonial domination, did provide an alternative source 
to knowledge that the Missions had refused to provide for Koreans in their attempts to keep 
them subservient to their intellectual and ecclesiastical authority. In other words, Japanese 
colonialism brought with it an opportunity for Korean Christian independence from the 
Mission, even as it deprived them of the opportunity for Korean national independence.   
  Up to the present time, scholars have consistently emphasized that anti-Japanese 
nationalism was a core value of the Korean Christian movement from its inception. 
However, our examination shows that there was a strong anti-missionary current within the 
Korean Church throughout its history that significantly affected its course of development. 
The tension between Korean leaders and missionaries existed prior to Japanese colonial 
rule and continued to grow even after colonization. Their disdain for missionary control  
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was so great that they constantly looked for liberation from it and at times took advantage 
of Japanese colonialism to bring greater ecclesiastical autonomy to Koreans.   
As shown in this study, the dynamic and complicated process of Christian 
development in Korea suggests that we need to revise the conventional perspective that 
views Korean Christian history within a nationalist framework. This perspective sees the 
Korean Church and Japanese colonialism as constantly pitted against each other, while the 
presence of the Mission remained completely overshadowed behind the struggle of Korean 
Christian nationalists and Japanese colonialists. If we take a closer look at the nature of the 
Mission and its domination over Korean autonomy, it is more reasonable to view it as a 
form of colonialism, what we may refer to as “religious colonialism.” With this notion, we 
can better understand the complicated and diverse historical paths that Korean Christians 
chose to follow. The history of Christianity in Korea was not a single national history but a 
history of multiple groups of Christians, who shared the unique experience of being placed 
under and torn apart by two kinds of different colonialisms: the religious colonialism of the 
western missionaries and the socio-political colonialism of the Japanese empire. 
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